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Currently our natural environment is threatened by climate change, habitat 
fragmentation, and other transboundary issues. To address these problems, it is thought 
that conservation organizations and land management agencies should attempt to manage 
at larger geographic scales and across political boundaries. The Crown Managers 
Partnership (CMP) and the Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere Cooperative 
(SAMAB) are two such organizations that work at an ecoregional scale to support 
collaboration among agencies, aboriginal groups, conservationists, scientists, and other 
stakeholders for the conservation and restoration of the Northern Rocky Mountain and 
the Southern Appalachian regions in North America. Over the past decades, SAMAB and 
CMP have contributed to their long-term goal of connectivity throughout the landscape 
and have created inspiring visions for ecoregional conservation planning and 
management by sharing and communicating sound scientific information and strategizing 
and implementing conservation action among diverse partners from the local to 
international scale.  Although landscapes are considered the suitable scale for 
conservation endeavors, developing a successful collaborative landscape-scale 
organization that can accomplish meaningful and sustained activities appears difficult. 
An in-depth analysis of SAMAB and CMP can help other landscape-scale organizations 
begin to understand the influence of both internal and external processes and factors that 
can impede or produce challenges to these types of organizations during different stages 
over the life of an organization. The presentation will present the case study findings 
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from nearly sixty interviews, secondary documents, and observations and specifically 
provide guidance regarding how SAMAB and CMP are evolving over time and provide 
strategies for maintaining the vitality of the organization and the roles they can play in 
future transboundary management of their respective regions. In addition, the in-depth 
analysis can provide broader lessons for other emerging landscape organizations or 
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Many ecosystems are challenged by threats including climate change, air 
pollution, and invasive species that transcend political and institutional jurisdictions and 
extend beyond traditional protected area boundaries  (Lidskog & Elander, 2010; Soule & 
Terborgh, 1999). Because of these challenges, many land management and conservation 
organizations recognize the need to conduct activities at larger spatial and longer 
temporal scales that can more effectively support viable populations and ecological 
processes (Dobson et al., 1999; Groves et al., 2002; Simberloff et al., 1999). However, 
managing at the landscape scale requires individual institutions and organizations to 
operate across traditional jurisdictional boundaries and therefore partner and collaborate 
with other organizations if coordinated and effective action is going to occur. 
One mechanism for addressing issues that transcend traditional jurisdictional 
boundaries include the formation of landscape-scale collaborative conservation 
organizations (LSCCOs) that undertake land management planning and actions at the 
landscape scale. LSCCO’s are unique in several ways. First, LSCCOs operate at the 
landscape scale, often extending across state and country borders, and transcend 
traditional institutional, political, and jurisdictional boundaries. Second, LSCCOs operate 
as umbrella organizations that are made up of representatives from multiple organizations 
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and agencies. Third, participation in LSCCOs is voluntary which can make it difficult to 
hold members and their respective organizations accountable for any tasks or actions.  
Lastly, LSCCOs are designed to be collaborative in nature by bringing together diverse 
groups; however each member group has their own distinct mission, goals, and operating 
procedures. Therefore, representatives’ jobs and their respective agency’s missions may 
align more or less with the LSCCOs mission than other representatives and agencies.  
Despite the popularity of LSCCOs, there have been limited studies focused on 
LSCCOs and how they evolve over time, the different stages of their life cycle, and the 
types of events and factors that contribute to success in these life cycle stages.  
Organizational and management theories do provide some insight; however LSCCOs 
possess unique attributes that set them apart from other types of organizations.  The lack 
of research in this field leaves a lot of unanswered questions such as: What are the critical 
events that contribute to the life cycle of LSCCOs? What are the factors and conditions 
necessary to support effective collaboration action at this scale? To explore these 
questions, we conducted an organizational life cycle analysis of two longstanding 
LSCCOs in North America: 1) Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere 
Cooperative (SAMAB) and 2) Crown Managers Partnership (CMP).  
Types of LSCCOs 
While LSSCOs encompass unique characteristics, different types of LSCCOs 
exist depending on their membership, focus, scale, and network association (see Table 
1.1). First, LSCCOs’ membership may vary from mainly government agencies to private 
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landowners to NGOs. Membership may be dominated by one type of group, such as 
federal agencies, while others may have a very diverse membership. Second, LSCCOs’ 
goals and mission may differ. One end of the spectrum often focuses on the general 
management of the area in question. Examples include organizations that employ 
ecosystem management or integrated coastal management, such as the Heart of the 
Rockies Initiative. At the other end of the spectrum are organizations that focus on one 
issue or species, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Joint Ventures Program. In 
addition, there are some LSCCOs that focus on identifying and protecting land, such as 
collaborative land trust organizations, and others focus on management of an area. Third, 
although LSCCOs operate within landscapes and transcend boundaries, there can be 
variations in scale. For example, some LSCCOs may be organized around watersheds, 
such as the Salmon Falls Watershed Initiative. Meanwhile other LSCCOs extend beyond 
international boundaries such as Two Countries, One Forest. Lastly, LSCCOs may be 
associated with a broader network of other LSCCOs, such as the Landscape Conservation 
Cooperatives, or operate as a stand-alone entity.  
Table 1.1 Different characteristics contributing to variations in LSCCOs.  
Membership:  
the individuals or 




Mission focus:  
the level of 
specificity in the 
LSCCO’s 
mission/goals 
Boundary scale:  
the types of political 




networks of similar 
LSCCOs  
 
 Agencies  
 Political figures 
 Private landowners 
 NGOs 
 
 Preservation vs. 
management 
 Only focus on a 
specific issue 
 
 City, county, 
district, etc. 
Generally within 
a single state or 
 
 Originated as a 
stand-alone entity 
 Originated as part 
of a broader 
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 Universities and/or species 





 Multiple states or 
provinces 
 Multiple countries 
network  
 
Opportunities and Challenges of LSCCOs 
These LSCCOs attempt to bring together different agencies and groups within a 
landscape to work together towards common conservation and natural resource 
management goals. This purpose brings a number of challenges. For example, there can 
be legal issues pertaining to political boundaries and differing managerial approaches by 
the varying agencies (Kittinger, Dowling, Purves, Milne, & Olsson, 2011). Additional 
challenges include differences in members’ perspective (Berkes, 2004), 
language/discourse (Cash et al., 2006), and  commitment to the range of issues (Cash et 
al., 2006; Margerum, 2008). Neuman (2005) also found disjointed processes due to 
multiple authoritative roles, lack of institutional managerial structure, and difficulty in 
evaluating success. These examples present general obstacles; however it is hypothesized 
that there are specific factors that can influence success of LSCCOs during specific 
stages of an organization’s life cycle. 
Organizational Life Cycles 
The organizational life cycle model operates under the assumption that 
organizations follow a predictable pattern and transition through different stages from 
birth through growth and maturation and possibly decline and revival (Miller & Friesen, 
1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). According to this theory, each stage of an organization’s 
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life cycle is associated with unique characteristics, challenges, and opportunities that 
distinguish it from the other stages (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). Organizations can 
differ in focus, structure, relations, resources, leadership, power, and commitment during 
the different life cycle stages. For example, members may focus on getting to know each 
other and building trust and relationships in the earlier organizational stages versus 
having strong personal and professional relationships in the organization’s maturity stage.    
Life cycle analysis has been applied to different types of organizations, such as 
corporations and non-profit organizations, and in a variety of fields including education, 
business, natural resource management, and online communities (Cameron & Whetten, 
1981; Dodge, Fullerton, & Robbins, 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & 
McLaughlin, 2001; Kimberly & Miles, 1980; Lester, Pamell, & Carraher, 2003; Miller & 
Friesen, 1984; Moores & Yuen, 2001; Pinto & Prescott, 1988; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; 
Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2010; Smith & Miner, 1983).  
In the literature there are numerous life cycle frameworks and models with 
diverse names for the stages. For example, the conception stage has also been referred to 
as the birth, courtship, first, entrepreneurial, and first stage. Based on our review of the 
organizational stages in the literature, we utilized the following names for the five life 
cycle stages in this study following Miller & Friesen (1984): 1) Birth Stage, 2) Growth 
Stage, 3) Maturity Stage, 4) Decline Stage, and/or 5) Revival Stage.  An example of the 
organizational life cycle stages are displayed in Figure 1.1 and a description of these 
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organizational stages are described in Table 1.2 compiled from a review of the 
organizational life cycle literature. 
 
Figure 1.1 Example of stages in an organizational life cycle.  
Table 1.2 Summary of characteristics of different organizational life cycle stages 
compiled from the organizational life cycle literature.  
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Need for Current Study 
There is recognition that conservation organizations and agencies need to manage 
at larger spatial scales to address transboundary issues threatening our natural 
environment. Though numerous LSCCOs have been established over the past decade, 
there has been limited research on larger scale collaborative efforts for natural resource 
management (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005). Therefore, we are limited in our knowledge of 
how an LSCCO transforms over its lifetime and the factors that influence the LSCCO’s 
success during the different stages.  While organizational and life cycle theories do 
provide some insight, LSCCOs have many unique attributes that may distinguish their 
opportunities and challenges them from other organizations. Therefore, there is a need to 
refine these theories to apply to LSCCOs (Mcguire, 2006). Through a comparative case 
study analysis, this dissertation addresses these challenges and gaps in the literature by 
exploring the life cycles of two longstanding LSCCOs and the factors influencing success 





This dissertation is intended to address the research gaps regarding a LSCCO’s life 
cycle and the influential internal and external factors during the various stages (i.e. birth, 
growth, maturity, decline, revival). Two types of LSCCOs, the Southern Appalachian 
Man and the Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB) and the Crown Managers Partnership 
(CMP), were compared in an effort to discover overlap and patterns despite differences in 
order to learn more about life cycles and influential factors for LSCCOs. In this study, we 
investigated the following research questions:  
 What is the pattern of life cycle change for SAMAB and CMP? 
 What internal and external factors support or inhibit the success of SAMAB and 
CMP during their different life cycle stages?  
This research can provide guidance regarding how these organizations are evolving 
over time and offer strategies for maintaining the vitality of the organizations and the 
roles they can play in future transboundary management of the Northern Rockies and 
Southern Appalachian regions. In addition, this in-depth analysis of SAMAB and CMP 
can provide broader lessons for other emerging or mature LSCCOs that are attempting to 





Case Studies  
A comparative case study approach (see Yin, 2009) of two longstanding LSCCOs 
was used to address the research questions. We selected the Southern Appalachian Man 
and the Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB) and the Crown Managers Partnership (CMP) 
as case studies because they both operated at a transboundary scale, focused on natural 
resource management and conservation, were comprised of multiple federal and state 
agencies, and were long standing organizations that have been in existence for more than 
10 years (see Table 1.3 for more details). 
Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB) 
Great Smoky Mountain National Park was established as a biosphere reserve in 
1976. SAMAB was established as an organization in 1988 to facilitate communication 
and coordination of efforts of federal and state agencies within the Southern Appalachian 
region. The organization’s membership included mainly federal agencies and state 
agencies that extended to six states in the southeastern United States: Alabama, Georgia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. This temperate region boasts 
high biodiversity and encompasses 37.4 million acres, seven national forests, and two 
national parks (Tonn, English, Turner, & Hemrick, 2006). For over two decades, 
SAMAB has served as a forum in the Southern Appalachians for agency collaboration on 
a variety of issues including air quality, invasive species management, an annual forum, 




Figure 1.2 Map of SAMAB region. (Source: U.S. Man and the Biosphere Program) 
 
Crown Managers Partnership (CMP) 
In 1932, an international peace park was established between Montana’s Glacier 
National Park and Alberta’s Waterton National Park. The peace park designation was the 
initial transboundary effort within the region, referred to as the “Crown of the Continent” 
ecosystem. Embedded within the larger Yellowstone to Yukon ecosystem (Y2Y), the 
Crown covers over 28,000 square miles of the northern Rocky Mountain region and 
includes parts of Montana, Alberta, and British Columbia.  In 2001, agencies within the 
“Crown” coordinated a meeting in Cranbrook, British Columbia to address current and 
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emerging transboundary issues. Soon after this initial meeting, the Crown Managers 
Partnership (CMP) was officially formed an organizational entity comprised of mainly 
federal, state, and provincial agencies. For over a decade, CMP has served as a forum for 
interagency collaboration and has initiated numerous projects such as aquatic invasive 
species management, grizzly bear management, and an ecological monitoring program 
focused on a variety of indicators.  
 
Figure 1.3 Map of CMP region. (Source: Crown Managers Partnership)
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Table 1.3 Summary of similarities between SAMAB and CMP as comparative case 
studies. 
Characteristic SAMAB CMP 
Transboundary 
area 
• Encompassing Southern Appalachian 
region and extends to six states: 
Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia  
 
 
• Encompassing the shared Rocky 
Mountain region of Montana, British 
Columbia and Alberta, this ecological 
complex spreads across two nations; 
one state and two provinces; 28,000 






• Conserve and sustain the use of natural 
ecosystems of the region and their 
genetic resources  
• Integrate conservation of natural 
resources with regional land uses  
• Demonstrate methodologies for sharing 
information and improving management 
skills  
• Foster public understanding of issues 
through education 
 
• Addressing cumulative effects of 
human activities across the ecosystem 
• Addressing increased public interest in 
how lands are managed and how 
decisions are reached 
• Addressing increases recreational 
demands and increased visitation 
• Collaborate in sharing data, 
standardizing assessment, and 
monitoring methodologies 
• Addressing the maintenance and 
sustainability of shared wildlife 
populations 
Membership • Federal and state agencies, universities • Federal, provincial, and state agencies, 
universities 




There were multiple phases of data collection and analysis to explore the life 
cycles of LSCCOs and the factors influencing success within the different stages. First, 
multiple forms of data were collected for this comparative case study: secondary data and 
semi-structured interviews. Second, timelines were created for each organization’s 
history to identify significant changes, events, and accomplishments. Third, the data was 
triangulated and coded for factors and assigned to a timeline period. Fourth, life cycle 
stages were assigned to the timeline periods based on criteria from a review of the 
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organizational life cycle literature. Fifth, each life cycle stage was examined for 
similarities and differences between the two case studies resulting in the emergence of 
critical factors that influenced success for each organizational life cycle stage.  
Data Collection 
Three forms of data collection (secondary data, semi-structured interviews, 
observations) were used based on recommendations by Yin (2009) and Patton (2002). 
First, secondary data in the form of letters, meeting minutes, administrative documents 
and reports, articles, etc. were collected from SAMAB and CMP.  We obtained these 
documents from organizational leaders and individual members. We also conducted a 
literature review to identify peer reviewed and publicly available documents. 
To complement the information found in the secondary data, we conducted 57 
semi-structured interviews with past and present organizational members following 
recommendations by Seidman (2006).  Using the secondary data documents, a 
spreadsheet was created listing every SAMAB participant since its creation and provided 
documentation of each year the individual was involved in the organization. Key 
informants, individuals who were involved throughout the organization’s history or for 
long periods of time, were contacted first for interviews. Emails were sent to all past and 
present members explaining the focus of the research study and extending an invitation 
for participation in an interview in-person or over the phone.  
The interviewees’ duration of organizational involvement ranged from less than a 
year to over twenty years and they represented different federal, state, and provincial 
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agencies and universities. To ensure temporal representation, we interviewed at least two 
members for every year of each organization’s history. The spatial distribution of the 
interviews within the respective landscapes is shown in Table 1.4. The reason for fewer 
interviews with CMP members is that SAMAB has been around nearly twice as long as 
CMP and has had more changes in representatives. The reason for fewer interviews with 
members from Georgia and British Columbia is that both areas represent a smaller part of 
SAMAB and CMP’s region respectively, therefore have less representation overall in the 
organization. An example, but not comprehensive list of the interviewees’ affiliations is 
shown in Table 1.5. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. To ensure accuracy and 
reliability, interviewees reviewed the transcription.   
Table 1.4 Spatial distribution of SAMAB and CMP interviewees.  
CMP Total SAMAB Total 
Montana 7 Tennessee 22 
Alberta 7 North Carolina 15 
British Columbia 2 Georgia 4 
Total (N = 57) 16  41 
 
 
Table 1.5 Examples of interviewees’ affiliations. 
Interviewee Affiliations (non-comprehensive) 
 U.S. National Park Service 
 U.S. National Forest Service 
 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
 U.S. Dept. of Agriculture 
 Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
 Tennessee Valley Authority 
 University of Montana 
 University of Tennessee 
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 Miistakis Institute for the Rockies 
 Cradle of Forestry 
 NC and GA Dept. of Environment and 
Natural Resources 
 BC Forest, Lands, and Natural Resource 
Operations 
 Alberta Fish and Wildlife 
 Alberta Tourism and Parks 
 
 
Finally, we used observations to advance the researcher’s understanding of the 
organization and member interactions in real time and context (Lee, 1999).  Observations 
took place during the organizations’ face-to-face meetings and individual interviews and 
were limited to the most recent state of the organization. Bailey's (2007) guidelines for 
observations were used to organize and document field notes which included 
observations of physical surroundings and participants, and analytic reflections on field 
notes (see Table 1.6).  
Table 1.6 Summary of Bailey (2007) guidelines for observations and field notes. 
Observations of Physical Surroundings Size, location, lighting, sounds, objects 
Observations of Participants Physical characteristics, behaviors, body 
language, verbal behaviors, speech patterns 
Field Notes During and Post Observation Detailed descriptions, analytic ideas and 




We assigned life cycle stages based on concurrent research conducted by 
Thomsen, et. al. (see Chapter 2). We then examined and coded all data collected 
pertaining to the conception and developmental stages to identify factors and 
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characteristics that were using a qualitative data analysis program (MaxQDA). The 
identification of patterns and themes represented the factors that influenced success 
during the LSCCOs’ life cycle stages (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Case studies were then 
compared and contrasted to identify broad similarities and differences to generate overall 
themes from both cases (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Strengths and Limitations of Data Collection 
There are some limitations to the data collection methods. First, the use of 
historical documents can be limited by the amount of access to documents the 
organization grants to the researchers, the loss of documents records over time, and the 
misinterpretation of historical documents by the researcher. Second, the interviews were 
limited by the potential lack of consistency between members’ memories or 
interpretations of past events, avoidance of difficult or unpleasant topics, and difficulty 
contacting past members. Third, a limitation to the retrospective study is the inability for 
the researchers to make observations during the earlier organizational stages.   
Despite the limitations of these methods, the strengths of collecting data from 
multiple sources increases the validity of the study and minimizing discrepancies in the 
researcher’s interpretation of data (Patton, 2002). Methods triangulation was used by 
checking the consistency among different data collection methods (documents, 
interviews, observations). Triangulation of sources will be used by exploring the 
consistency between different sources within the same method. For example, the 
researcher looking for consistencies across interviews with multiple individuals. 
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Inconsistencies during triangulation analysis allowed the research to delve deeper into the 
data and explore new perspectives of the findings (Patton, 2002).  
 
Structure of the Document 
 
The remainder of the dissertation is comprised of six chapters followed by 
appendices and references. Each chapter except for Chapter 6 includes the following 
sections: introduction, literature review, data collection and analysis, results, discussion, 
and conclusions. Chapter 2 addresses the following research question: What events and 
changes contribute to SAMAB and CMP’s life cycles?  Chapters 3-5 address the 
following research question: What internal and external factors support or inhibit the 
success of SAMAB and CMP during different life cycle stages? Chapter 3 focuses on the 
birth and growth stages, Chapter 4 focuses on the maturity stage, and Chapter 5 focuses 
on the decline and revival stages.  Chapter 6 is a synthesis the key findings of the 





THE INFLUENCE OF CHANGE ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE 




Landscape-scale collaborative conservation organizations (LSCCO) have 
emerged in response to threats, such as climate change, that pose challenges across 
traditional political and jurisdictional boundaries. LSCCOs have unique characteristics 
that may set them apart from other types of organizations, yet little is known about how 
LSCCOs evolve over time and the different stages of their life cycle. To address this gap, 
an organizational life cycle analysis was conducted on two longstanding LSCCOs: the 
Crown Managers Partnership (CMP) and the Southern Appalachian Man and the 
Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB). These types of LSSCCOs have worked at the 
landscape scale over the past few decades to support collaboration among agencies and 
other stakeholders for the conservation and restoration of the Northern Rocky Mountains 
and the Southern Appalachians in North America. Understanding the dynamic history of 
these organizations can offer insight into the challenges LSCCOs face during different 
stages and what types of events may trigger shifts in organizational activities. This 
research applied life cycle theory and synthesized 57 interviews, secondary documents, 
and observations to identify and describe life cycle models for SAMAB and CMP. The 
findings provide insight into the most influential types of events during each stage of the 
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organization’s life cycle and offer strategies for how LSCCOs and other organizations 




Species, natural processes, and ecosystems face threats including climate change, 
air pollution, habitat fragmentation, and invasive species (Soule & Terborgh, 1999). 
Many of these threats transcend political and institutional jurisdictions and extend beyond 
traditional protected areas’ boundaries (Lidskog and Elander 2010). Because of these 
challenges, land management and conservation organizations now focus on larger 
geographic landscapes and on strategies that can encompass diverse land uses, 
ownerships, and jurisdictions to more effectively support viable populations and 
ecological processes (Dobson et al., 1999; Groves et al., 2002; Simberloff et al., 1999).  
One mechanism for addressing transboundary issues includes the formation of 
landscape scale collaborative conservation organizations (LSCCOs) that undertake land 
management planning and actions at the landscape scale. Despite the large amount of 
resources put towards LSCCO efforts and their growing popularity, little is known about 
how LSCCOs evolve over time and if these organizations are faced with unique 
challenges and changes that influence their long-term success. This paper seeks to fill this 
gap by applying organizational life cycle theory to identify the critical events and 




Unique Attributes of LSCCOs 
LSCCOs are unique in several ways. First, LSCCOs operate at the landscape 
scale, extending across state and country borders and transcending traditional 
institutional, political, and jurisdictional boundaries. Second, LSCCOs function as an 
organization of organizations. For example, each organization selects at least one 
individual to represent their respective organization or agency in an LSCCO. Third, 
membership/participation in LSCCOs is voluntary, which can make it difficult for 
accountability and enforcement of tasks or actions from representatives and their 
respective organizations. Fourth, LSCCOs are designed to be collaborative in nature by 
bringing together diverse groups; however, each group has their own distinct mission, 
goals, and operating procedures, which may or may not complement the goals, mission, 
and operating procedures of an LSCCO. These as well as other characteristics of 
LSCCOs suggest that they are not only a relatively new type of organization but that they 
have many unique features. However, what is not known is if these LSCCOs follow a 
traditional life cycle and if there are pivotal events that drive the evolution of these 
unique types of organizations. To address these challenges and gaps in the literature, this 
paper seeks to identify if LSCCOs follow a similar life cycle pattern to other 
organizations and explore the types of events and changes that may mark different stages 





Types of LSCCOs 
While LSSCOs encompass unique characteristics, different types of LSCCOs 
exist depending on their membership, focus, scale, and network association (see Table 
2.1). First, LSCCOs’ membership may vary from mainly government agencies to private 
landowners to NGOs. Membership may be dominated by one type of group, such as 
federal agencies, while others may have a very diverse membership. Second, LSCCOs’ 
goals and mission may differ. One end of the spectrum often focuses on the general 
management of the area in question. Examples include organizations that employ 
ecosystem management or integrated coastal management, such as the Heart of the 
Rockies Initiative. At the other end of the spectrum are organizations that focus on one 
issue or species, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Joint Ventures Program. In 
addition, there are some LSCCOs that focus on identifying and protecting land, such as 
collaborative land trust organizations, and others focus on management of an area. Third, 
although LSCCOs operate within landscapes and transcend boundaries, there can be 
variations in scale. For example, some LSCCOs may be organized around watersheds, 
such as the Salmon Falls Watershed Initiative. Meanwhile other LSCCOs extend beyond 
international boundaries such as Two Countries, One Forest. Lastly, LSCCOs may be 
associated with a broader network of other LSCCOs, such as the Landscape Conservation 




Table 2.1 Different characteristics contributing to variations in LSCCOs.  
Membership:  
the individuals or 




Mission focus:  
the level of 
specificity in the 
LSCCO’s 
mission/goals 
Boundary scale:  
the types of political 




networks of similar 
LSCCOs  
 
 Agencies  
 Political figures 




 Preservation vs. 
management 
 Only focus on a 
specific issue 
and/or species 





 City, county, 
district, etc. 
Generally within 
a single state or 
province 
 Multiple states or 
provinces 
 Multiple countries 
 
 Originated as a 
stand-alone entity 
 Originated as part 
of a broader 
network  
 
Organizational Life Cycles  
The organizational life cycle model operates under the assumption that 
organizations follow a predictable pattern and transition through different stages from 
birth through growth and maturity and possibly decline and revival (Miller & Friesen, 
1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). According to this theory, each stage of an organization’s 
life cycle is associated with unique characteristics, challenges, and opportunities that 
distinguish it from the other stages (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). Organizations can 
differ in focus, structure, relations, resources, leadership, power, and commitment during 
the different life cycle stages. For example, members may focus on getting to know each 
other and building trust and relationships in the earlier organizational stages versus 
having strong personal and professional relationships in the organization’s mature stage.    
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Life cycles have been applied to different types of organizations, such as 
corporations and non-profit organizations, and in a variety of fields including education, 
business, natural resource management, and online communities (Cameron & Whetten, 
1981; Dodge et al., 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; 
Kimberly & Miles, 1980; Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Moores & Yuen, 
2001; Pinto & Prescott, 1988; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Sirmon et al., 2010; Smith & 
Miner, 1983). Despite the vast amount of organizational life cycle research, the majority 
of the studies focus on businesses and corporations. Further, there has not yet been an 
attempt to study the life cycle of LSCCOs that have distinct characteristics setting them 
apart from these other types of organizations.  
In the literature there are numerous life cycle frameworks and models with 
diverse names for the stages. For example, the conception stage has also been referred to 
as the birth, courtship, first, entrepreneurial, and first stage. Based on our review of the 
organizational stages in the literature, we utilized the following names for the five life 
cycle stages in this study following Miller & Friesen (1984): 1) Birth Stage, 2) Growth 
Stage, 3) Maturity Stage, 4) Decline Stage, and/or 5) Revival Stage. The following 
sections provide a brief description of each stage highlighting the important and 
necessary events that have been emphasized in the literature as critical for the 
organization to evolve and transition to its next organizational life cycle stage.  
Birth Stage 
Whether formed from a bottom-up or top-down approach, organizations tend to 
share similar characteristics in their birth stage as the group becomes an established body 
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(Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Lester et al., 2003; Miller & 
Friesen, 1984). An initial part of becoming established is dedicating ample time to 
defining the organization’s unique purpose and niche (Dodge et al., 1994; Iriberri & 
Leroy, 2009; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). Once the organization 
defines its niche, there is an effort to develop a clear plan with goals and objectives 
(Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Pinto & Prescott, 1988). To 
achieve many of these benchmarks in the birth stage, there is a strong dependence on 
leadership from a few individuals who often are the organization’s founders (Lester et al., 
2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Santora & Sarros, 2008). These 
leaders help identify and secure resources for the organization to become established and 
grow (Dodge et al., 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Miller 
& Friesen, 1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Sirmon et al., 2010; Van de Ven, 1980).  
Growth Stage 
After the organization has established a mission and goals, it shifts to a stage of 
growth and high activity around a specific project or initiative (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 
2001; Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984).  The rapid development in this stage 
requires an enthusiastic leader who can obtain resources, promote the organization, and 
communicate with government, the public, and members’ respective organizations  
(Miller & Friesen, 1984; Pinto & Prescott, 1988; Santora & Sarros, 2008).  As a result, 
there is often an adequate and consistent supply of resources to support activity (Jawahar 
& McLaughlin, 2001; Pinto & Prescott, 1988). The demonstrable benefits in the growth 
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stage attracts membership and the organization continues to expand (Iriberri & Leroy, 
2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001).   
Maturity Stage 
After periods of growth and development, an organization focuses on maintaining 
its level of activity and maximizing efficiency (Dodge et al., 1994; Jawahar & 
McLaughlin, 2001; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Moores & Yuen, 2001; Quinn & Cameron, 
1983; Sirmon et al., 2010). By the maturity stage, members have formed strong personal 
relations from relationship and trust building in earlier stages (Adizes, 1979; Lodahl & 
Mitchell, 1980). Consequently, members can efficiently work together and often form 
subgroups with individual leaders (Gray, 1989; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Margerum, 2011; 
Miller & Friesen, 1984; Schein, 2004). Often during this stage, the original leadership 
retires or no longer remains involved with the group (Lester et al., 2003; Miller & 
Friesen, 1984).  As the organization continues to mature, its anticipation and responses to 
change will influence the likelihood of it transitioning to the decline stage.  
Decline Stage 
The decline stage has limited resources to support the organization and its efforts 
(Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Levine, 1978; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Moores & Yuen, 
2001; Santora & Sarros, 2008). Consequently, there is a lack of activity and poor 
organizational performance (Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 
1984; Moores & Yuen, 2001; Santora & Sarros, 2008). The declining state of the 
organization contributes to weakened relationships among members and increased 
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conflict (Carr, Selin, & Schuett, 1998; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Whetten, 1980a). 
Therefore, this stage is associated with decreased participation and the organization 
struggles to retain membership (Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Santora & Sarros, 2008). With 
decreased participation and activity, the organization’s purpose and legitimacy gradually 
dissipates (Dodge et al., 1994; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Levine, 1978). Eventually, 
the combination of all these challenges increases the organization’s vulnerability to 
competing groups  (Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984).  Without actively 
addressing the obstacles in the decline stage, the organization will continually deteriorate 
or disband.  
Revival Stage 
Organizations are not necessarily doomed when enduring periods of stagnation or 
decline. An organization may revive itself and become more productive and successful 
(Hurst, 1995). Unlike the decline stage, there is a strong support for innovation and risk-
taking in an organization’s revival (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Miller & Friesen, 
1980). However, successful changes are often dependent on a change in leadership to an 
individual who can override organizational constraints, reduce members’ anxieties to 
change, and guide the future direction of the group (Schein, 2004). As the organization 
tries to target new markets and broaden their mission (Lester et al., 2003; Miller & 
Friesen, 1984), external consultants are often used to facilitate the planning and 
brainstorming process (Schein, 2004; Whetten, 1980). Despite the importance of this 
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stage, we know very little about the transition from an organization’s decline to its 
revival (Schein, 2004). 
Developing a Life Cycle 
Though there have been a variety of researchers investigating different aspects of 
the organizational life cycle, this study focuses on the identification of internal and 
external changes or events that are influential to the different stages. Miller & Friesen’s 
(1984) seminal research on the corporate life cycle provided the basis for many 
subsequent life cycle studies and is a highly cited paper on the subject. Because of their 
method’s utility, Miller & Friesen’s (1984) study serves as the foundation for our study’s 
methodology. This section provides a brief description of their methods and the 
associated strengths and limitations.  
Miller & Friesen’s (1984) research explored the life cycles of corporations that 
were at least over twenty years old. The researchers reviewed historical secondary 
documents from each corporation and the information was verified with questionnaires 
sent to the top executive at each organization. Each corporation’s history was then 
divided into periods based on the eight types of change and events established from  
Miller & Friesen's (1980) study (see Table 2.4). The researchers were looking for 
significant changes in environment, organization structure, strategy-making, or leadership 
and aimed to identify the types of specific and influential events throughout the 
organization’s history (Miller & Friesen, 1984). Two raters assigned scores on pre-
determined organizational variables before or after any significant changes. These 
variables addressed organizational context, decision-making styles, structure, and 
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strategy. The periods were then assigned to one of the five stages in the organizational 
life cycle from criteria identified in the literature.  
There are strengths to using Miller & Friesen’s methods including their ability to 
examine a range of organizations with a systematic process for determining the historical 
periods, scoring the variables, and assigning the life cycle stages.  In addition, the 
immense amount of organizational literature on corporations offered a sound and 
scientific source to establishing the pre-determined variables.  
As with any methodology, there are limitations and weaknesses. Some of the 
limitations Miller & Friesen identified include the time-lapse from the start of these 
corporations, only studying large well-known firms, and the potential for inaccuracies in 
the historical documents or the researchers misinterpreting the documents (Miller & 
Friesen, 1984). We identified additional limitations to their methods. First, data collection 
was largely dependent on historical documents.  Though the researchers verified the 
historical events through a questionnaire with the current top executive, this individual 
may not have the historical knowledge and can also be biased towards the executive’s 
perspective. Additionally, the reliance on quantitative scoring left minimal opportunity to 
explore each variable in depth.   
The strengths and limitations of Miller & Friesen’s (1984) study influenced the 
design of our current research exploring the types of critical events and changes that 
distinguish a LSCCO’s life cycle stages. Although there has been a vast amount of 
research on organizational life cycles, we know little about how LSCCOs evolve over 
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time, the different stages of their life cycle, and the types of changes and events that 
contribute to these life cycle stages.  To address these challenges and gaps in the 
literature, this paper seeks to identify 1) whether organizational life cycle analysis can be 
applied to LSCCOs and 2) how do LSCCOs’ responses to changes influence the life 





Two LSCCOs were selected as case studies (see Yin, 2009): 1) Southern 
Appalachian Man and the Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB) and 2) Crown Managers 
Partnership (CMP) based on their similarities of criteria outlined in Table 2.2.  
Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB) 
Great Smoky Mountains National Park was established as a biosphere reserve in 
1976. SAMAB was established as an organization in 1988 to facilitate communication 
and coordination of efforts of federal and state agencies within the Southern Appalachian 
region. The organization’s membership included mainly federal agencies and state 
agencies that extended to six states in the southeastern United States: Alabama, Georgia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. This temperate region boasts 
high biodiversity and encompasses 37.4 million acres, seven national forests, and two 
national parks (Tonn et al., 2006). For over two decades, SAMAB has served as a forum 
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in the Southern Appalachians for agency collaboration on a variety of issues including air 
quality, invasive species management, an annual forum, and a large scale assessment of 
the landscape.  
Crown Managers Partnership (CMP) 
In 1932, an international peace park was established between Montana’s Glacier 
National Park and Alberta’s Waterton National Park. The peace park designation was the 
initial transboundary effort within the region, referred to as the “Crown of the Continent” 
ecosystem. Embedded within the larger Yellowstone to Yukon ecosystem (Y2Y), the 
Crown covers over 28,000 square miles of the northern Rocky Mountain region and 
includes parts of Montana, Alberta, and British Columbia.  In 2001, agencies within the 
“Crown” coordinated a meeting in Cranbrook, British Columbia to address current and 
emerging transboundary issues. Soon after this initial meeting, the Crown Managers 
Partnership (CMP) was officially formed an organizational entity comprised of mainly 
federal, state, and provincial agencies. For over a decade, CMP has served as a forum for 
interagency collaboration and has initiated numerous projects such as aquatic invasive 
species management, grizzly bear management, and an ecological monitoring program 





Table 2.2 Summary of similarities between SAMAB and CMP as comparative case 
studies. 
Characteristic SAMAB CMP 
Transboundary 
area 
• Encompassing Southern Appalachian 
region and extends to six states: 
Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia  
 
 
• Encompassing the shared Rocky 
Mountain region of Montana, British 
Columbia and Alberta, this ecological 
complex spreads across two nations; 
one state and two provinces; 28,000 
square mile  
Focus  • Conserve and sustain the use of natural 
ecosystems of the region and their 
genetic resources  
• Integrate conservation of natural 
resources with regional land uses  
• Demonstrate methodologies for sharing 
information and improving management 
skills  
• Foster public understanding of issues 
through education 
 
• Addressing cumulative effects of 
human activities across the ecosystem 
• Addressing increased public interest in 
how lands are managed and how 
decisions are reached 
• Addressing increases recreational 
demands and increased visitation 
• Collaborate in sharing data, 
standardizing assessment, and 
monitoring methodologies 
• Addressing the maintenance and 
sustainability of shared wildlife 
populations 
Membership • Federal and state agencies, universities • Federal, provincial, and state agencies, 
universities 





To explore the changes and events that influence the life cycles of LSCCOs, there 
were multiple phases of data collection and analysis. First, three forms of data were 
collected for this comparative case study: secondary data, semi-structured interviews, and 
observations. Second, the data was triangulated and coded for influential changes and 
factors. Third, timelines were created for each organization’s history identifying 
significant changes, events, and accomplishments. Fourth, life cycle stages were assigned 
to the timeline periods based on criteria from a review of the organizational life cycle 
literature. Fifth, each life cycle stage was examined for similarities and differences 
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between the two case studies resulting in the emergence of influential changes in an 
LSCCO’s organizational life cycle.  
When designing the methods for our current study of two in-depth case studies, 
we adapted the methods from Miller & Friesen (1984) who studied a larger sample of 
corporations.  To address some of the limitations from Miller & Friesen’s study, we 
incorporated methods from two other studies (Glick et al., 1990; Pettigrew, 1979) that 
explored organizational changes over time. First, we triangulated multiple sources of data 
to strengthen our validity. Second, we interviewed members who were involved 
throughout the history of the organization and not just top managers, which eliminated 
potential bias and added to the validity of our results by using multiple sources (Glick et 
al. 1990). A detailed account of this study’s methodology is described in the following 
section, and an abbreviated list of the methods is presented in Table 2.3 and compared 
with Miller & Friesen (1984), Glick et.al. (1990), and Pettigrew (1979).  
Table 2.3 Comparison of methods from previous studies that guided the methodology of 
this research study.  
Miller & Friesen’s 
(1984)  Methods 






 Compiled histories of 
from a variety of 
documents 
 
 Verified through 
questionnaires with top 
executives 
 
 Split histories into 
periods using 8 types of 
change model 
 
 Pre-identified variables 
 Conducted four 
interviews spaced 
sixth months apart 
with top manager of 
each organization 
 
 Executives were asked 
to describe different 
changes that occurred 
during that period 
based off the 
examples of design 
and non-design 
 Conducted two sets of 
interviews and 
questionnaires to 
members after a major 
structural change  
  
 Conducted a 
retrospective analysis 
through interviews of 
a variety of past and 
present participants 
 
 Interview data 
 Conducted literature 






 Collected historical 
documents from 
each organization  
 
 Conducted 
interviews with past 
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from a review of the life 
cycle literature  
 
 Raters scored variables 
before and after 
significant changes  
 
 Assigned the periods to 
one of the five life cycle 
stages based on criteria 
identified in the life 
cycle literature  
 
changes provided  
 
 Attributes of change 
were defined a priori 
and others were 
applied post hoc 
 
 They were able to 
develop a 24-month 
retrospective event 
history based on 
interviews. 
 
 Collected additional 







and archival material   
 
 Identified influential 
changes throughout 







 Created a timeline 
distinguished by 
influential changes  
 
and present 




 Made observations 
of organizations 
during their present 
state 
 
 Triangulated all data 
and coded for types 
of changes 
 




 Assigned life cycle 





The three forms of data collection (secondary data, semi-structured interviews, 
and observations) were used based on recommendations by Yin (2009) and Patton 
(2002). First, secondary data documents in the form of letters, meeting minutes, 
administrative documents and reports, articles, etc. were collected from SAMAB and 
CMP.  These documents came from organizational leaders, individual members, and 
available public documents. 
To complement the information found in the secondary data, a total of 57 semi-
structures (SAMAB = 41, CMP = 16) interviews were conducted with a representative 
sample of past and present organizational members following Seidman's (2006) methods.  
The interviewees’ level of organizational involvement ranged from less than a year to 
over twenty years and they represented different federal, state, and provincial agencies 
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and universities. To ensure temporal representation, each year of the organization’s 
history was captured by interviews with at least two members involved during that time. 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed. To ensure accuracy and reliability, 
interviewees invited to review the transcription.   
Finally, we used observations following Bailey (2007) to advance the researcher’s 
understanding of the organization and member interactions in real time and context (Lee, 
1999).  Observations took place during the organizations’ face-to-face and phone 
meetings and individual interviews. I attended CMP’s multi-day retreat and three of 
SAMAB’s meetings although observations were limited to the most recent state of the 
organization.  
Triangulation and Coding 
A qualitative data analysis program (MaxQDA) was used to triangulate the 
secondary data, interviews, and observations. The data was coded for factors and 
subfactors following the techniques of Lee (1999). To code the influential changes and 
events, the frameworks of Miller & Friesen (1980) and Glick et al. (1990) were adapted 
to identify significant changes. See Table 2.4 for the previous frameworks for identifying 





Table 2.4 Criteria for identifying changes and events from Miller & Friesen (1980) and 
Glick et al. (1990) and the adapted framework for the current study.  
Miller & Friesen (1980)  Glick et al. (1990) Thomsen et al. 2014 
Replacement of a top executive  Important changes in the 
responsibility or resources of top 
management team members 
 
Type I: Replacement of 
president, facilitator, or an 
influential member displaying 
strong leadership 
Introduction of a new product-
market strategy (entering a new 
market, geographical expansion, 
new product introduction) 
Important changes in the 
organization's internally-directed 
goals, philosophy, or culture  
 
Important changes in the way 
that you produce your product or 
service 
Type II: A new vision or 
direction for the group’s efforts, 
expansion of goals, objectives, 
and actions; integrating or 
targeting a new issue or group of 
issues 
Decision to build a major new 
facility or to adopt a significantly 
different production technology 
Important changes in 
responsibility or resources at the 
other levels in the organization 
Type III: Change in the 
members’ respective agency or 
group 
A major change in distribution, 
promotion, or pricing strategies 
and techniques 
Important changes in the 
organization's externally-
directed strategy  
 
Important changes in the way 
that your organization interacts 
with its customers, clients, or 
parent organization 
Type IV: A change in external 
imaging and communication 
strategies  
Modification of organizational 
structure and distribution of 
authority 
Important additions or 
eliminations of a major 
organizational unit 
Type V: Modification of 
organizational structure and 
distribution of power and 
authority 
A change in the external 
environment caused by 
competitor strategies, technology 
obsolescence, economic booms or 
recessions, etc.  
Important changes in the 
organization's external 
environment (e.g., changes in 
competitors, regulators, or 
suppliers) 
 
Type VI: External political, 
social, environmental, and 
economic changes or influences 
(i.e. changes in legislation and 
political support, social and 
economic patterns) 
Acquisitions, mergers, or the 
creation of new departments 
Important changes in specific 
personnel or in staffing levels 
(e.g., additions, deletions, 
transfers, reassignments)  
Type VII: Additions or 
deletions of members, 
organizations, committees, 
subgroups, partnerships  
A change in administrative 
practices pertaining to control and 
information systems and planning 
methods 
Important changes in 
administrative procedures  
 
 Important changes in internal 
coordination or communication 
procedures 
Type VIII: A change in internal 
procedures, information capacity 
and management, and planning 
and implementation strategies 
 Important changes in the 
performance of either the whole 
or part of an organization  





Timeline Formation and Life Cycle Stage Designation 
Following data collection and coding, timelines were created for each year of the 
organizations’ history. Within each organization’s timeline, periods were created using 
the adapted framework to identify significant changes, events, or accomplishments. To 
increase the reliability and validity of the timeline, individual members who were most 
active throughout the organization’s history were selected to review the timelines. 
Detailed life cycles for SAMAB and CMP were created from the timelines 
designating the distinct stages for each organization based on criteria identified in the 
review of the organizational life cycle literature similar to Miller & Friesen (1984). The 
following five stages and their characteristics were used as a general guide to assigning 
life cycle stages for each organization: 1) Birth Stage, 2) Growth Stage, 3) Maturity 
Stage, 4) Decline Stage, and/or 5) Revival Stage.  
Comparing Cases 
Case studies were then examined for broad similarities and differences 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Patterns and themes emerged from comparing the two cases to each 




Life cycles were created for SAMAB and CMP identifying the changes and 
events during each stage. In the figures for each life cycle stage, the symbols next to each 
event represent the type of change following the adapted framework described in the 
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methods section. Many more changes and events were identified and coded for each life 
cycle stage. However, only the events that were emphasized in the organization’s 
documents, member interviews, and observations as very influential were included in the 
results.  
SAMAB’s Birth Stage 
There were many events that led to SAMAB’s formation. In 1970, UNESCO 
developed the Man and the Biosphere (MAB) program to coordinate the efforts of an 
international network of biosphere reserves. The U.S. MAB program became active in 
the mid-1970s and Great Smoky Mountains National Park (GRSM) was one of the first 
U.S. biosphere reserve units established in 1976. As the U.S. MAB program became 
more active, GRSM was selected as a MAB pilot project and hosted a conference on 
biosphere reserve management in 1984. In the following years, there was a push for 
expansion of the U.S. MAB program and an interagency report was presented to 
Congress to gain support. The U.S. MAB program was awarded funding for planning 
efforts and the Southern Appalachian landscape was perceived as ideal for an initial 
attempt to improve transboundary coordination. Subsequently, this led to the signing of 
an interagency agreement and the establishment of SAMAB in 1988.  
With this formalized signing, one member stated that “when SAMAB got started it 
came in with a lot of support federally.” The organization was designed for agencies to 
come together and “talk about ways to pool resources to address some of these problems 
beyond the traditional agency to agency approach.” SAMAB fulfilled a unique niche as 
“there was no other means for the federal agencies to come to the same table” and 
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“agencies hadn’t been working together…even considering things like the landscape 
approach was innovative for that time.”  
Much of the U.S. MAB and SAMAB’s creation can be attributed to a few 
individuals. One person served as the U.S. MAB president along with a distinguished 
career with the National Park Service and George Wright Society. He was called “the 
gears of this thing, the motor.” Another member described him as “the guy that really 
made the push and saw the need… he was so determined and persistent.” Soon after this 
individual helped get the U.S. MAB and SAMAB formed, an executive director was 
hired (ED1) “who helped get SAMAB started and get recognized and functioning.” 
Members described ED1 as “a good politician and was able to get around to try get 
different organizations and agencies to support the program.” 
ED1’s networking and fundraising skills helped SAMAB to promote its image, 
gain support, and obtain resources. During this stage, there was a major focus on 
promoting its image and purpose through a variety of communication strategies to reach 
agencies, the public, and political groups. For example, SAMAB created a public 
involvement committee to “sell” the SAMAB concept and there were briefings with 
regional directors and political figures in Washington D.C. In addition, the executive 
director and other SAMAB representatives would give presentations and speeches about 
SAMAB’s mission to groups such as the Greater Yellowstone Commission. There was 
also strong communication and coordination between SAMAB and the international 
MAB program as described by a member: “At an international level you would have the 
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man of the biosphere meetings where SAMAB and its equivalents from other parts of the 
world would come together.” 
As a result of the large push in communication, SAMAB recruited members and 
became more established as a group with a defined mission statement that fulfilled a 
unique role of a forum for interagency collaboration. SAMAB was one of the first 
attempts at landscape-scale ecosystem management and was recognized for its innovation 
through nomination for a partnership award and by UNESCO as exemplifying the 
biosphere reserve concept. The growing excitement for SAMAB and the U.S. MAB 
program led to more biosphere reserve units in the region including Grandfather 






Figure 2.1 Timeline of SAMAB’s birth stage with significant changes and events.  
 
 
SAMAB’s Growth Stage 
 
As SAMAB transitioned to its growth stage, the organization narrowed their focus 
and developed a plan of action. During this period, SAMAB primarily focused on the 
Southern Appalachian Assessment (SAA) and the Southern Appalachian Mountain 
Initiative (SAMI). SAMI was started as an offshoot project from a SAMAB forum and 
resulted in a ten-year effort addressing air quality issues in the Southern Appalachians. 
The SAA served as the leading project for SAMAB and was driven by the U.S. Forest 
Service’s need to assess the health of the forests in the region. SAMAB offered an 
opportunity to expand the health assessment beyond forests to include lands managed 
under other jurisdictions resulting in a more scientifically sound and representative 
assessment that could benefit all the agencies. To effectively implement the SAA, 
SAMAB experienced a lot of organizational growth and membership expansion. 
Described as the “action years” and “coming of age” for the organization, the SAA 
became the focal point for several years that contributed to SAMAB members building 
relationships with each other and forming a shared identity with the organization: 
“That is when there was the maximum amount of engagement because it was all 
driven in part by the Southern Appalachian assessment that was done.  It was 
truly an integrated program and people that were running all of these programs 
and all of these agencies were very, very involved.” 
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As one of the first attempts to conduct a landscape-scale assessment, SAMAB 
was again perceived as a leader in ecosystem management. In the years to follow, 
SAMAB was nominated for the Environmental Sustainability Award, featured in 
UNESCO’s MAB brochure, and selected as one of the ecosystems evaluated by the 
White House Ecosystem Task Force. Additionally, “SAMAB was recognized as a model 
program both by the President’s Council for Environmental Quality and also by 
UNESCO and that attracted a lot of people to the area.” With all this prestige, SAMAB 
promoted its positive image through the creation of newsletter and development of a 
communication plan. In tandem with SAMAB’s successful growth, the U.S. MAB 
program had a renewed energy with approval of a new strategic plan and the 20
th
 
anniversary celebration for some of the biosphere reserve units including Great Smoky 
Mountains National Park.  
At “the peak” of its career and described as the “glory days of SAMAB,” there 
was strong commitment and “a lot of ownership in some of the SAMAB projects” by 
members and their respective agencies. Meetings were “jam-packed” and people “were 
highly energized during this time frame” and “directing a huge amount of their time to 
this every day.”  
Through the completion of the SAA, SAMAB had retained ED1 who was 
described as “an economist” and someone who knew “how to get grants and how to 
administer programs.” ED1’s “dynamic, energetic” personality made him “good at 
talking to people, getting partners, non-traditional partners involved in the 
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organization.” Soon after the SAA’s completion, ED1 announced his retirement. As the 
search for a new executive director began, SAMAB began another transition into the 











Figure 2.2 Timeline of SAMAB’s growth stage with significant changes and events. 
 
 
SAMAB’s Maturity Stage  
As SAMAB completed the SAA and was “entering a bold new era,” a new 
action plan was needed with a focus on disseminating and synthesizing the SAA data. At 
about this same time, a transition team was created to search for a new executive director 
(ED2). Members expressed the significance of this leadership change as “when [ED1] 
retired, that changed the direction again.  I think he was the face for a long time.” 
Members indicated that ED2 held a very different set of skills and was focused on 
different goals than ED1. Members described him as “more of a scientist,” “an 
intellectual leader,” and skilled with a “technical background.” After the completion of 
the SAA, the database had become “static.” Hiring ED2 helped SAMAB address some 
of the data issues: 
“He had a big focus on sort of the technology. How do we try to take this product 
that we created, the Southern Appalachian Assessment, how do we put that on the 
internet? How do we get this information out? How do we do a regular update? 
How do we get beyond just the sort of the piece of data to actually doing things 
with the data?”  
Translating the SAA data into a usable form was a main goal for ED2 throughout his time 
as executive director: 
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“He was actually very information focused and never let die the dream that the 
Southern Appalachian Assessment could be updated or could be maintained…So I 
think that awareness and that doggedness about information using data, turning 
data to information and facilitating activities to support the use of information for 
all kinds of decisions by all kinds of folks in the region was probably one of the 
biggest assets that he brought to the position.”  
SAMAB continued to be recognized for their completion of the SAA and was 
awarded the prestigious Hammer Award. The early 2000s also marked the completion of 
SAMI’s ten-year air quality initiative and SAMAB shifted focus to invasive species 
management through the Save Our Hemlock action team and continuing the Sustainable 
Community Initiative.  
Though there was much advancement for SAMAB, there were challenges as 
SAMAB matured. Over the course of several years, the SAA database transitioned to 
different data management systems, SARIS and then SAIN, which was no longer 
managed by SAMAB. Some stated “it never really did take off because the amount of 
money to bring up a system and maintain it was more than SAMAB could generate.” 
There was a lot of frustration that the SAA “did not transfer into affecting policy 
decisions or program decisions at the field level” never resulted into a usable form or 
product as described by some members: 
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“Because while we had produced a really nice report, and had a lot of good 
information in it, I am not sure how that information was ever really used and 
how it was converted into tangible products” 
Though there were other projects during SAMAB’s maturity stage, there was a 
continuous search for another “SAA” project that was relevant to all participating 
agencies: 
“I think we had an identity crisis. We weren’t clear where we were going or what 
we were there for and how we were going to get there. I think we had to, we 
needed another major project. Then we could have all gotten behind it. I never 
really felt that that solidified.” 
Some members thought that SAMAB was still caught up in its glory days of the SAA. 
For example, “…it was a rising star that has slowly faded over time. Its initial assessment 
of the Appalachian was its crown and all it did from then on was just polish the crown.” 
Though SAMAB remained relatively stable for most of the mature stage, the group 
struggled to find its direction resulting in a change in the energy among members: 
“It seemed like at the beginning there’s a lot of excitement and everybody wants 
to be involved. You know, maybe money is being thrown around. But the longer it 
lasts the excitement drops and people move on to new things. Whereas in the 
beginning everyone wants to be involved, but at the end people are being told to 
be involved.”  
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Towards the end of the maturity stage, SAMAB lost participation of some critical 
agency partners and some individual representatives. One member described the loss of 
agency partners as “…the XXX dropped out as a partner because they didn’t see the 
value at it…the XXX interest diminished…it was dropping completely off the radar while 
I was there.” For individual members, some started to become “overburdened” while 
others retired, changed jobs, or delegated SAMAB involvement to others. The impact of 
this turnover was emphasized by members as “some groups are only as good as a few of 
their strongest wheels.” When some of these “keystone species that are holding it 
together” left the group as representatives, there was a significant loss for SAMAB.  
There were additional leadership challenges including the risk-averse nature of 
many of the agency representatives. For example, a member stated that there were efforts 
“to push for things that were outside the comfort zone of the agencies and got pushed 
back very quickly…we were not to consider ourselves flag carrying leaders trying to do 
new things.” Though leadership still valued involvement with the international MAB 
network, there was a waning support by many of the members. For example:  
“We saw a great deal to learn from them and we had a lot of them coming to visit 
us to learn. And so that seemed to us to be a logical and worthwhile connection 
and that’s something that drove the agencies nuts.” 
The U.S. MAB program faced opposition in the maturity stage when the U.S.’s 
relations with the United Nations changed. As a result, some groups vocalized their 
skepticism of the United Nations taking control over land property rights as one member 
described the situation: 
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“…there was the black helicopters…but it was that whole thing, you know, not in 
my back yard, don’t mess with my land, you guys this is a UN conspiracy to take 
over the Southern Appalachians. So that kind of was coming out and that was 
more from the MAB program…So a lot of that was being driven down into the 
local SAMAB organization…” 
Though agencies perceived these allegations to be inaccurate and irrational, these groups 
gained support at the national level with their persistent attempts to disband the U.S. 
MAB program and pass the Land Sovereignty Act.  These changes in the external 
environment began to directly affect SAMAB when Tennessee, one of the major 
representative states to SAMAB, considered a resolution to abolish biosphere reserves in 
their state senate. In addition, there was resistance from Georgia’s Republican Governor. 
The growing political opposition for SAMAB and MAB was reflected by many 
members: 
“You have powerful members of Congress that go along with it and they did to 
the extent that they first tried to pass what was called the American Land 
Sovereignty Protection Act and that passed the House.” 
In response, the executive director of the U.S. MAB program addressed the 
fallacies of these accusations through responses in the member newsletter.  One of the 
founders of the U.S. MAB program took a more direct response by meeting with the 
individual who was considered to be the driving force behind the UN opposition to try 
and clarify the mission and efforts of the U.S. MAB program. Despite these efforts, the 
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change in relations between the U.S. and the United Nations and the vocal opposition to 
U.S. MAB programs resulted in a tainted image for SAMAB. Though funding and 
support for the U.S. MAB program had been tight, there was a proposal to renew the 
program in 2003 after the U.S. returned to their involvement with UNESCO. As a result, 
the Biosphere Reserve Association was established to try and revive energy in the 
national program. SAMAB continued to be challenged by internal and external changes 
as it matured. Unfortunately, the organization’s reluctance to acknowledge and actively 






Figure 2.3 Timeline of SAMAB’s maturity stage with significant changes and events.  
 
 
SAMAB’ Decline Stage  
While the decline stage is identified as part of the organizational life cycle, 
whether an organization ever experiences this stage is largely dependent on the 
organization’s responses to challenges and changes. Unfortunately for SAMAB, its 
inability to react and overcome obstacles in its maturity stage transitioned to 
organizational decline. Many changes occurring within agencies were impacting 
SAMAB. For example, agencies were experiencing structural reorganizations, 
downsizing of jobs, new directors and leadership, severe budget cuts and travel 
restrictions. Since SAMAB was largely funded by agencies, the organization’s capacity 
to function and actively work on projects was greatly reduced. SAMAB’s budget 
continued to decline until the executive director position could no longer be supported. 
This change in structure heavily impacted the organization and was described as “a 
significant loss” and that “the cooperative can’t work without staff and the executive 
director...” One member identified this change as the catalyst for SAMAB’s decline: 
“The wind comes out of an organization when all of a sudden you don’t have 
administration anymore and you have fluid leadership. All those kind of pillars 




SAMAB’s strong dependence on the executive director’s leadership resulted in 
the workload being transferred to the voluntary chair position and the rest of SAMAB’s 
members. However, members described their limited time for SAMAB as they were 
already being overworked with their job responsibilities:  
“I think it was incredibly diminished…if you are already doing a 60 hour week to 
do a 40 hour job and then SAMAB is not in the 60 hours, then you have to find the 
4 extra hours a week to do SAMAB. That is really tough.” 
The loss of the executive director’s role as a salesman and public face for SAMAB was 
also identified as a significant change: 
“I think it hurt the organization because they lost the higher-level drive…the 
ability to pick up the phone and call the regional director in the agency, or 
somebody in Washington, or a Congressman…and I think that probably hurt the 
organization.” 
As SAMAB continued in the decline stage without the executive director position, many 
members identified a lack of leadership: 
“I think there’s a real leadership gap in the organization right now…When you 
have a chair that is looking for reasons to stall things instead of reasons to push 
forward, you are not going to have an organization that’s going to hold my 
attention very long.” 
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In addition to the changes occurring within the agencies and within SAMAB’s 
leadership, the U.S. MAB program was still struggling to regain momentum. In 2004, it 
developed a new vision with action steps at the local, national, and international levels. 
However, the initial skepticism towards the MAB program that began in the mature stage 
heightened to a critical point in the degenerative stage. The negative publicity eventually 
led to the disbandment of the U.S. MAB program. In response, SAMAB began to 
distance itself from the MAB program despite its strong connection in the earlier stages. 
Members cited “direct challenges to participating federal members about their 
participation in SAMAB.” The association with the MAB program instilled fear in some 
agencies that they would lose support and resources:  
“This was all in response to the private property rights people getting to 
Congress and Congress saying they were going to shut down government agency 
budgets if they kept supporting SAMAB.” 
As the original SAMAB members were replaced by new representatives, many 
new members were unaware of SAMAB’s history with the MAB program: 
“As the representatives from the various cooperative member agencies changed, 
their experience with SAMAB was different in what they were looking to get from 
SAMAB. Budgets changed, all sorts of things changed, so that after a while there 
were not a whole lot of people who remembered the MAB background.” 
55 
 
There was very little effort to orient new members to SAMAB and its history. It was 
recognized by members that SAMAB “should have figured out how to perhaps better 
engage new people as they came on board” to support smoother transitions. For example: 
“There’s a lot of catching up to do when you join an organization, and that’s 
okay. But I didn’t feel like there was any attempt by anybody to really educate any 
of the new people about what SAMAB is and what it’s done in the past…” 
During the decline stage, SAMAB experienced a major change in its 
administrative structure when the University of Tennessee (UT) did not renew its contract 
as the financial and administrative support for SAMAB. UT felt that SAMAB no longer 
aligned with their goals and as a result, SAMAB had to search for another managing 
entity and signed a contract in 2009 with the Cradle of Forestry (COF), a small non-profit 
in Asheville. Described as a “tough, transitional year,” some members identified this as 
one of the most influential changes: 
“I think honestly if I had to pin it on two things that are most damaging to 
SAMAB, it would be UT’s decision to not to be the host of the group anymore and 
also the funding and resource depletion of the organization.” 
UT’s historical knowledge of SAMAB from their long-time involvement was identified 
as a significant loss when transitioning to the COF: 
“So there was kind of a bump transitioning to the Cradle which had no 
institutional knowledge or history with the organization…The harm was we lost 
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the institutional knowledge that came with the UT folks. Cradle can’t help that, 
that’s just the function of the situation.” 
Many members recognized the COF as a fine organization, but it lacked alignment with 
SAMAB as “they have never provided the staff resources at the level of expertise an 
organization of this level needs.” The COF’s decision to work with SAMAB was 
described as: 
“The Cradle has done their best but they sort of have taken on an unwanted child 
of another family. And they are doing their best to be the parent of it, but it’s just 
not what the Cradle does.” 
Soon after the transition to the COF, two more significant changes occurred in 
SAMAB’s external environment. First, more groups had emerged since SAMAB’s 
conception creating a more competitive environment for limited resources and 
membership: 
 “SAMAB has been overrun by other groups and organizations doing more and 
better of the same kind of things and SAMAB has not kept up with what they 
started.” 
For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service established the national network of 
Landscape Conservation Cooperatives (LCCs) in 2010 that were attempting to fill a 
similar niche as SAMAB. As SAMAB continued its decline, the LCCs were gaining the 
support, resources, and recognition that SAMAB once had in its earlier stages. Agencies’ 
limited resources and manpower meant they often had to choose which organization to 
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support. Sequestration marked another influential change in SAMAB’s external 
environment as members stated “their travel budgets are frozen.” The impact of 
sequestration on SAMAB was described as: 
“I think it was at a time when budgets were dwindling, and that’s when it became 
less of a priority for agencies to contribute to or be involved in. You always hear 
the expression ‘Do more with less,’ but there’s a breaking point there and you 
have to do less with less.” 
These types of external changes had an influence on the internal changes within SAMAB 
as one member expressed:  
 “I think the balance between external and internal influences is I think almost 
always weighted towards external influences. Sometimes they might show up as 
internal influences but only to the extent that external influences are like policy 
directives, organizational culture of the entities that are participating, political 
changes that reinstitute different leadership levels at the federal agencies, every 
election for every state.” 
During the decline stage, the annual forum was SAMAB’s last major activity. When 
sequestration occurred, the forum was delayed and then eventually cancelled which 




“…some people were frustrated that it couldn’t happen because it is kind of an 
important accomplishment that the group tries to pull off a yearly conference. But 
then people recognized that we did not have the resources together to pull off 
what we were trying to do and there wasn’t enough commitment from the 
members to be able to pull it off.”  
SAMAB members started to seriously consider the decision of whether to disband the 






Figure 2.4 Timeline of SAMAB’s decline stage with significant changes and events.  
 
 
SAMAB’s Revival Stage 
SAMAB members described entering the revival stage as being “at the bottom of 
the curve… the dawn is hopefully beyond the storm but it's hard to see it quite yet. We are 
right smack at the bottom.” Members were asking: “Do we need to sunset? Are we done? 
Do we still stick around?” To help the group address these important questions, SAMAB 
hired an external facilitator to guide a one-day retreat with past and current members in 
hopes that SAMAB would “get a theme and define a scope of work.” As a result of the 
retreat’s discussion, the group revisited the original mission and started to adapt a new set 
of goals and vision for SAMAB’s future to regain relevancy, but also a sustainable model 
for organizational survival.  For example: 
“There is a draft of a new vision statement and that we need to commit to a 
particular niche.  There is a need to do 2 things: 1) continue a history of 
relevancy and a useful purpose and 2) turn relevancy into a funding model for the 
future of the organization.” 
Another outcome of the retreat was the formation of a revitalization team that 
included a select group of SAMAB members to drive the effort. One of the team’s initial 
tasks was to define the different membership levels of SAMAB and reengage agencies 
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and biosphere reserve units. To revitalize the organization, some members felt that 
SAMAB needed: 
“a complete change of leadership or membership of the group. And maybe like a 
younger contingent. Ones that really have no former involvement…maybe 
younger people who are more on the ground involved, not in sort of more 
administration of people.” 
One of the most recent changes in SAMAB’s revival stage was the transition to a 
new chair. Many pointed to a need for leadership “that builds enthusiasm and energy” 
and is “motivational and visionary.” The new chair has a long history with SAMAB and 
therefore has the historical knowledge but also recognizes the obstacles that need to be 
overcome.  As one of his initial efforts to revive SAMAB, the chair and some other 
SAMAB members have been in communication with the Appalachian LCC on joining 
forces to work on a vitality index or another project.  
In tandem with SAMAB’s revitalization, there were efforts to reengage the U.S. 
MAB program with the international network of biosphere reserves. One member stated: 
“…we think we have a way to reinvigorate these programs and bring them back 
into it. Because there is a very huge amount of interest internationally for the U.S. 
to get back into the biosphere reserve program and be very active.” 
UNESCO requires a review of the biosphere reserve units every ten years to maintain 
their status. In an effort to revive the U.S.’s involvement, the same individual who was 
the catalyst for the U.S. MAB program years ago initiated a review of all biosphere 
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reserve units in the U.S. with the support of the National Park Service. Unfortunately, 
many of the managers were unresponsive to the call for reviews or submitted inadequate 
or incomplete reviews. However, there was substantial support from other units that still 
valued the importance of their biosphere reserve status.  Though some members 
recognized the challenges of reengaging SAMAB with the U.S. MAB program: 
“I really think there are some problems right now, but hopefully we can rejoin the 
program at the international level and get through this period. We will be able to 
revitalize the Southern Appalachians, which you know would be a huge loss to the 
region if that was left behind because once you lose a cooperative framework, it's 
hard to reestablish. It can be done, but you know a lot of people put a lot of effort 
into this and I think it would be unfortunate if we lost that mechanism.” 
The final critical change that is still in the process of being implemented has been 
a revision to SAMAB’s website and communication plan. Members recognized the need 
to reconnect with diverse audiences and promote its new image to gain the support 
needed for SAMAB’s revival: 
“To me one of the best things an agency can do is make sure the public knows 
what they are doing. And number two: Why is it valuable.” 
SAMAB has only recently transitioned into a revival stage and will be continually 
challenged by change. Without active and effective responses, SAMAB may revert back 





Figure 2.5 Timeline of SAMAB’s revival stage with significant changes and events.  
 
 
CMP’s Birth Stage 
 
In 1932, an international peace park was created between Canada’s Waterton 
Provincial Park and the U.S.’s Glacier National Park. After UNESCO started the MAB 
program in the 1970s, both parks were recognized as biosphere reserves. However, there 
was limited cooperation between agencies and other groups operating within the broader 
Crown of the Continent region until about 2001. At this time, a gathering was organized 
in British Columbia (BC) to engage managers in discussions of how to most effectively 
address transboundary issues in the Crown of the Continent ecosystem. Many members 
identified a few key individuals whose vision and energy inspired the original meeting 
and “a great deal of credit needs to go to them for making this happen.” These 
individuals “weren’t thinking about a Crown Managers concept necessarily, it was just 
bringing agencies together from Montana, Alberta and BC.” The meeting addressed 
some critical questions: 
“Can governments do anything other than just react? And is there a possibility 
for expanding this idea of cooperation across boundaries and large landscapes 
beyond sort of a Peace Park core to consider broader landscapes? We felt there 
were enough issues out there in terms of effects and recreational demands and all 
the rest of it, that there were obviously common issues.”  
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The success and support generated from this initial meeting led to the formation 
of the Crown Managers Partnership to coordinate the efforts of federal, state, and 
provincial agencies within the Crown. At CMP’s conception, the Miistakis Institute of the 
Rockies was hired to support the CMP through managing the organization’s finances and 
database financial in addition to planning meetings and the annual forum. As an applied 
research institute, Miistakis could provide a range of support and was a good fit with the 
CMP as it had “a focus on the Crown of the Continent landscape the same as the Crown 
Managers.” 
Despite support for the CMP, the organization faced a major challenge soon after 
its conception. BC underwent a major reorganization of its government that marked the 
beginning of an ongoing struggle to maintain BC’s involvement in the partnership: 
“One of the big challenges we faced was participation from one of the provinces. 
So BC had a change in government and going along with the change of 
government might mean a change in ministries and a change in people and a 
change in focus and that led to BC really abandoning the Crown.” 
One member recalled going to a CMP meeting during this time where “two of the offices 
that were coming from the provincial government in BC…over half of their office had 
been terminated.” This major political change in the CMP’s external environment had a 
major impact on the organization’s membership, as BC was the third major component of 
the partnership. Despite the radical changes occurring in BC, the CMP continued its 
efforts to become an established body by recruiting members and developing a work 
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plan. In order to recruit membership and secure resources, the CMP spent a lot of energy 
on communication and image promotion through the development of a webpage and a 
communications committee that devised strategies to engage senior managers, political 





Figure 2.6 Timeline of CMP’s birth stage with significant changes and events.  
 
 
CMP’s Growth Stage 
 
To expand and promote the CMP from its birth stage, the group revisited its 
communication strategy in the growth stage. Many members identified the importance 
"to define ourselves before someone else defines us" and to form “an identity that helps 
to create a profile within the agencies.” In response, the CMP began to “sell” the CMP 
concept and sought funding support. In addition, the CMP launched their website in 2004 
and started development of a logo to promote their image and efforts.  
During this stage, membership continued to expand and diversify as University of 
Montana and the Flathead Basin Commission joined the CMP.  As a proactive strategy, 
the organization would revisit its membership to fill gaps and “look around the table at 
regular intervals and take a chance to see if we are missing an entity that we would 
really like to have engaged in our conversation.”  
Despite the growth in membership, there was concern about individuals retiring 
and turnover of steering committee members in the near future. In another proactive 
response, the CMP implemented planning to groom new members and ease transitions. 
For example:  
“We talked about secession planning…there is not necessarily obvious 
replacements for them and I think those are significant issues that the Crown 
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Managers faces and there is potential for those huge gaps for loss of 
participation…there needs to be multiple people from the same agencies 
participating recognizing that when people change you want to have that 
continuity.” 
While the initial act of coming together in the conception stage was perceived as a 
success, members recognized that “the process cannot be the product.” The CMP 
revisited their original goals and revised the strategic plan with a detailed outline of 
action steps and benchmarks to achieve their goals. As a result, the CMP started to 
generate energy as it finalized the vision for the Ecological Health Project (EHP). This 
“large flagship program” formed a long-term strategic direction for the organization’s 
future to link environmental performance indicators with a regional analysis. The CMP 
was “breaking new ground here with this project” and in preparation for the EHP, a 
meta-portal for data and a committee to define priorities was established. Members felt 
that the EHP provided the CMP with “a clear focus as a partnership” and that there was 
“a well thought-out framework and mission within that Ecological Health Project that's 
going to sustain them for many many years.”  
The large amount of activity occurring in the growth stage led to the CMP 
establishing a steering committee chair position to handle internal group tasks to keep the 
group organized and accountable. Unlike a typical leadership role where the chair directs 
the agenda, the CMP chair’s job was “to glue all of the pieces together ahead of our 
meetings and formulate an agenda that makes sense and to really run us through our 








Figure 2.7 Timeline of CMP’s growth stage with significant changes and events.  
 
 
CMP’s Maturity Stage 
 
As CMP transitioned into its maturity stage, the organization had “evolved from 
information sharing to developing actual things on the ground” with the EHP as the 
CMP’s “primary building block.” One member described the transformation of the CMP 
up to this point: 
“[CMP] evolved through a series of initiatives to the point of which the 
partnership has matured. A dozen or so years later, it is moving forward in a fully 
integrated way with an Ecological Health Project that is focused upon all aspects 
of environmental health and looking at transboundary outcomes that we can 
agree to, for the entire Crown, that all of the areas, jurisdictions, can pursue 
knowing that we have complementarity amongst other jurisdictions, and our 
borders and we share the outcomes that we want to achieve.”  
The EHP guided CMP’s focus while also providing a long-term plan. Referring to the 
EHP, a member stated “we’re going to set benchmarks, and develop protocols for long-
term management that would require a long-term commitment and long- term buy-
in…And I think the ecological health project will help get us there.” 
During the EHP’s progress, The CMP elected to move meeting planning and 
financial management from the Miistakis Institute of the Rockies to an individual serving 
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as part-time Secretariat. This transition may have been a result of greater distancing 
between the CMP and Miistakis’ missions: 
“We are a research institute and so I think over time we just realized that what 
the Crown Managers needed with respect to support didn't align that great with 
what our research priorities are even though you know we really support what the 
Crown Managers is doing. I think we just found our skill sets better served 
engaging in other ways with the CMP.” 
Though it was more economical for the CMP to transition from the Miistakis Institute to 
an individual secretary, there was recognition of losing Miistakis’ high capacity to 
manage data: 
“Miistakis is able to afford not just a secretariat role but like hosting and data 
storage…I think that those are kinds of things that any collaborative needs to be 
thinking about if they want to be able to afford the things for their partners…” 
Along with the new secretary, there was a transition in the CMP chair position as 
the original chair was “looking to pass the torch.” Since the chair served more of a 
facilitative versus leadership role, the transition did not cause major changes. For 
example, “the chair or the leader really takes their cue from the stampede so I don’t 
really think there was much change” as a member reflected on the shift to a new chair. 
During the maturity stage, CMP members focused on sustaining the vitality of the 
group and wanted to “explore better fits with agencies and new members.” For example, 
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the CMP updated their communication plan to reengage BC and search for opportunities 
to involve First Nations and Tribes as well senior agency management.  
By this time, most of the original CMP members had been replaced by new 
representatives. The group recognized that “organizational commitment to the 
partnership helps when steering committee members are retiring or leaving.”  Within the 
CMP steering committee, there was a “core group within the core group…there are just 
a few individuals that are the work horse for the whole group. You know without those 3 
or 4 people the whole CMP could risk falling apart.” This did create some uncertainty 
about CMP’s future as a member stated “partnerships last as long as the people who set 
them up last. And that scared the bejesus out of me.”   
During CMP’s growth stage, the organization started training and grooming new 
representatives. In the maturity stage, the chair and other members implemented steps to 
ease the transition for these new members. One member described his positive experience 
when joining the CMP:
“[The chair] made an appointment with me and we probably spent a couple of 
hours and we just met one on one and she gave me some of the materials and 
introduction to what their mission was and who the members were and gave me 
some good advice on what my expectations was in the steering committee so that 
was really an excellent introduction.” 
In addition to internal changes, there were changes occurring in CMP’s external 
environment. The emergence of other organizations in the Crown created some 
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opportunities for cooperation, but also competition for the CMP. One member described 
the situation as: 
“There would certainly be potential to get wrapped up in what everybody else is 
doing and being competitive, but we made a strategic decision not to take that 
route while at the same time looking for ways to add value to what everybody else 
is doing, to find ways to be more strategic. It's all about the economics of 
efficiency in the landscape and determining who does what best and how we work 
together to actually get some collective work done across the crown with what 
resources because regardless of what competition is coming from other entities, 
ultimately all of us are dealing with a world of shrinking resources so we have 
really taken the perspective of you know how do we work with the initiatives and 
how do we value add rather than you know take away.” 
For example, two significant changes in the CMP’s external environment were the 
establishment of the Crown Roundtable and the Great Northern Landscape Conservation 
Cooperative (GNLCC). Some members emphasized the cooperation between the CMP 
and these groups: 
“I think you can essentially make sure that you don’t create unnecessary 
duplication or run across purposes. I think you can really see these things align 
reasonably well and complement each other.” 
Meanwhile other members highlighted the competition between CMP and the 
GNLCC for BC’s membership and support. BC underwent another major reorganization 
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that caused a shift in priorities and a top-down decision from the provincial government 
to engage in the Landscape Conservation Cooperatives instead of the CMP: 
“BC was a striking example of how changes at the provincial level drastically 
were changed with the involvement in the agencies there. You know if you 
changed political parties and therefore political perspectives then one party might 
encourage involvement and the other one would discourage it and you know 
groups in BC would just kind of disappear from the CMP.” 
In addition to BC’s political changes, the oil and gas controversy between BC and 
Montana caused further tension for BC to remain involved with the CMP. One member 
described the situation as: 
“There was a proposed coal mine in the Flat Head Valley and there was quite a 
bit of opposition to it especially from the U.S. because of the downstream 
effects…so it's a piece of ground that is very controversial. But what's happened 
is we finally did sign a MOU with Montana and BC…and there will be no mining 
or gas development within the Flat Head.”  
Currently the GNLCC supplies the only connection between CMP and BC. Although 
many CMP members recognized that “in politics everything is cyclic and we’re hoping to 
actually see change in BC which we all thought was going to be forthcoming and we 
didn’t get. So ultimately I think the pendulum will swing back. That’s proven to be one of 
the more difficult issues.” 
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Beyond BC, the CMP has also struggled to engage the public and local 
communities in its annual forum. Early in its maturity stage, the CMP opened its annual 
forum to the public to create awareness and engagement of the local communities in the 
Crown. When the Crown Roundtable emerged, it offered an annual forum to engage 
diverse groups and communities within the Crown in discussions over a multi-day 
meeting.  Many of the CMP members participate in the Crown Roundtable, and it is now 
used as a means for the CMP to reach a broader audience. To further bolster its 
relationship with the public, the CMP has decided to post meeting minutes on the CMP 
website for open access. Referring to the public, one member stated that “they’ll define 











This study developed life cycle models for SAMAB and CMP to explore the 
changes and events that influence a LSCCO’s life cycle. The following discussion 
focuses on the most influential types of change that impacted the functioning and success 
of these LSCCOs in each life cycle stage derived from this comparative case study’s 
findings.  
Birth Stage 
SAMAB and CMP experienced similarities in their birth stage. They were both 
focused on establishing the organizations through developing a mission and 
communication strategy. Additionally, the organizations recruited agencies as members 
of the LSCCO and individual representatives to serve on the steering committee. These 
findings support previous studies that have found defining the organization’s unique 
purpose and developing goals and objectives critical in the birth stage (Dodge et al., 
1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Miller & Friesen, 1984; 
Pinto & Prescott, 1988; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). 
There were also some key differences between the LSCCOs. SAMAB started as 
an offshoot of the U.S. Man and the Biosphere program. As a result, there was a 
formalized interagency agreement and SAMAB hired an executive director who was 
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skilled at networking, fundraising, and securing support for the organization. In contrast, 
the CMP was formed from an informal gathering not associated with an established 
program and had informal distributive leadership with responsibilities shared among its 
members.  
SAMAB’s leadership focus on securing resources and external support is 
common during an organization’s birth (Dodge et al., 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; 
Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Sirmon 
et al., 2010; Van de Ven, 1980). However, the CMP’s distributive leadership contradicts 
the findings that leadership is usually centralized in a few individuals (Lester et al., 2003; 
Miller & Friesen, 1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Santora & Sarros, 2008). This may be 
a result of its more informal genesis compared to SAMAB.  
It appears that although these LSCCOs started differently, the same significant 
events needed to take place in their birth stage, including defining and promoting the 
organization’s niche, securing resources, and recruiting members. However, SAMAB and 
the CMP illustrate different strategies for a LSCCO to achieve these benchmarks. 
SAMAB was able to establish itself as an organization quite efficiently with the support 
of the executive director and the externally driven mission. Meanwhile, CMP’s informal 
beginning and distributive leadership minimized dependence on a single individual and 






SAMAB and CMP’s growth stages involved the identification and 
implementation of a major project. Both groups conducted an assessment of their 
landscape’s ecological health: the Southern Appalachian Assessment (SAA) and the 
Ecological Health Project (EHP). The vision of SAMAB’s SAA was driven mainly by 
the U.S. Forest Service’s need for an assessment of the region’s national forests. As a 
result of already having the plan and resources from the Forest Service, SAMAB was 
able to quickly implement and complete SAA data collection over a couple years. In 
contrast, CMP’s Ecological Health Project (EHP) was developed collectively by the 
CMP’s members and therefore required a longer planning period to carry out the project.  
In tandem with the development of these assessments, SAMAB and CMP were 
undergoing membership expansion and gaining a reputation in their respective 
landscapes. SAMAB’s executive director had a political and economic background that 
contributed to the organization’s growth through his effective networking skills. In 
response to CMP’s increased activity, a chair position was established to coordinate 
meetings and internal tasks, though leadership remained distributed among CMP’s 
members.  
These findings support the high activity and expansion commonly associated with 
the growth stage (Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Lester et al., 
2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984). Similar to SAMAB’s executive director, leadership often 
serves as a liaison between the organization and the external environment (Miller & 
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Friesen, 1984; Pinto & Prescott, 1988; Santora & Sarros, 2008).  In contrast, CMP’s 
distributive leadership seems less common to the earlier stages of an organization’s life 
cycle. Though a chair position was created, the individual was more of a facilitator than a 
leader. CMP’s distributive leadership allows for different leaders to emerge depending on 
the organization’s needs and the individual’s strengths (Imperial et al., forthcoming).  
While it is evident that the growth stage marked a shift to higher activity and 
selection of a major project, there appeared to be different drivers of this process. Similar 
to its birth stage, SAMAB’s main project was externally driven by the Forest Service. 
SAMAB was able to quickly start the SAA, which generated excitement and camaraderie 
for its members. However, there may have been a missed opportunity for SAMAB’s 
members to collectively brainstorm and devise a long-term plan. In comparison, the 
CMP’s project may have taken a longer time to get off the ground, but members invested 
more time and thought in the planning process which has been found to generate long-
term buy-in to the project and organization (Gilbert, 2014).   
Maturity Stage 
During the maturity stage, SAMAB and the CMP were faced with four types of 
change that impacted the LSCCOs differently. First, both groups experienced a change in 
their executive director and chair positions. Changes from the original leadership is 
common in the maturity stage (Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984). SAMAB’s 
new executive director was hired for his technical and scientific background that differed 
from the original executive director. Thus the change in executive directors created a 
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greater impact because of SAMAB’s heavy reliance on a single leader. Meanwhile, 
CMP’s transition in chairs created little impact on the group because the true leadership 
still remained among its members.   
Second, political changes influenced both LSCCOs during this stage. After further 
political revisions, BC disengaged itself from the CMP and shifted resources to other 
organizations. As one of the Crown’s three major components, this left a significant gap 
in the organization’s representative membership. Meanwhile, SAMAB experienced a 
different shift in political support when the U.S.’s relations with the United Nations 
weakened. This started a negative campaign of any UNESCO program and SAMAB was 
stigmatized because of its MAB connection. Political and high-level support can 
influence an organization’s ability to function and sustain itself (Gilbert, 2014; Gray, 
1989; Leach & Pelkey, 2001; Uitto & Duda, 2002; Yaffee & Wondolleck, 2003a). As 
demonstrated in these cases, when political or administrative changes occur, external 
support can easily shift towards or away from LSCCO efforts inhibiting the ability for 
organization’s to implement long-term planning (Gilbert, 2014). These changes do not 
seem associated with a specific stage, but remain an ongoing challenge.  
Third, SAMAB and CMP experienced high turnover of original members in the 
maturity stage. While turnover has been found to affect the capacity of an organization 
(Elbakidze, Angelstam, Sandstrom, & Axelsson, 2010; Gilbert, 2014; Powell, 2010), 
SAMAB and CMP were impacted differently by the membership changes. SAMAB 
experienced slowed group processing and reduced stability as a result of turnover which 
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previous studies have supported (Margerum, 2002b, 2011; Margerum & Whitall, 2004). 
In contrast, the CMP’s members proactively implemented planning that contributed to 
smoother transitions when membership changes occurred in the maturity stage. Members 
learned about CMP’s history and future directions while interacting with members 
through formal and informal interactions. These actions helped members acclimate 
quickly allowing the organization to maintain a high degree of efficiency and strong 
organizational culture.  
Fourth, there was a noticeable emergence of other organizations that created 
competition for SAMAB and CMP. As an organization matures, they are often faced with 
competing groups (Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Sirmon et al., 2010).  
While SAMAB and CMP both initially experienced some membership competition, 
eventually the CMP responded by building relations with groups like the GNLCC and the 
Crown Roundtable and found ways to complement each other’s efforts.  The CMP 
recognized that to remain competitive, they needed to utilize their external partners 
(Sirmon et al., 2010). In contrast, SAMAB tended to stay focused on its own agenda 
versus seeking cooperative opportunities with the new groups. By viewing other groups 
as a threat versus an opportunity, SAMAB began to isolate itself within its changing 
landscape as networks of organizations were being formed.  
Typically organizations in the maturity stage are focused on maintaining their 
level of activity and stability (Dodge et al., 1994; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Miller & 
Friesen, 1984; Moores & Yuen, 2001; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). While SAMAB and 
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CMP were both attempting to progress on their efforts and maintain their reputation, the 
LSCCOs were also faced with significant challenges. This study’s findings highlight how 
a LSCCO’s ability to anticipate and actively respond to change can help it avoid or 
transition to the decline stage. The CMP was able to implement proactive strategies and 
innovative responses to changes that contributed to the LSCCO’s continued progression 
in the maturity stage. Some literature supports this promotion of innovation and 
adaptation (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Lester et al., 2003; Sirmon et al., 2010). 
Meanwhile others have found the mature stage to inhibit adaptation and innovation 
(Dodge et al., 1994; Koberg, Uhlenbruck, & Sarason, 1996; Miller & Friesen, 1984; 
Schein, 2004) that was evident by SAMAB’s inability to adapt to the changes and 
challenges of its maturity stage and as a result led the LSCCO to shift into the decline 
stage.   
Decline Stage 
The CMP has not experienced a state of decline and may never enter this stage if 
the organization can efficiently respond to the changes and challenges in the maturity 
stage. SAMAB had a long duration in its decline stage. The economic downturn and 
sequestration tightened agencies’ budgets and resulted in downsizing and travel 
restrictions that reduced their support and involvement for SAMAB. With declining 
contributions from agencies, SAMAB’s budget continued to deteriorate until the group 
could no longer support the executive director position. In tandem with the loss of a paid 
director, the University of Tennessee did not renew its contract to manage SAMAB’s 
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resources and assist in planning efforts. As SAMAB continued to decline, the U.S. MAB 
program became inactive due to the continued opposition by vocal groups for any 
program associated with the United Nations.  
Many of the events that occurred in SAMAB’s decline stage have contributed to 
other organizations’ decline including reduced funding and resources (Jawahar & 
McLaughlin, 2001; Levine, 1978; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Moores & Yuen, 2001; 
Santora & Sarros, 2008), decreased member participation  (Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; 
Santora & Sarros, 2008), and struggling leadership (Miller & Friesen, 1984). During 
decline, organizations struggle to adapt to these challenges and resist change (Dodge et 
al., 1994; Margerum, 2011; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Whetten, 1980a).  Similar to 
SAMAB, organizations eventually are outcompeted by other groups in  their external 
environment (Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984).  When the annual conference 
was cancelled, this marked a critical point for SAMAB’s members to decide whether to 
disband or revive the organization. Members struggled with the decision and eventually 
organized a retreat to discuss SAMAB’s options.  
Revival Stage 
In an effort to have a strategic discussion about SAMAB’s current and future 
state, the group hired an external facilitator and organized a member retreat which proved 
to be the critical event that shifted the group from the decline stage to the revival stage. 
External consultants can be influential in problem-solving and brainstorming processes in 
the revival stage (Schein, 2004; Whetten, 1980).  
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 The guided discussion during the retreat allowed the members to discuss 
SAMAB’s challenges and revisit its mission and goals. The members then worked 
together to brainstorm ideas and nontraditional options for SAMAB’s future.  The 
group’s attempt to redefine and broaden their mission is characteristic of the revival stage 
(Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984). The retreat also helped support innovative 
thinking among members which is critical to an organization’s revival (Jawahar & 
McLaughlin, 2001; Miller & Friesen, 1980).  At the conclusion of the retreat, a new chair 
was nominated and this individual has proved in the past year to be critical to motivating 
SAMAB’s members and helping the group to get back on its feet. This change in 
leadership to an individual who can overcome obstacles and guide the group during times 
of change has been found critical to the revival efforts (Schein, 2004). 
 
Conclusions  
Organizations at any scale are exposed to internal and external changes 
throughout their life cycle. It appears easier for LSCCOs like SAMAB and CMP to 
anticipate and respond to internal changes, such as leadership and member turnover, 
versus external changes like political changes, funding, and emergence of other 
organizations.  The majority of these external changes occurred in the maturity stage and 
how SAMAB and the CMP reacted to these changes may be indicative of why SAMAB 
shifted to the decline stage while the CMP has remained in its maturity stage.  
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Previous studies have found external challenges to be more influential to an 
organization’s life cycle than internal challenges (Dodge et al., 1994). This study’s 
findings further highlight the prevalence and influence of external changes on SAMAB 
and CMP. In a landscape that is constantly undergoing social and environmental change, 
adaptation to change and failure is a critical component to whether an organization will continue 
to thrive or decline (Frost, Campbell, Medina, & Usongo, 2006; Gilbert, 2014; Gunton & Day, 
2003; Margerum & Whitall, 2004; Powell, 2010; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). For long-term 
success and sustainability, LSCCOs should embrace change as an opportunity versus a threat. 
This research offers insight into the types of changes influencing each life cycle stage for 
SAMAB and CMP, comparisons with other organizational types and between the cases, and 
potential implications for these types of LSCCOs (see Tables 2.5 - 2.9). SAMAB and CMP 
illuminate some of the critical types of change facing these types of LSCCOs and how similar 
LSCCOs can prepare and respond to changes over their lifetime. 
Table 2.5 Types of changes in the birth stage, comparisons with other organizations and 
between cases, and potential implications for SAMAB and CMP.  





Defining purpose and 






SAMAB: Externally driven 
by MAB 
 
CMP: Internally driven by 
participating members 
 
SAMAB: Aligned with 
MAB; less time invested by 
members 
 
CMP: Longer time spent 







Agreement   
 




membership and commitment  
 
CMP: Less formalized; easier 
to join/leave 
 




(Type I)  
 
SAMAB: Formal executive 
director  
 
SAMAB: Salaried ED with 




Leaders identify and 
secure resources*** 
 
CMP: Founding individuals 
act as informal leaders 
 
 
CMP: No salaried leadership 
completely focused on CMP 
 
*(Dodge et al. 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001) 
** (Lester et al. 2003; Miller & Friesen,1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Santora & Sarros, 2008) 
*** (Dodge et al., 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Sirmon et al. 2010) 
 
Table 2.6 Types of changes in the growth stage, comparisons with other organizations 
and between cases, and potential implications for SAMAB and CMP.  





High activity around a 
project* 
 




SAMAB: Driven by the U.S. 
Forest Service’s needs and 
resources 
 
CMP: Driven internally by 
participating agencies’ needs 
 
SAMAB: Fast start-up and 
completion  
 
CMP: Slower start-up and 
worked on one stage at a time 
 








representatives from each 
agency 
CMP: Multiple 
representatives from each 
province/state, but BC 
reduced 
 
SAMAB: High energy and 
group identity 
 
CMP: Struggle to maintain 
BC involvement and 
representation 
 









CMP: Creation of Chair 
position focused on internal 
tasks 
 
SAMAB: ED supported 




membership/ utilize strengths 
and share responsibility 
 
*( Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Lester et al. 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984) 
** ( Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001) 
*** (Miller & Friesen, 1984; Pinto & Prescott, 1988; Santora & Sarros, 2008) 




Table 2.7 Types of changes in the maturity stage, comparisons with other organizations 
and between cases, and potential implications for SAMAB and CMP.  











SAMAB: Transition to 
Technically Driven ED 
 
CMP: Transition to New 
Chair 
 
SAMAB: Focused more on 
utility of data and less on 
fundraising and networking 
 
CMP: No change in 














SAMAB: Beginning of 




representation; but still 










SAMAB: Did not have 
planned orientation 
 
CMP: Created recruiting and 
orientation strategies 
 
SAMAB: Slowed group 
processing and reduced 
stability 
 









SAMAB: Felt threatened by 
new organizations, but 
ignored them 
 
CMP: Competition from new 
groups, but actively built 
relations 
 
SAMAB: Lack of 
cooperation 
 
CMP: Groups built relations 
and complemented each 
other’s goals 
 
*(Lester et al. 2003; Miller & Friesen,1984) 
**(Santora & Sarros, 2008) 










Table 2.8 Types of changes in the decline stage, comparisons with other organizations, 
and potential implications for SAMAB.  









Workload shifted to 
voluntary chair position 
 






Cuts (Type VI) 
 
Reduced agency funding for 
SAMAB and limited travel 
funds for members 
 
Inability to carry out efforts 
 





Completely distanced itself 
from the MAB program 
 
Disconnect from original 
mission/start 
 




Switched to COF for 
management 
 











Only focus of SAMAB’s 
efforts; Inability to host event 
 









Kept functioning with 
reduced representation 
 
Loss of many original agency 
members 
 
* (Miller & Friesen, 1984) 
** (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Levine, 1978; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Moores & Yuen, 2001; Santora 
& Sarros, 2008) 
*** (Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Moores & Yuen, 2001; Santora & 
Sarros, 2008) 














Table 2.9 Types of changes in the revival stage, comparisons with other organizations, 
and potential implications for SAMAB.  
Typical Stage Cases’ 
Changes 
Response Implications 








Helped guide a productive 
discussion on challenges and 
opportunities 
 
Learned from past failures to 
move towards future 





Helped carry out goals set 
during retreat 
 
Increased accountability of 
new goals and actions 






goals (Type II) 
 
Adapted mission and goals to 
the changes over the past 
decades to remain relevant  
 
Created a greater awareness 
of mission and a clear 
direction for future 





Initiated a meeting between 
SAMAB’s biosphere reserve 
units and efforts to reengage 
units with SAMAB 
 
Decreasing competition and 
increasing cooperation with 
other groups 




selected   
(Type I) 
 
New leader  is respected by 
group, knowledgeable of 
SAMAB’s past and visionary 
for its future 
 
Created a renewed 
excitement and drive among 
the group 
*(Schein, 2004; Whetten, 1980) 
** (Lester et al. 2003; Miller & Friesen; 1984) 
***(Schein, 2004) 
 
As with any research project, there are limitations. First, the findings were limited 
to the voluntary participation of members and members involved in earlier periods were 
difficult to contact. Second, organizational members may have been hesitant to admit 
challenges and failures faced especially if the members are still currently engaged with 
the organization. Third, the findings presented in this paper are part of a larger in-depth 
study; therefore further analysis on life cycle changes and events were limited. Fourth, 
due to time constraints and the longitudinal nature of the study, the research was limited 
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to two in-depth case studies. Lastly, the findings may not be transferrable to other 
organizational cases that vary in representation and settings.  
Future research should focus on longitudinal studies exploring life cycles of 
LSCCOs and apply the adapted framework to identify changes. Comparisons to groups 
that operate under diverse membership such as land trusts, NGOs, private landowners, 
etc. can provide insight to similarities and differences based on stakeholder representation 
as SAMAB and CMP mainly consist of agencies. Future studies should also explore other 
regions and countries within and beyond North America as other settings may result in 




START UP AND GET MOVING! FACTORS INFLUENCING SUCCESS 




As ecosystems and species are threatened by transboundary issues such as climate 
change, it is thought that conservation organizations and agencies should attempt to 
manage at larger geographic scales and across political and institutional boundaries. In 
response to this need, land management agencies, non-governmental conservation 
organizations and others have increasingly turned to forming landscape-scale 
collaborative conservation organizations (LSCCOs). Although landscapes are considered 
the suitable scale for conservation endeavors, developing a successful landscape-scale 
collaborative organization that can survive past birth and growth appears difficult as these 
early stages are associated with unique opportunities and challenges. Despite the growing 
popularity of LSCCOs and the large amount of resources directed towards transboundary 
conservation initiatives, there is limited knowledge of the influential internal and external 
factors that can support or impede success during the early stages of these organizations. 
To address this gap, an in-depth comparative case study analysis was conducted of two 
longstanding LSCCOs, the Crown Managers Partnership (CMP) and the Southern 
Appalachian Man and the Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB), that work to support 
collaboration among agencies, conservationists, and other stakeholders for the 
conservation and restoration of the Northern Rocky Mountain and the Southern 
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Appalachian regions in North America. This paper presents the findings from 57 
interviews and an extensive review of organizational documents that identify the 
influential internal and external factors that can support or impede success during the 
birth and growth stages of SAMAB and CMP. The results provide insight into the 
challenges facing these types of LSCCOs and offer strategies for newly emerging 




Many ecosystems are challenged by threats including climate change, air 
pollution, and invasive species that transcend political and institutional jurisdictions and 
extend beyond traditional protected area boundaries  (Lidskog & Elander, 2010; Soule & 
Terborgh, 1999). Because of these challenges, many land management and conservation 
organizations recognize the need to conduct activities at larger spatial and longer 
temporal scales that can more effectively support viable populations and ecological 
processes (Dobson et al., 1999; Groves et al., 2002; Simberloff et al., 1999). However, 
managing at the landscape scale requires individual institutions and organizations to 
operate across traditional jurisdictional boundaries and therefore partner and collaborate 
with other organizations if coordinated and effective action is going to occur. 
One mechanism for addressing transboundary issues includes the formation of 
landscape-scale collaborative conservation organizations (LSCCOs) that undertake land 
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management planning and actions at the landscape scale. Collaboration between a variety 
of stakeholders at the landscape scale for conservation initiatives has only recently 
become popular  (Koontz & Thomas, 2006; Olson et al., 2001). Though there has been an 
emergence of LSCCOs in an attempt to increase scale of activities that match the 
landscape, reduce redundancy, and increase efficient use of limited resources, they are 
still relatively new compared to other types of organizations. Therefore, there has been 
limited research exploring the unique conditions necessary to support effective 
functioning as many LSCCOs struggle to survive past their early years. To help fill this 
gap, this study examined two longstanding LSCCOs and identified the factors that 
support success during their birth and growth stages.  
Unique Attributes of LSCCOs 
While many different types of organizations have been studied extensively in the 
literature; LSCCOs, have largely been ignored. LSCCO’s are unique in several ways. 
First, LSCCOs operate at the landscape scale, often extending across state and country 
borders, and transcend traditional institutional, political, and jurisdictional boundaries. 
Second, LSCCOs operate as umbrella organizations that are made up of representatives 
from multiple organizations and agencies. Third, participation in LSCCOs is voluntary 
which can make it difficult to hold members and their respective organizations 
accountable for any tasks or actions.  Lastly, LSCCOs are designed to be collaborative in 
nature by bringing together diverse groups; however each member group has their own 
distinct mission, goals, and operating procedures. Therefore, representatives’ jobs and 
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their respective agency’s missions may align more or less with the LSCCOs mission than 
other representatives and agencies.  
Types of LSCCOs 
While LSSCOs encompass unique characteristics, different types of LSCCOs 
exist depending on their membership, focus, scale, and network association (see Table 
3.1). First, LSCCOs’ membership may vary from mainly government agencies to private 
landowners to NGOs. Membership may be dominated by one type of group, such as 
federal agencies, while others may have a very diverse membership. Second, LSCCOs’ 
goals and mission may differ. One end of the spectrum often focuses on the general 
management of the area in question. Examples include organizations that employ 
ecosystem management or integrated coastal management, such as the Heart of the 
Rockies Initiative. At the other end of the spectrum are organizations that focus on one 
issue or species, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Joint Ventures Program. In 
addition, there are some LSCCOs that focus on identifying and protecting land, such as 
collaborative land trust organizations, and others focus on management of an area. Third, 
although LSCCOs operate within landscapes and transcend boundaries, there can be 
variations in scale. For example, some LSCCOs may be organized around watersheds, 
such as the Salmon Falls Watershed Initiative. Meanwhile other LSCCOs extend beyond 
international boundaries such as Two Countries, One Forest. Lastly, LSCCOs may be 
associated with a broader network of other LSCCOs, such as the Landscape Conservation 
Cooperatives, or operate as a stand-alone entity.  
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Table 3.1 Different characteristics contributing to variations in LSCCOs.  
Membership:  
the individuals or 




Mission focus:  
the level of 
specificity in the 
LSCCO’s 
mission/goals 
Boundary scale:  
the types of political 




networks of similar 
LSCCOs  
 
 Agencies  
 Political figures 




 Preservation vs. 
management 
 Only focus on a 
specific issue 
and/or species 





 City, county, 
district, etc. 
Generally within 
a single state or 
province 
 Multiple states or 
provinces 
 Multiple countries 
 
 Originated as a 
stand-alone entity 
 Originated as part 
of a broader 
network  
 
Opportunities and Challenges of LSCCOs 
These LSCCOs attempt to bring together different agencies and groups within a 
landscape to work together towards common conservation and natural resource 
management goals. This purpose brings a number of challenges. For example, there can 
be legal issues pertaining to political boundaries and differing managerial approaches by 
the varying agencies (Kittinger et al., 2011). Additional challenges include differences in 
members’ perspective (Berkes, 2004), language/discourse (Cash et al., 2006), and  
commitment to the range of issues (Cash et al., 2006; Margerum, 2008).  Neuman (2005) 
also found disjointed processes due to multiple authoritative roles, lack of institutional 
managerial structure, and difficulty in evaluating success. These examples present 
general obstacles; however it is hypothesized that there are specific factors that can 
influence success of LSCCOs during specific stages of an organization’s life cycle. 
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The Organizational Life Cycle  
The organizational life cycle model operates under the assumption that 
organizations follow a predictable pattern and transition through different stages from 
birth through growth and maturity and possibly decline and revival (Miller & Friesen, 
1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). According to this theory, each stage of an organization’s 
life cycle is associated with unique characteristics, challenges, and opportunities that 
distinguish it from the other stages (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). Organizations can 
differ in focus, structure, relations, resources, leadership, power, and commitment during 
the different life cycle stages. For example, members may focus on getting to know each 
other and building trust and relationships in the earlier organizational stages versus 
having strong personal and professional relationships in the organization’s maturity stage.    
Life cycle analysis has been applied to different types of organizations, such as 
corporations and non-profit organizations, and in a variety of fields including education, 
business, natural resource management, and online communities (Cameron & Whetten, 
1981; Dodge et al., 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; 
Kimberly & Miles, 1980; Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Moores & Yuen, 
2001; Pinto & Prescott, 1988; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Sirmon et al., 2010; Smith & 
Miner, 1983).  
In the literature there are numerous life cycle frameworks and models with 
diverse names for the stages. For example, the conception stage has also been referred to 
as the birth, courtship, first, entrepreneurial, and first stage. Based on our review of the 
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organizational stages in the literature, we utilized the following names for the five life 
cycle stages in this study following Miller & Friesen (1984): 1) Birth Stage, 2) Growth 
Stage, 3) Maturity Stage, 4) Decline Stage, and/or 5) Revival Stage. The focus of this 
paper is on the birth and growth stages and the factors that contribute to an organization’s 
success. The following sections describe each of these stages in further detail and Table 
3.2 provides a summary of the characteristics associated with these stages based on a 
review of the general organizational life cycle literature.  
Birth Stage 
Organizations begin in a variety of ways such as through formalized 
governmental agreements or people simply organizing around a particular issue that 
needs to be addressed. Whether organizations form from a bottom-up or top-down 
approach, they share a similar focus in their birth stage of defining the organization’s 
unique purpose and niche (Dodge et al., 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Miller & Friesen, 
1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983) and becoming an established body (Iriberri & Leroy, 
2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984). Once 
the organization defines its niche, there is an effort to develop a clear plan with goals 
(Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Pinto & Prescott, 1988). This 
shared vision and set of goals can be formed through mutual learning and information 
sharing among members (Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Kittinger et al., 2011; Tichy, 1980; Van 
de Ven, 1980). Because many of these members have never worked together, this process 
is important for building trust among members who differ in values and perspectives 
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(Ansell & Gash, 2007; Carr et al., 1998; San Martín-Rodríguez, Beaulieu, D’Amour, & 
Ferrada-Videla, 2005; Tichy, 1980).  
During the organization’s formation, there is a strong dependence on leadership 
from a few individuals (Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Quinn & Cameron, 
1983; Santora & Sarros, 2008).  These leaders tend to be ambitious, visionary, and 
entrepreneurial  (Kimberly, 1980; Pennings, 1980) as they identify and secure adequate 
resources and support for the organization (Dodge et al., 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; 
Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Kimberly, 1980; Schein, 2004; Sirmon et al., 2010; 
Whetten, 1980a).  One of the main strategies for leaders to acquire these resources is 
through developing  external partnerships with other organizations and community 
leaders (Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, Jacobson, & Allen, 2001; Margerum, 
2011; Santora & Sarros, 2008; Schuett, Selin, & Carr, 2001; Sirmon et al., 2010).  With 
the leader’s support, the organization solidifies its purpose and secures resources in 
preparation for further growth and activity.  
Growth Stage 
After the organization has an established mission, it needs to develop a feasible 
and clear action plan to achieve its goals (Pinto & Prescott, 1988; Quinn & Cameron, 
1983).  Shifting to this more action-oriented stage, the organization experiences growth 
and member expansion (Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Lester et 
al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984). When integrating these new members into the 
organization, leaders strive to create a sense of culture and collectivity in the group 
101 
 
(Santora & Sarros, 2008). As personal relationships are formed, members’ attitudinal or 
affective commitment to the organization is strengthened which can contribute to higher 
accountability and performance (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002; 
Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Riketta, 2002).  These relationships can also initiate informal 
partnerships among members to drive specific projects depending on their interests and 
resources (Powell, Cuschnir, & Peiris, 2009).  
Along with building a shared group identity, the rapid growth of this stage 
requires an enthusiastic leader who can engage with the organization’s external 
environment to obtain resources, promote the organization, and communicate with 
government, the public, and members’ respective organizations  (Miller & Friesen, 1984; 
Pinto & Prescott, 1988; Santora & Sarros, 2008). With an adequate and consistent supply 
of support and resources (Pinto & Prescott, 1988),  members perceive this stage as a non-
constraining environment that supports  innovation and helps the organization remain 
competitive (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Koberg et al., 1996; Miller & Friesen, 1984; 
Quinn & Cameron, 1983).    
Table 3.2 Summary of characteristics of birth and growth organizational life cycle stages 
compiled from the literature.  
Factors Birth Stage Growth Stage 
Organizational Focus Becoming an established body  Growth and expansion, becoming 
more efficient and formalized 
Vision/Mission Identification and formation of 
organization’s niche and shared 
mission 
Refined and clear goals and 
development of action plan to 
achieve goals 
Leadership Highly entrepreneurial and 
ambitious leadership focused on 
establishing vision and garnering 
resources 
Focus on securing resources and 
promoting organization and 
building external relations 
Resources/Funding Identify sources for funding and Secure and adequate funding 
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obtain adequate resources and 
support 
supports increased growth  
Member Relations/ 
Commitment 
Introductions and overcoming 
differences among members 
from diverse backgrounds 
Membership expansion; 
Increasing informal and personal 
interactions; High commitment 
and shared identity 
Adaptability/ 
Innovation 




Need for Study  
There is recognition that conservation organizations and agencies need to manage 
at larger spatial scales to address transboundary issues threatening our natural 
environment. Despite the recent popularity and emergence of LSCCOs, little is known 
about how these organizations are established and develop in their initial stages and that 
factors that contribute to their success. While organizational and management theories do 
provide some insight, LSCCOs have many unique attributes that may distinguish them 
from other organizations in their early life cycle stages. To address these challenges and 
gaps in the literature, this paper seeks to explore the factors influencing success in the 
birth and growth stages of LSCCOs through a comparative case study analysis of two  




A comparative case study approach (see Yin, 2009) was used to address the 
following research question: What internal and external factors support or inhibit success 
during the birth and growth stages of a landscape-scale collaborative conservation 
103 
 
organization?  We selected two LSCCOs as case studies, the Southern Appalachian Man 
and the Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB) and the Crown Managers Partnership (CMP), 
because they both operated at a transboundary scale, focused on natural resource 
management and conservation, were comprised of multiple federal and state agencies, 
and were long standing organizations that have been in existence for more than 10 years 
(see Table 3.3 for more details). 
Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB) 
Great Smoky Mountains National Park was established as a biosphere reserve in 
1976. SAMAB was established as an organization in 1988 to facilitate communication 
and coordination of efforts of federal and state agencies within the Southern Appalachian 
region. The organization’s membership included mainly federal agencies and state 
agencies that extended to six states in the southeastern United States: Alabama, Georgia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. This temperate region boasts 
high biodiversity and encompasses 37.4 million acres, seven national forests, and two 
national parks (Tonn et al., 2006). For over two decades, SAMAB has served as a forum 
in the Southern Appalachians for agency collaboration on a variety of issues including air 
quality, invasive species management, an annual forum, and a large scale assessment of 





Crown Managers Partnership (CMP) 
In 1932, an international peace park was established between Montana’s Glacier 
National Park and Alberta’s Waterton National Park. The peace park designation was the 
initial transboundary effort within the region, referred to as the “Crown of the Continent” 
ecosystem. Embedded within the larger Yellowstone to Yukon ecosystem (Y2Y), the 
Crown covers over 28,000 square miles of the northern Rocky Mountain region and 
includes parts of Montana, Alberta, and British Columbia.  In 2001, agencies within the 
“Crown” coordinated a meeting in Cranbrook, British Columbia to address current and 
emerging transboundary issues. Soon after this initial meeting, the Crown Managers 
Partnership (CMP) was officially formed an organizational entity comprised of mainly 
federal, state, and provincial agencies. For over a decade, CMP has served as a forum for 
interagency collaboration and has initiated numerous projects such as aquatic invasive 
species management, grizzly bear management, and an ecological monitoring program 
focused on a variety of indicators.  
Table 3.3 Summary of similarities between SAMAB and CMP as comparative case 
studies. 
Characteristic SAMAB CMP 
Transboundary 
area 
• Encompassing Southern Appalachian 
region and extends to six states: 
Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia  
 
• Encompassing the shared Rocky 
Mountain region of Montana, British 
Columbia and Alberta, this ecological 
complex spreads across two nations; 
one state and two provinces; 28,000 
square mile  
Focus  • Conserve and sustain the use of natural 
ecosystems of the region and their 
genetic resources  
• Integrate conservation of natural 
resources with regional land uses  
• Addressing cumulative effects of 
human activities across the ecosystem 
• Addressing increased public interest in 
how lands are managed and how 
decisions are reached 
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• Demonstrate methodologies for sharing 
information and improving management 
skills  
• Foster public understanding of issues 
through education 
 
• Addressing increases recreational 
demands and increased visitation 
• Collaborate in sharing data, 
standardizing assessment, and 
monitoring methodologies 
• Addressing the maintenance and 
sustainability of shared wildlife 
populations 
Membership • Federal and state agencies, universities • Federal, provincial, and state agencies, 
universities 




To explore the factors influencing success of SAMAB and CMP during the birth 
and growth stages, there were multiple phases of data collection and analysis. First, two 
forms of data were collected for this comparative case study: secondary data and semi-
structured interviews. Second, timelines were created for each organization’s history to 
identify significant changes, events, and accomplishments. Third, the data was 
synthesized and coded for factors and assigned to a timeline period. Fourth, life cycle 
stages were assigned to the timeline periods based on criteria from a review of the 
organizational life cycle literature. Fifth, each life cycle stage was examined for 
similarities and differences between the two case studies resulting in the emergence of 
critical factors that influenced success for each organizational life cycle stage.  
Data Collection 
Two forms of data collection (secondary data, semi-structured interviews) were 
used based on recommendations by Yin (2009) and Patton (2002). Secondary data in the 
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form of letters, meeting minutes, administrative documents and reports, articles, etc. were 
collected from SAMAB and CMP.  We obtained these documents from organizational 
leaders and individual members. We also conducted a literature review to identify peer 
reviewed and publicly available documents. 
To complement the information found in the secondary data, we conducted 57 
semi-structured interviews (SAMAB = 41, CMP = 16) with past and present 
organizational members following recommendations by Seidman (2006).  The 
interviewees’ duration of organizational involvement ranged from less than a year to over 
twenty years and they represented different federal, state, and provincial agencies and 
universities. To ensure temporal representation, we interviewed at least two members for 
every year of the organizations’ history. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and 
interviewees had the opportunity to review the transcription to ensure accuracy and 
reliability. 
Data Analysis 
We assigned life cycle stages based on concurrent research conducted by 
Thomsen, et. al. (see Chapter 2). We then examined and coded all data collected 
pertaining to the birth and growth stages to identify factors and characteristics that were 
using a qualitative data analysis program (MaxQDA). Patterns and themes emerged 
within the data and we identified influential factors during the birth and growth stages of 
each organization (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Case studies were then compared and 
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contrasted to identify broad similarities and differences to generate overall themes from 




SAMAB’s Birth Stage 
In the 1970s, UNESCO established the Man and the Biosphere program to 
coordinate the efforts of an international network of biosphere reserves. SAMAB’s birth 
stage began with the establishment of biosphere reserve units in the Southern 
Appalachians including Great Smoky Mountain National Park and Coweeta Hydrologic 
Laboratory. UNESCO recognized the Southern Appalachians as exemplifying the 
biosphere reserve concept subsequently leading to the formation of the SAMAB 
Cooperative in 1988 to coordinate the activities of the biosphere reserve units and 
management agencies in the region. The main idea of SAMAB was “to demonstrate that 
we can all come together and attack an issue or a problem that otherwise we would 
attack individually and probably would have never gotten anywhere.” Another member 
identified two critical questions that SAMAB addressed:  “What can we do together 
more effectively than we can do separately? And more importantly, what problems are 
there we cannot solve or be solved unless we work together?”   
At this time, SAMAB fulfilled a unique niche as “there was no other means for 
the federal agencies to come to the same table…there was no other organization out 
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there doing that.” SAMAB appeared to have a distinctive role, and for most individuals 
this “was the first time to have a chance to get acquainted with other professionals and 
related federal agencies and state agencies.” Another member described SAMAB as a 
leader in interagency collaboration because “agencies hadn’t been working together as a 
large group at all, so we were all coming together and even considering things like the 
landscape approach was innovative for that time.” 
SAMAB’s formation was driven largely by the leadership of a few committed and 
experienced individuals that wanted to see the U.S. participate in the international MAB 
network. One individual in particular was described as “this moving force way back in 
the beginning” and that SAMAB was his “brainchild.” This individual’s energy 
contributed to the formalized signing of an interagency agreement and the hiring of an 
executive director and staff for the cooperative.  
The first executive director (ED1) had a strong economic background and was 
skilled at networking and promoting SAMAB’s image. During this stage, “he helped get 
SAMAB started and get recognized and functioning.” Other members also commented on 
the ED1’s persistence and ability to convince people of the importance of the cooperative 
and its efforts:  
“He would basically beat the telephone to death until he could get somebody to 
agree…It became obvious he was a good salesman as to why you would want to 
do this because it was basically extra work for most sites.” 
109 
 
One of the main efforts of early leadership was gaining support from high-level directors 
and political figures. When the interagency agreement was signed and SAMAB was first 
established, “it came in with a lot of support federally” and “you had the support of 
regional directors.” SAMAB’s leadership had annual briefings with regional directors in 
Atlanta and briefings in Washington D.C. with political figures updating them on 
SAMAB’s efforts.  In addition to national support, there was high engagement between 
SAMAB and the international MAB program “where SAMAB and its equivalents from 
other parts of the world would come together.” During this time, the U.S. had amiable 
relations with the United Nations and was trying to build the U.S. MAB program, with 
SAMAB as the premier success story.  
After SAMAB obtained commitment from the federal and state agencies, the next 
step was to select representatives from these agencies to participate in SAMAB’s 
meetings and efforts. Many members identified “the first element is getting the right 
people at the table” and the selection of representatives “depends upon the individuals 
and their interests and personalities.” Some members emphasized that “so much of the 
involvement is based on personal passion. If you can’t find the right person then it sort of 
falls through.” The voluntary participation in the SAMAB effort meant “a lot of it 
depended on the people who were willing to pursue and take time because this was 
individual effort.” Others described the importance of alignment with an individual’s job 
at their respective agency. For example, one individual stated that “as a researcher, I am 
tied up with our specialty. So that is why SAMAB has not really been very useful to me.” 
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When trying to select representatives, some current members would try to recruit people 
they thought would be ideal: 
“It’s a lot easier if you can identify a specific person, so we would ask who would 
know someone in this organization and we would try to figure out somebody who 
people knew and who would be of interest and at the right level that could make 
the decision that their agency may be involved.” 
By the end of the birth stage, SAMAB was able to establish formalized commitments 
with the agencies and had a dedicated group of representatives eager to get efforts started 
as SAMAB transitioned to the growth stage.  
 
SAMAB’s Growth Stage 
As SAMAB shifted to the growth stage, it went through a rapid expansion of 
membership and efforts. This stage was associated with high levels of activity and getting 
SAMAB members to define and then rally around their first major effort, the Southern 
Appalachian Assessment (SAA). The U.S. Forest Service provided the initial inspiration 
for the SAA, which was conducting assessments of multiple national forests in the region 
and wanted to increase the efficiency and usefulness of the effort by expanding this 
assessment beyond their jurisdictional boundaries. One member described the U.S. Forest 
Service’s motivation as: 
“This is going to cost us to do a lot of these assessments for the 5 or 6 different 
national forests. Let’s just pool our resources and do one big assessment that 
would serve all of the Southern Appalachian Forests. If we’re going to do that, 
111 
 
let’s look at assessment of conditions on both public and private land and there 
are a lot of other people that maybe can help us do that. So it was an economic 
decision and it was an environmental decision. You know, let’s do it at a broader 
scale and we can be much more efficient and also have credibility.” 
SAMAB offered an ideal opportunity to organize and complete this large scale 
assessment because of the federal and state agency membership. An overall strategic plan 
and multi-year action plan was developed and the SAA was implemented over several 
years in the mid-90s.  The SAA coordinated the activities of agency members for a first-
of-its-kind assessment of the Southern Appalachian landscape’s ecological health and 
involved data collection, analysis, and synthesis from a variety of agencies and contexts. 
This landscape-scale assessment demonstrated that the “SAMAB idea about working 
across boundaries was enlightened” especially during the early 1990s when the “whole 
idea of landscape level was really just in the beginning.”  
The high levels of activity centered on the SAA resulted in this stage being 
referred to as the “heyday” and “the peak” of SAMAB with a high commitment and 
participation from agencies and their individual representatives. Meetings were described 
as “jam-packed” with “usually 2 or 3 [representatives] from every agency …usually 30 
to 40 people at those times.” Like the conception stage, many of the members were high 
level representatives described as “influential and powerful in their agencies. They were 
not low level decision-makers; these were some of the big ones.” The SAA generated 
energy for the initiative and created a sense of “some panache to being associated with 
SAMAB.” A member compared the excitement to the start of a relationship: 
112 
 
“Like a new boyfriend for you.  It is new.  There is a new energy.  There were new 
excitements.  There were new projects…The newness was a good thing.”   
Instead of individuals only associating themselves with their respective agencies, there 
was “camaraderie when we got together that we were a joint federal agency” and this 
was a time when “there was the greatest feeling of being a piece of something.” The 
large amount of activity and participation resulted in low membership turnover “because 
we got in there and got it done” and the SAA “really pulled people together probably 
more than any other of the activities that SAMAB did over the years.” In addition, the 
SAA was at “a scale that was beneficial to everybody.” The growth stage required 
significant time identifying the issues that the group would focus upon in the SAA, but 
“the final set of questions that we landed on was represented across the board from all 
the agencies.” 
During this growth stage, many members stressed that relationships and trust 
building among members were strengthened outside of formal SAMAB meetings. One 
individual stated, “we had social things ongoing in those days” and the “after-hour 
meetings were as valuable as the organized meetings.” Though individuals were 
traveling long distances to participate in SAMAB meetings and activities, many members 
identified the importance of meeting in person: “Nothing beats a face to face interaction 
and making friends with your peers.”  During the frequent formal and informal meetings, 
members developed “strong interpersonal relationships and ongoing communication 
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with partners” that continued to strengthen their commitment to SAMAB and to the 
other members.  
In tandem with individuals devoting time and energy to SAMAB, agencies were 
contributing a large amount of financial resources during this stage:  
“When all the partners first came in, everybody was putting in sort of $10,000 to 
coordinate, to have a coordinator and get things going, so when you got, you 
know, 15 organizations you have a fairly big chunk of money to be able to pay 
somebody to keep things coordinated, keep things moving, and that was a big 
help.” 
Having consistent sources of funding allowed SAMAB to carry out its various efforts. 
Members “felt really fairly secure in our role, really not threatened by anything like 
financial sequestration.” SAMAB was able to function at a high level because the 
organization could support a “staff that could wake up every single day focusing on those 
issues.” 
The consistent funding supported the salary of a paid executive director. The ED1 
maintained a strong focus on the external environment through networking, securing 
resources, and increasing membership for the organization. Many members described 
ED1 as “more of an economist” and “a good politician.” This leader was also described 
as having strong social and relational skills which allowed him to get “non-traditional 
partners involved in the organization.” As the ED1, he could act as the cheerleader of 
SAMAB and “increase the awareness in SAMAB and what it does and help it work in 
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communities.” Though the ED1 was reported to have less of a scientific background, he 
“was a mover and shaker” that secured resources and support for the organization as it 
continued to expand in membership and activity.  
Promoting a positive image of SAMAB and creating awareness of the 
organization’s efforts was one of the main roles of ED1 and a main focus of SAMAB 
during this stage. For example, there was a creation of a newsletter and the development 
of a communication strategy to sell the SAMAB concept. These efforts would target 
different groups such as “convincing daily management the interactions apply to them”  
and that “it’s meeting a core agency need you can demonstrate you can get this done 
cheaper and better working with SAMAB.”  
SAMAB also formed a public involvement committee and “had a public affairs 
person on our board, some relations with the press.” During the SAA, SAMAB “did a 
lot of public hearings,” though SAMAB continuously struggled with how to engage with 
the public. Members felt that “most of the public were totally removed from the existence 
of the organization.” The importance of creating this sense of awareness and purpose 
outside the participating agencies was described by one individual: 
“I think you need to have something to show the public that you have got 
something for them…we should have given more attention to what the economics 
advantage and economic impact that SAMAB could have made through its 
activities locally.”  
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Similarly, a member recalled “I think there was a lot of hope that building support at the 
community level would be consistent with or be a good direction for SAMAB to go, I 
don’t think that’s worked out.” Despite the struggle to engage with the public, SAMAB 
was recognized as a role model for its efforts during this stage by the international MAB 
organization and was nominated for several awards. As SAMAB continued to grow and 
neared the completion of the SAA, the organization transitioned into its mature stage with 
a change in vision and leadership. Though SAMAB had built a strong foundation and 
reputation through its birth and growth stages, the organization would soon be faced with 
internal and external challenges in its maturation. 
 
CMP’s Birth Stage 
The transboundary relations between Canada and the U.S. dated back to the 1930s 
when Glacier and Waterton parks were established as an international peace park. This 
relationship acted as the initial “catalyst for thinking across boundaries.” Later in the 
1970s, the parks were designated as biosphere reserves and world heritage sites by 
UNESCO. Despite the long-term recognition of the linkages (both ecologically and 
socially) between the two parks, limited coordinated efforts were undertaken in the 
broader Crown of the Continent region until 2001.  
In an initial attempt to address transboundary issues facing the Crown, a gathering 
of “seventy different participants from about twenty different agencies” in the three 
regions was organized in 2001. Though, “there were no plans to go necessarily further 
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than to pull everyone together for the first meeting to talk about if we wanted to maintain 
that relationship and develop it,” the strong support by the participants for transboundary 
cooperation inspired the subsequent creation of the Crown Managers Partnership. 
Compared to today, there were only about “10% of the initiatives operating on the 
landscape.” The minimal amount of organizations operating in the Crown allowed the 
CMP a unique opportunity for interagency cooperation. Members described CMP as a 
“safe place for agency folks to come together” and “share the outcomes that we want to 
achieve” while still “pushing us outside of our comfort zone and our existing 
frameworks.” The informal genesis of the group was attributed to its compelling purpose 
and as a consequence, the first meeting was “one of the most well attended if not the best 
attended meeting that we ever had because people were really curious.”  
The initial meeting and the subsequent start of the CMP would not have occurred 
without “some key people that had a vision and saw the benefit to having a long term 
relationship across borders and worked to make that happen.” One of these individuals 
described the process that led up to the initial meeting as:  
“We know there are larger landscape issues. We know the NGOs are starting to 
show leadership. Can governments do anything other than just react? And is 
there a possibility for expanding this idea of cooperation across boundaries and 
large landscapes beyond sort of a Peace Park core to consider broader 
landscapes? We felt there were enough issues out there in terms of effects and 
recreational demands and all the rest of it, that there were obviously common 
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issues. So we organized the work shop in Cranbrook to which multiple state and 
provincial organizations were invited in 2001.” 
Other members have recognized that “there are some key players that have been 
driving it” and “leadership during the first 2 years was, it was very much relying on 
individuals and in this case I think that XXX was tremendous at leading the group and 
making sure things happened.” Though CMP includes involvement from U.S. and 
Canadian agencies, “the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society was a real driving force 
in these transboundary efforts” and the Canadians were described as “bigger picture 
thinkers.”  These individuals were described as having long histories within their 
respective jurisdictions, “collaborative-minded,” “very well respected,” “dedicated,” 
“big strategic thinkers,” and “patient, willing to listen, not necessarily someone who 
drives their own agenda.” Further, the leaders are “looking at the landscape level as 
opposed to specific sites and because of that he [has] been influencing a number of 
people.” One member described one of the leaders as “the best collaborator I think I 
have ever crossed bounds with in my entire life. He's amazing.  He can diffuse anything 
and can also get people thinking in a positive direction and seeing the big picture.” 
Despite these influential individuals in CMP’s creation, members often referred to 
the group as “the coalition of the willing, as there is no formal or legal administrative 
mechanism” and there was no official “leadership position per say. There was like a 
group.” Instead of a single leader, CMP consisted of a group of people that were coming 
together to discuss and address issues. During CMP’s birth, members recognized that the 
organization needed “to be clear about what it’s mission mandate is and what it can 
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achieve” while “finding that common ground and setting realistic goals for the group 
where everyone had a part and there was no burden too great on anyone participant.” 
Though members state “there are no riders and we all have strengths and weaknesses,” 
there are individuals that “stepped up in those leadership roles… because of their interest 
and passion.” For example, some members were viewed as “the most prominent visual 
representatives of the CMP” and “these are some of founding members the people that 
have held on to the vision they have of the Crown and the Continent.”  
Working across jurisdictional and political boundaries can pose challenges, but 
international borders created additional obstacles for CMP. There was early recognition 
by members for the need of strong political and high-level support: 
“Politics can be a huge player as well…Do you have a regional manager that is 
progressive and committed and can get this and can invest? Do you have an 
agency that empowers and enables or one that controls and limits? And do you 
have politics that are scared and defensive?...I think what you are looking for in 
the politics is something that is not actively aligned against it.” 
One of the initial CMP efforts was to gain political support from Montana, Alberta, and 
BC governments through formalized Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) to ease 
some of these challenges such as moving funding across the international border. For 
example, one member described: 
 “There has been some pretty significant efforts in that regard like there is an 
official MOU signed between Alberta and Montana and there is also one signed 
between BC and Montana. They are not specific and they are not solely specific to 
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the CMP but they lend quite a bit of support to the CMP as having those 
memorandums at the provincial level and state levels signed.” 
Despite the MOUs, many members reflected that they “don’t think for the most 
part that the political level is aware of and has any opinions strongly for or against the 
CMP. I just don’t think it’s on their radar at a political level.” In addition, the constant 
changes that occurred in political arenas impacted the long-term commitment to the 
CMP: 
“You couldn't keep track of what the agencies were called let alone who the 
appropriate people would be to be engaging with…when there is reorganization 
within government agencies. It has profound impact because lots of people can't 
commit in participating because they are waiting to see how the reorganization of 
agencies is going to fall, and the Crown Managers have seen countless iterations 
of this happen.”  
The CMP had an easier time engaging high-level support within the agencies 
during the birth stage as one member stated “senior managers, executives and agencies 
[were] pretty well aware of the CMP and supportive.” The organization developed 
presentations for the individual agencies illustrating the alignment of their mission with 
the CMP and presenting the CMP’s action plan to generate continuous support and 
awareness for the group’s efforts.  
After engaging high-level and political support, the CMP focused on recruiting 
not only individual representatives to participate in the organization, but the “right 
players.” This was viewed as important by members as the organization’s success “often 
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comes down more to the individual level” and “sometimes it only takes one individual to 
derail a whole effort.” One member reflected “the key is the people… I don't think they 
should be picked- I think they should choose to participate.” Though the ultimate choice 
of a representative was left up to the agency, there were certain qualities that the CMP 
sought in its members. For example, one member describes that “I think they are just 
looking for people at the same level of management and but again I think that is of less 
importance than of people who they feel are just committed and interested.” Others 
highlighted the need for representatives to see beyond their individual agencies and 
jurisdictions: “we have to have individuals who see their work within the context within 
the Crown of the Continent ecosystem. If they don't then they aren't going to be any value 
to come to the table.” Similarly, another member emphasizes the ability to think broadly: 
“I think you would have to get the right people in there because I think they are 
kind of key and instrumental. If they just dropped out…I think there would be a 
real gap in the function because there are a lot of resource managers in different 
agencies but not everyone can really think that broad scale…”  
The CMP also knew that every individual would have different ways to contribute to the 
organization and “sometimes that is experience, sometimes that’s connections, sometimes 
that’s funding.” Once representatives were selected to participate in the CMP, there was 
a shift to introductions and initial relations.  
Since most of these agencies had no prior experience working together and “had 
never met each other,” members had “to really develop the relationships for people to be 
able to speak openly and frankly in that agency forum.” CMP targeted members who had 
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a “middle to senior management role” and “were not necessarily looking for the top 
managers because they have limited time…” Like other partnerships, much of the 
relationship building occurred during informal settings “when you are not technically 
meeting but you are having a beer together…When you lose the face to face time, you can 
never really be as good as you might be.”  
As the CMP established its membership and vision, the organization began to shift 
towards a more action-oriented stage where it was faced with some of its first major 
challenges.  
 
CMP’s Growth Stage 
During the growth stage, the CMP established a strategic plan that supported 
projects aligning with the organization’s overall vision and goals defined in the birth 
stage. Although this process took time, one member acknowledged “I think the key is you 
have to meet in person and meet regularly maybe 3 or 4 times a year… to have ideas 
brought to the table and to think about them and to talk about them and take the time to 
see what your strategic plan is going to be.” Members also recognized the importance of 
a legitimate and transparent process to ensure buy-in to future efforts: 
“We went through a pretty intense and strategic planning effort to develop our 
most strategic plan and we built that together and basically that was a grueling 
process in terms of finding bigger picture concepts while fitting the wording to it 
for everyone to be comfortable… And now that we have our strategic plan we 
generally have our mission, our vision, and our focus identifying the areas where 
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we can efficiently get work done on the landscape without a whole bunch of 
capacities.” 
After development of the plan, the CMP had “a very clear focus” as it began to 
work towards its main long-term initiative and “flagship program,” the Ecological Health 
Project (EHP). The overall idea was to assess the health of the landscape and “set 
benchmarks and develop protocol for long term management that would require a long 
term commitment and long term buy-in.” It was not difficult to get buy-in from the 
agencies as reflected by a member:  
“And if you look at the Ecological Health Project, whether your business is 
cutting down trees or supporting a tourism economy or recreational activities or 
looking after fish and wildlife populations, the bottom line is that you want a 
healthy ecosystem.” 
Some of the members emphasized the importance of on-the-ground management 
impacts from the EHP by setting thresholds based on the data. For example, one member 
refers to the EHP as “this isn’t going to just be academic exercise. This is not just going 
to be talking about getting along better and doing things cooperatively. We’re really 
going to try to put our money where our mouth is.” There was recognition that this was a 
long-term project and that results were not going to happen overnight: “We want to have 
small achievements and grow them and so on. And become more substantial over 
time…it’s about a long game.”  
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This process helped “people recognize the interdependency” of the individual 
agency goals and there was a high level of member buy-in to the collaborative process: 
“Many of the issues that as land managers we deal with transcend our 
boundaries… It is something that while people kind of recognize that conceptually 
it has only been in the last decade I think that people have begun to start thinking 
that now we have to work at this as if we are not an island. We have to start 
working together.” 
Though there is recognized interdependency, members still associated themselves with 
the needs and priorities of their respective agencies and jurisdictions: 
“Every agency knows what its specific things; we manage water, we cut down 
trees, we manage parks and protective areas and so what have you. And that’s 
our job and these are our priorities of the day…we have a really hard time 
looking beyond those boundaries and we are physically reacting to particular 
priorities within our organizations that are not truly strategic.” 
To contribute to a shared identity with the CMP, many members identified the 
significant time needed to build relationships and trust with other members, as most 
individuals lacked experience working with other agencies and across borders. One 




“…where you have players that aren’t familiar with each other and you have 
jurisdictional issues, taking the time to build the trust…it all comes down to this is 
very much a tribal philosophy…if you don’t have the relationships I just don’t 
think you can be successful.” 
The representatives needed “to know who you are working with in that setting and in that 
group and what their roles are and how you can help them and how they can help you.” 
For example, one member stated that initially CMP members must “build those 
relationships and then work to tackle the issues…It is a lot of upfront work but it pays off 
at the back end.” By investing time in “the foundation…now the relationship in the 
organization is so strong that it can withstand the turnover and not fracture.”  
As the members spent more time together formally and informally “beyond the 
phone, the digital world,” individuals started to form personal relationships and reported 
being “engaged at more than just the working level.  I think everybody genuinely cares 
about each other. Because of that   think it makes people a lot more committed and seeing 
the value in it and being accountable.” This marked “evolution of the culture” from the 
conception stage “in terms of cohesion, in terms of trust…you really foster the sense of 
we’re all in it together verses we’re all sitting in a meeting together.” 
Despite the strengthening of member relationships and building of trust among 
members during the growth stage, the relationship between BC and CMP became 
tumultuous after a political reorganization in BC. Though BC was one of the three main 
components to the Crown, “typically there would be only one representative at the 
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meetings and the other jurisdictions would have 5 or 10 people.” After the 
reorganization, it became increasingly difficult for BC to participate as “half of their 
office had been terminated” and individuals struggled to “muster the energy to come.” 
Consequently, as BC members weighed the costs and benefits of participation, CMP 
activities were not recognized as needed for the province to accomplish its goals. Instead 
CMP involvement was perceived as a “nice to have category” that fell lower in priority 
for BC. 
The proposal for a coal mine in the Flat Head Valley caused an additional 
obstacle to maintaining BC’s engagement with the CMP as tension heightened between 
BC and Montana. There “was quite a bit of opposition to it especially from the U.S.” and 
although members supported CMP’s collaborative goals, some individuals recognized 
that their job was “heading off some of the really disastrous development that has been 
planned in BC.” For representatives from these different jurisdictions to successfully 
work beyond their conflicting views, it was especially important for the CMP to take time 
to build relationships and overcome historical conflicts.  
As the CMP’s membership expanded and relationships strengthened in this period 
of activity, it was important for the organization to have adequate and consistent funding 
for effective organizational functioning. Members claim the CMP “came up with funding 
pretty regularly” from the various agencies and “everyone was pitching in what they 
could” though it was not required to be a CMP member. For example: 
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“All of those funds can be used for projects. They can be used for paying for the 
administration of keeping the partnership, steering committee and all those things 
going, like helping to pay for the annual forum, paying for speakers to come, 
paying for our website. Then beyond that we recognize in-kind donations so 
people who are giving time but not necessarily funding is recognized.”  
With adequate funding and resources, the CMP was able to start synthesizing data 
across jurisdictional and political boundaries. During the growth stage, a data 
management system was established and funded with the Miistakis Institute for the 
Rockies, who “took that data and sort of married it or joined it or sort of ironed out the 
differences between it so that we had a database between the three jurisdictions...” 
However, there were some challenges identified with data management including 
Alberta’s “provincial laws that prevent the province from sharing data” without an 
associated cost.  Additionally, there had to be sufficient resources for data “to be updated 
in the near future because of the dynamic nature.” For example to adequately update and 
maintain data management, one member identified the importance of finding “some 
source of money that provides kind of long term blocks of endowment funds to ensure the 
future of the group.” Members were aware that budget cuts were likely to continue and 
without proper financial planning, this could impact the effectiveness of the CMP: 
“Anytime budgets tighten these sorts of things are the first to go. The partnerships 
that were developed, the relationships we have developed are abandoned, people 
are told to remain in their offices, operate through phone or email…but really you 
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do not get the sense of camaraderie and set on nuances from your team meetings 
as you do when you are in a setting face to face.” 
With the continuous expansion of the organization and increasing activity, the 
CMP created a chair position in the growth stage to “keep things moving forward and 
staying on task.” The chair focused on internal tasks and “their job is to sort of glue all 
of the pieces together ahead of our meetings and formulate an agenda that makes sense 
and to really run us through our phone calls and meetings efficiently.” Many members 
felt that the chair helped keep the group organized and on task, but the true leadership 
was still collectively held as the CMP was described by a member as “a very egalitarian 
group…they [the members] are contributing and it balances out. You know, I really think 
it’s a partnership.” Similarly, another member reflected on the shared leadership model: 
“It is a coalition and collaboration of parties that are collectively feeling the way 
and defining the agenda and owning it. So there isn’t a game plan that a 
controller is imposing. There is a shared journey that we are perceiving and 
implementing collectively.” 
Leadership responsibilities and decisions may have been distributed among the group; 
however there was still recognition that some members play a more influential part to the 
group’s dynamics. For example: 
“The people that were in the core group are extremely passionate and even within 
that core group there are a few members that really kept it going with their 
passion, you know they were the work horse. And in my experience as those 
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people retire [and] are at the retiring age, the whole thing could fall because the 
passion just is not there.” 
Though there was low turnover during the growth stage, the CMP began to plan 
for member retirement and replacement especially after recognizing the impact of certain 
members. There is an understanding that in an organization, “there are constants but 
participation does seem to ebb and flow over time and that’s just part of the voluntary 
nature of the organization.” Strategies were developed to recruit and integrate new 
members and maintain the efforts of the group: 
“A lot of these folks are on the table for retirement and there is not necessarily 
obvious replacements for them and I think those are significant issues that the 
CMP faces and there is potential for those huge gaps for loss of 
participation…there needs to be multiple people from the same agencies 
participating recognizing that when people change you want to have that 
continuity.” 
Members reflected their concern for the organization’s future as members potentially 
changed in coming years:  
“What we were really concerned about was basically how to keep the Crown 
Managers going as those members retire. So it has been very important to us to 
bring new people in to form those relationships and for everyone to become 
familiar with the work and the thinking behind the work that we do and then to 
move it forward.” 
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One strategy implemented in this stage was having current members look within their 
own agencies for potential replacements within their agencies and also to revisit their 
membership to assess who was missing at the table. 
 As the CMP became more focused on their vision and action plan in this stage, 
the organization worked on promoting their image through the development of a 
communication strategy, website, logo, and traveling roadshow. Members recognized 
that building awareness and recognition of the group’s efforts takes time as described by 
an individual: 
“There isn’t like this flash of lightning bolt and this whole world is aware of the 
CMP or these results that we’ve done. If you continue to go slowly and 
methodically over time people will just be aware of the CMP, and they won’t 
know when they became aware of it.”  
The CMP wanted to communicate the message that they were not a top-down initiative 
and that the group wanted to engage with the public and other groups. However, many 
members stated the CMP struggled with developing public awareness of the group as it 
“wasn't something that the public knew about” and was not “on their radar 10 years 
ago.” Another member agrees that there was always discussion about expanding public 
engagement and communications, “but in the early years I think it was envisioned to be a 
much bigger thing.”  Despite that public awareness and involvement was one of CMP’s 
main goals, the organization continually struggled for public support at the local level 
within the large landscape.  
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Though faced with some of its first major obstacles in this stage, the CMP 
continued its progress on the Ecological Health Project as the group expanded its 
membership. Transitioning to the mature stage, the CMP is faced with some new 




This discussion identifies a consistent list of factors influencing success during 
the birth and growth stages of these organizations. Similarities and differences in these 
factors between SAMAB and CMP are discussed and recommended strategies for 
organizations in these stages are provided in the following conclusion.  
Birth Stage 
Unique Organizational Niche 
Though SAMAB and CMP started at different time periods, 1988 and 2001 
respectively, both organizations offered one of the first opportunities for agencies to 
coordinate efforts pertaining to natural resource issues. Being one of the only 
organizations with this niche in their respective “landscapes” meant that the organization 
faced little competition for membership, resources, and support from other organizations. 
Both LSCCOs were fulfilling a distinct and identified need by providing a venue that 
representatives from diverse agencies could openly discuss common issues and work 
together towards common ecosystem management goals.  
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According to niche overlap theory, the more organizations overlap in purpose 
within the same context or region, the greater the competition for resources (Baum & 
Singh, 1994; Hannan, Carroll, & Pólos, 2003; Sohn, 2002). During the early stages of an 
organization’s life, it appears important to fill a distinctive role that sets the organization 
apart from other groups and provides unique benefits to its members. This is thought to 
enhance organizational commitment from agencies and individual representatives and 
easily justify resource allocation for the LSCCO.   
Entrepreneurial Leadership 
Many members of SAMAB and CMP attribute the early success of these 
organizations to a few critical individuals’ vision and efforts. Several even suggest that 
without the driving force of these individuals, SAMAB and CMP would not exist. The 
leaders who facilitated the early meetings and the establishment of SAMAB and CMP 
possessed certain characteristics that appeared important for an LSCCO in its birth stage. 
Similar to results from studies investigating other LSCCOs such as Powell et al., (2009), 
these attributes included being energetic, dedicated, highly-respected and well-
established in their field, and visionary, especially pertaining to articulating the goals of 
the organization (Katz, 2000, Northouse, 2007). Early SAMAB and CMP leaders also 
possessed skills that promoted participant involvement (Schein, 2004) by establishing a 
collaborative environment and empowering members to undertake tasks.  
While SAMAB and CMP both had key individuals involved from the onset, the 
formalization of leadership positions differed greatly between the two groups. Soon after 
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SAMAB was established, there was a push to hire an executive director. When the first 
executive director was eventually selected, the individual had a strong economic 
background and relational skills to help in networking and securing resources in his 
position. In contrast, the CMP had a collective leadership where there was no formal 
leadership position; instead leadership was shared among the members of the group. This 
form of distributive leadership has recently been identified as important for successful 
large landscape conservation efforts (Imperial et al., forthcoming). As a result, CMP 
operated under a much more flexible and fluid leadership structure where responsibilities 
were shared among all members, though some members may have shown more initiative 
than others.  
Similar to other organizations, LSCCOs to get started there is a need for dedicated 
and motivated leaders to drive the process. However, the leadership model can differ 
depending on the LSCCO. The formalized leadership of SAMAB allowed for a faster 
start for the LSCCO to establish its membership, allocate resources, and promote its 
image to gain support for SAMAB’s efforts. While having a paid and formal leader can 
be beneficial, this requires the LSCCO to already have funding and resources established 
to support the leader and staff which may be problematic for LSCCOs that are more 
informally organized like the CMP.  
High-Level Support  
Because of their operational spatial scale, LSCCOs need to recruit large agencies 
and groups versus individuals and smaller stakeholder groups. Engaging these large 
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organizations in LSCCOs necessitates commitment and support from high-level 
leadership. Political and high-level support has been found to improve organizational 
functionality and can come in many forms such as funding, resources, and legislation 
(Carr, Selin, & Schuett, 1998; Gray, 1989; Leach & Pelkey, 2001; Margerum, 2002a; 
Schuett et al., 2001; Uitto & Duda, 2002; Yaffee & Wondolleck, 2003a). This study’s 
findings support earlier research that identified the impact of political changes (Powell et 
al., 2009) and the necessity for political support to be adaptable to accommodate 
changing conditions for successful long-term resource management (Margerum & 
Whitall, 2004; Margerum, 2011; Raadgever, Mostert, Kranz, Interwies, & Timmerman, 
2008).  
High-level agency and political support was critical to SAMAB and CMP’s early 
success. For SAMAB in particular, the ED1’s major role was reaching out to high-level 
directors and obtaining commitment for membership and resources. These efforts 
included regular briefings and interactions with agency leaders in the region and political 
figures in Washington D.C and the international MAB program to keep them informed 
and supportive of SAMAB. While CMP did not have an ED, soliciting high-level support 
was recognized as essential especially with the constant changes that occur within 
agencies and governments. In an effort to create long-term political commitment, the 
CMP tried to formalize relations between Montana, Alberta, and B.C. through 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs). Though MOUs eased interactions and 
transactions across the international borders, many CMP members felt that the political 
arena was fairly unaware of CMP beyond specific agency involvement.  
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Changes in the political environments are not a new challenge nor will they be 
less of a challenge in the future. However, LSCCOs can prepare themselves in their early 
stages with strong high-level support through continuous communication at the local, 
regional, national, and international levels that can help sustain the LSCCO in future 
stages. Previous research highlights the importance for organizations to have a clear 
strategy for communicating with these high-level directors and political figures to 
illustrate the short and long-term benefits of participation such as efficient use of funding 
and leveraging additional resources (Gray, 1989; Margerum, 2011; Shaw, 2003; 
Thomson & Perry, 2006).  
Strategic Membership 
One lesson that can be drawn from both SAMAB and CMP is the need to recruit 
not only member agencies that are strategically important across the landscape, but also 
to recruit the “right” representative(s) from these agencies and groups to participate in the 
activities of the LSCCO. Results suggest that early success of the LSCCOs was 
dependent on the individual members and their level of commitment. This translated to a 
membership that committed time to the activities of the LSCCO, held positions that could 
mobilize resources within their respective agency (usually high level managers within 
their respective agencies), and were not too specialized in their professions and could 
address issues creatively.  Some of these skills have been identified in the literature such 
as the ability to work cooperatively (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001) and willingness and 
motivation to participate in the group (Powell et al., 2009). However, if the selection 
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process is not clear as to what the collaborative group needs to accomplish their efforts, 
individual representatives can vary in their authority levels, skills, and areas of expertise 
within their respective group.  
While SAMAB and CMP sought similar attributes of their representatives, the 
level that the members operated within their respective agencies differed greatly between 
the LSCCOs. For example, SAMAB’s initial membership was represented by top 
regional directors that could allocate resources, make internal policy decisions, and 
garner regional and national support within their respective agencies which increased 
SAMAB’s efficiency in its birth stage.  In comparison, CMP purposely did not have the 
top executive directors as representatives on the steering committee because the group 
felt that top directors would lack the flexibility and time for LSCCO efforts. However, 
this meant that most CMP members could not always make major decisions without 
checking with their respective agency. Despite these differences, SAMAB and CMP were 
able to attract motivated, enthusiastic, and skilled members to their LSCCOs that enabled 
the organizations’ continued growth.  
 
Growth Stage 
Project with High Appeal and Utility 
In the birth stage, SAMAB and CMP focused on defining their missions. 
Transitioning to the growth stage, these organizations focused on developing and 
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implementing action plans. During this stage, SAMAB and CMP both conducted a range 
of activities focused on varying topics and scale. But one key attribute of both 
organizations during this phase was that they identified and developed signature projects 
that motivated and excited their membership, had demonstrable benefits to all members, 
and while challenging, were achievable. These projects, the Southern Appalachian 
Assessment (SAA) and the Ecological Health Project (EHP) also shared several 
characteristics: they both involved collecting and synthesizing data from multiple 
institutions to produce integrated landscape scale information that informed decision-
making.  
As they worked towards these common goals, the SAA and EHP created a sense 
of unity and purpose among members, which strengthened confidence and excitement 
that the group was making progress. Both projects were viewed as relevant and important 
to the diverse membership, which in previous studies was critical for instilling 
commitment to the project and organization (Powell, 2010; Thomson & Perry, 2006). 
Though the SAA and EHP were long-term projects, these organizations also set clear 
incremental objectives and recognized their achievements while continuing forward, 
which has been identified as critical for maintaining the momentum of a project (Powell 
et al., 2009).  
Formal and Informal “Face to Face” Meetings 
The growth stage marked a critical time for developing professional and personal 
relationships among members. For SAMAB and CMP, most members had limited 
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experience working together, across boundaries, and through a collaborative process. 
Each member originated from an agency with distinct missions, goals, languages, and 
values that can make it difficult for individuals to understand or relate to the other 
members without having adequate time to learn and discuss their similarities and 
differences (Berkes, 2004; Cash et al., 2006; Kittinger, Duin, & Wilcox, 2010). Though 
personal relationships are not created overnight, both groups could not emphasize enough 
the importance of overcoming historical conflicts and stereotypes to support greater 
understanding for members’ backgrounds and how other agencies function.  For the CMP 
in particular there was some historical controversy among participating jurisdictions over 
a proposed mine in the Crown that required members to understand each other’s different 
perspectives on the issue.  
Both SAMAB and CMP identified numerous opportunities for informal 
interactions in the growth stage and that often times members’ emotional relationships 
were strengthened during field trips, dinners, and overnight excursions. These forms of 
communication have been identified in the literature for contributing to relationship-
building and trust (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Carr et al., 1998; Crotty, Henderson, & Fuller, 
2012; Jansujwicz & Calhoun, 2010b; Johnson et al., 2003; Kotlarsky & Oshri, 2005; 
Margerum & Whitall, 2004; Powell et. al, 2009; Powell, 2010; Schuett et al., 2001; 
Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). This research demonstrated how SAMAB and CMP 
members transitioned from acquaintances to friends by the end of the growth stage and 
how these relationships impacted their personal investment in the LSCCO. Strengthening 
members’ relationships to each other and to the group can translate to increased 
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benevolence (Mayer & Davis, 1999), reciprocal accountability (Roberts, 2001), and 
attitudinal organizational commitment (Powell et al., 2009).   
Although, it was stressed that individuals need to meet formally and informally on 
a regular basis, SAMAB and CMP members noted the difficulty of travel restrictions 
especially for the long distances necessary to get to meetings within the large landscape. 
It has been found that operating at larger spatial scales can increase the distance between 
members, limiting the frequency and type of interactions (San Martín-Rodríguez et al., 
2005). As a result, phone and video conferencing has been increasingly used for 
communication among LSCCO partners, though these findings indicate they may be a 
poor substitute for face-to-face meetings especially in the early phases of an organization.  
Anticipation of Member Changes  
Overall, the birth and growth stages experienced low turnover of the original 
SAMAB and CMP members as they were highly engaged in the activity and expansion of 
the organization. This loyalty and growing identity to the organization has been 
associated with stronger commitment and lower absenteeism (Deery & Iverson, 2005) 
and can also contribute to positive performance (Riketta, 2002) as demonstrated by the 
low turnover and highly productive activity of SAMAB and CMP in this stage. However, 
the CMP showed that it is never too early to start planning for member secession. In 
anticipation of membership turnover, the CMP recruited and groomed potential 
replacements to ease the transition. For example, some of the potential new members 
would accompany the current members to meetings to orient them to the organization’s 
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efforts.  In contrast, SAMAB did not start planning for member secession during these 
early stages.  
Others have noted that one of the biggest challenges to organizations is 
membership turnover, which can quickly erode LSCCOs functioning (Elbakidze et al., 
2010; Powell, 2010). Though the growth stage is characterized by high momentum, it is 
important for LSCCOs to proactively plan for future turnover of original members to 
maintain efficient organizational functioning and maintain member commitment. For the 
long-term viability of the organization, it appears imperative to anticipate and prepare for 
membership turnover through training and incorporating new members (Powell et al., 
2009).  
Adequate and Diverse Resources 
During the early phases, each member agency contributed resources and 
maintained a line item in their annual budget to ensure the stability of SAMAB and CMP. 
Diverse and consistent funding contributes to the long-term resilience and sustainability 
of  organizations (Margerum, 2002a, 2011; Raadgever et al., 2008) and is important to an 
organization’s early stages of development (Dodge et al., 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; 
Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Kimberly, 1980; Schein, 2004; Sirmon et al., 2010; 
Whetten, 1980a).  This is especially important for LSCCOs as they operate beyond the 
typical temporal and spatial scales of many organizations. Several CMP members noted 
that reliance on agencies for operational budgets may jeopardize future functioning if and 
when agency budget cuts occur. Meanwhile, SAMAB did not seem to anticipate or worry 
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about agency budget cuts which may be a result of the long time frame between 
SAMAB’s growth stage in the 90s and the economic decline that did not occur until the 
2000s. Up to this point, SAMAB’s federal and state agencies had not experienced the 
extreme funding cuts and travel restrictions that are commonplace today.  
Support for Members’ Involvement 
In addition to funding, SAMAB and CMP members cited the need for ample 
support from their respective organizations to effectively participate in the LSCCO. 
Previous studies have found extensive time commitment and lack of support from upper-
level management as major challenges for participants (Carr et al., 1998; Yaffee & 
Wondolleck, 2003a). For some SAMAB and CMP members, participation in the LSCCO 
was part of their individual performance goals for their job granting them adequate time 
and resources to engage in the collaborative process. Meanwhile, other members had a 
personal commitment to the LSCCO, but struggled to find time and resources for 
participation. Depending on the priorities of the agency and supervisor, participants may 
have variations in their available time and energy (Thomson & Perry, 2006). In turn, 
members’ perceived support from their supervisor can influence their level of 
commitment and performance to the organization (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002). Being 
transparent and upfront in the process with supervisors from the start can ensure 
commitment and adequate resources for the representatives involved and decrease power 




Leadership Networked in the External Environment 
The leadership models continued to differ between SAMAB and CMP in the 
growth stage. SAMAB still retained the original executive director that worked on getting 
SAMAB established in the birth stage. This ED1 was skilled at political networking and 
obtaining support and resources for SAMAB as it grew rapidly in membership and 
activity. Leadership focused on the external environment (Hill, 2007) appeared critical 
for administering the SAA during this period while gaining the national and international 
recognition for SAMAB as a role model program. Some of ED1’s roles have been found 
in previous studies such as communicating external information to the group (Robbins & 
Judge, 2007) and building relationships with influential groups (Chrislip & Larson, 1994; 
Margerum, 2011). In addition his relational skills with people such as being tactful, 
diplomatic, and sociable (Northouse, 2007) have been integral to his activities in the 
external environment.  
While CMP did not hire an executive director position, the group did create a 
chair position for the steering committee during this stage. However, the role of chair 
differed greatly from SAMAB’s executive director. Instead of a typical “leader,” the 
chair was more of a facilitator who organized meetings. This type of leadership focuses 
on internal tasks and tends to carry out day-to-day functioning for the organization (Hill, 
2007). Despite the creation of this position, CMP’s maintained its distributive leadership. 
This collective effort supports different leaders coming to the forefront based on their 
strengths and interests (Imperial et al. forthcoming). Although members noted that there 
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were several individuals that had a greater influence because of their conceptual and 
visionary skills.  
Without an executive director that was skilled at securing resources and 
promoting the organization, SAMAB most likely would have struggled to implement the 
SAA so early in its existence. However, large amounts of responsibility and pressure 
were concentrated on SAMAB’s executive director versus being distributed among the 
CMP members.  
Public Support  
In both the birth and growth stages, SAMAB and CMP focused on developing a 
positive image and raising awareness of the groups’ efforts to the participating agencies 
and to the public. SAMAB’s image was closely linked to the national and international 
MAB programs which helped SAMAB gain recognition as a role model biosphere 
reserve that attracted international visitors to learn from their management strategies and 
led to it being nominated for awards. Though the CMP also encompassed biosphere 
reserve units, the group did not identify itself with the international MAB program. 
Instead, CMP focused its efforts on defining the boundaries of the Crown and creating a 
communication and outreach strategy within that region. 
Some of the strategies used by SAMAB and CMP in this stage included a 
newsletter, annual forum, and website. Despite these efforts, both LSCCOs struggled to 
engage and inform the public. This has been an issue identified by previous research 
demonstrating that when organizations operate at larger spatial scales, it can become 
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increasingly difficult to effectively engage and communicate with the public and other 
groups despite its necessity (Abel & Stephan, 2000; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005; Margerum 
& Whitall, 2004;  Margerum, 2011; Stern & Predmore, 2011). SAMAB and CMP 
members recognized the importance of public support and engagement in comparison to 
other studies that found some interdisciplinary teams in the U.S. Forest Service viewed 
public involvement just as a requirement (Stern & Predmore, 2012).  The large landscape 
appears to heighten the challenges of promoting image and awareness for LSCCOs which 
may require unique strategies to reach the diverse and broad audiences within the 
designated region. Social media and more untraditional marketing schemes may become 
a new outlet for agencies to gain public support. For example, NASA has one of the most 
followed Twitter accounts in the government, while other agencies have struggled with 




Despite the increasing popularity of LSCCOs over the past few decades, there has 
been limited research on how these types of organizations are created and develop in their 
early stages. This research offers insight into the influential factors that support or inhibit 
success of LSCCOs during the birth and growth stages. Because LSCCOs are a relatively 
new type of organization, this research provides theoretical contributions pertaining to 
collaborative organizations that are voluntary in membership, operate across political and 
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jurisdictional boundaries at the landscape scale, and bring together diverse entities to 
reach collective conservation and management goals.  
Based on the findings from the SAMAB and CMP case studies, this research can 
offer practical recommendations for other LSCCOs in their birth and growth stages. Brief 
recommendations are provided in Table 3.4 for each of the influential factors outlined in 
the previous discussion. This research and the following recommendations should be 
viewed as an initial jumping off point for further research on the factors influencing 
LSCCO success in the birth and growth stages of their organizational life cycle. To 
advance the theoretical underpinnings of LSCCOs, future research recommendations 
include: 1) develop a framework with quantitative measures for LSCCO life stages, 2) 
continue longitudinal research on SAMAB and CMP in addition to other recently 
emerging LSSCOs, and 3) research LSCCOs in different settings and with variations of 
membership representation.  
Table 3.4 Recommendations for factors influencing success in the birth and growth 
stages of a LSCCO’s organizational life cycle.  
Recommendations for LSCCO’s Birth Stage 
 
 Find your Unique Organizational Niche: Assess what organizations currently exist 
in the landscape and whether the purpose of the proposed organization fills an 
unfilled. Find ways to complement versus compete with current organizations and 
clearly establish your mission and the unique benefits of participating in your 
LSCCO. 
 
 Support Entrepreneurial Leadership: Well-respected and well-known leaders in 
their professional field are needed to coordinate the initial meeting to determine if the 
idea will turn into an organization. These individuals need to have the motivation, 
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charisma, and expertise to generate excitement and support among the agencies and 
other groups for the LSCCO idea.  
 
 Gain High-Level Support: Though high-level directors may not act as the LSCCO 
representatives, there should be regular communication to ensure awareness and 
sustained commitment to the LSCCO and its efforts. Formalized support such as a 
MOU or interagency agreement can help support long-term commitment, but there 
should also be ongoing communication as political leadership turnover will frequently 
occur and the new directors may not be aware of the commitments set by earlier 
directors. This communication can come in the form of briefings, invitations to the 
meetings, or strategic communication between members and their respective 
agencies.  
 
 Strategically Recruit Representatives: Set clear expectations and have a two-way 
process to ensure an ideal match that meets the needs of the LSCCO, the 
representative, and their respective agency. Some of the desired characteristics and 
skills include high levels of passion and commitment, ability to dedicate time to the 
LSCCO, ability to think broadly and willingness to work with diverse individuals and 
perspectives.  
 
Recommendations for LSCCO’s Growth Stage 
 
 Find a Unifying Project: After establishing the LSCCO’s vision and mission, it is 
time to transition from planning to action to maintain the interest and commitment of 
the members. Select a project that is perceived as relevant and important to all 
members and set benchmarks within the long-term project to celebrate achievements.  
 
 Form Professional and Personal Relationships: Create opportunities for regular 
face-to-face contact in formal meetings and informal social settings such as field trips, 
dinners, and overnight retreats. Create a trusting and supportive atmosphere for 
members to learn about each other and their respective agencies to create a shared 
identity with each other and the LSCCO. 
 
 Plan Ahead for Turnover: Develop a plan for member secession and new member 
orientation that may not occur until later stages. Planning strategies can include 
identifying potential replacement representatives and inviting them to meetings along 
with the current representative. In addition, start creating an orientation process for 





 Acquire Diverse Funding and Resources: Develop a sustainable funding model 
through exploring a variety of sources and planning long-term budgets. During the 
early stages of the organization, LSCCOs should have clear communication with 
representatives and their supervisors about the expectations and needs for participation 
in the LSCCO to ensure that representatives have adequate resources and support such 
as time and travel to stay involved with the LSCCO.  
 
 Obtain Support for Members’ Involvement: Be transparent and upfront in the 
process with supervisors to ensure commitment and adequate resources, such as time, 
funding, and travel, for the representatives involved and decrease power differentials 
among members.  
 
 Leadership Activity in the External Environment: Select leaders that are focused 
on reaching out to the external environment and are skilled in networking, obtaining 
resources, and generating interest and support for the LSCCO. During this stage of 
growth and high activity, leadership roles can also be distributed among the LSCCO as 
members’ strengths emerge.  
 
 Promote Public Image: Create a consistent image and an awareness of the LSCCO’s 
mission and efforts that can be communicated through diverse strategies to various 
audiences and the public.  Utilize social media and technological advances to promote 





WE MADE IT THIS FAR, NOW WHAT? FACTORS INFLUENCING 





It has been well established that for conservation organizations and land 
management agencies to combat transboundary threats like climate change, they have to 
operate at a larger geographic scale. Consequently, there has been an emergence in the 
past few decades of landscape-scale collaborative conservation organizations (LSCCOs) 
that transcend political and institutional boundaries. As these organizations evolve past 
their early stages of birth and growth, they begin to mature and focus on maintaining 
stability and sustaining action. How an organization anticipates and responds to 
opportunities and challenges in this stage can influence the sustainability and success of 
its future. Yet, we have a limited knowledge of the influential factors that support or 
inhibit success during the LSCCO’s maturity stage and determine whether a LSCCO 
continues to sustain itself or enters a state of decline. To address these gaps, a 
comparative case study analysis was conducted of two longstanding LSCCOs, the Crown 
Managers Partnership (CMP) and the Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere 
Cooperative (SAMAB).  These LSCCOs work to support collaboration among agencies, 
conservationists, and other stakeholders for the conservation and restoration of the 
northern Rocky Mountains and the Southern Appalachians in North America. This paper 
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presents the findings of nearly 57 interviews and an extensive review of organizational 
documents that identify the influential internal and external factors that can support or 
impede sustained action during the maturity stage of these types of LSCCOs. The results 
provide insight into the challenges facing SAMAB and CMP during the maturity stage 
and offer strategies for similar mature LSCCOs to sustain themselves for long-term 




Our natural environment is challenged by anthropocentric threats including 
climate change, air pollution, habitat fragmentation, and invasive species (Soule & 
Terborgh, 1999). Often these threats transcend political and institutional jurisdictions and 
extend beyond traditional park and protected areas’ boundaries (Lidskog and Elander 
2010). Because of these challenges, many land management and conservation 
organizations recognize the need to manage at larger spatial and longer temporal scales 
that can more effectively support viable populations and ecological processes (Dobson et 
al., 1999; Groves et al., 2002; Simberloff et al., 1999). However, managing at the 
landscape scale requires individual institutions and organizations to operate across 
traditional jurisdictional boundaries and therefore partner and collaborate with other 
organizations if effective and sustained action is going to occur. 
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One mechanism for addressing transboundary issues has been the formation of 
landscape-scale collaborative conservation organizations (LSCCOs) that undertake land 
management planning and actions at the landscape scale. There has been a recent 
emergence of LSCCOs in an attempt to increase scale of activities to match landscape, 
reduce redundancy, and increase efficient use of limited resources. Because LSCCOs are 
relatively new compared to other types of organizations, there has been limited research 
investigating the unique conditions necessary to support their effective functioning. More 
importantly, why do some LSCCOs sustain action in their maturity stage while others do 
not? This study examined two types of LSCCOs to explore the factors that support 
success and sustained action during their maturity stage.   
Unique Attributes of LSCCOs 
While many different types of organizations have been studied extensively in the 
literature; LSCCOs have largely been ignored. LSCCO’s are unique in several ways. 
First, LSCCOs operate at the landscape scale, often extending across state and country 
borders, and transcend traditional institutional, political, and jurisdictional boundaries. 
Second, LSCCOs operate as umbrella organizations that are made up of representatives 
from multiple organizations and agencies. Third, participation in LSCCOs is voluntary 
which can make it difficult to hold members and their respective organizations 
accountable for any tasks or actions.  Lastly, LSCCOs are designed to be collaborative in 
nature by bringing together diverse groups; however each member group has their own 
distinct mission, goals, and operating procedures. Therefore, representatives’ jobs and 
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their respective agency’s missions may align more or less with the LSCCOs mission than 
other representatives and agencies.  
Types of LSCCOs 
While LSSCOs encompass unique characteristics, different types of LSCCOs 
exist depending on their membership, focus, scale, and network association (see Table 
4.1). First, LSCCOs’ membership may vary from mainly government agencies to private 
landowners to NGOs. Membership may be dominated by one type of group, such as 
federal agencies, while others may have a very diverse membership. Second, LSCCOs’ 
goals and mission may differ. One end of the spectrum often focuses on the general 
management of the area in question. Examples include organizations that employ 
ecosystem management or integrated coastal management, such as the Heart of the 
Rockies Initiative. At the other end of the spectrum are organizations that focus on one 
issue or species, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Joint Ventures Program. In 
addition, there are some LSCCOs that focus on identifying and protecting land, such as 
collaborative land trust organizations, and others focus on management of an area. Third, 
although LSCCOs operate within landscapes and transcend boundaries, there can be 
variations in scale. For example, some LSCCOs may be organized around watersheds, 
such as the Salmon Falls Watershed Initiative. Meanwhile other LSCCOs extend beyond 
international boundaries such as Two Countries, One Forest. Lastly, LSCCOs may be 
associated with a broader network of other LSCCOs, such as the Landscape Conservation 
Cooperatives, or operate as a stand-alone entity.  
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Table 4.1 Different characteristics contributing to variations in LSCCOs.  
Membership:  
the individuals or 




Mission focus:  
the level of 
specificity in the 
LSCCO’s 
mission/goals 
Boundary scale:  
the types of political 




networks of similar 
LSCCOs  
 
 Agencies  
 Political figures 




 Preservation vs. 
management 
 Only focus on a 
specific issue 
and/or species 





 City, county, 
district, etc. 
Generally within 
a single state or 
province 
 Multiple states or 
provinces 
 Multiple countries 
 
 Originated as a 
stand-alone entity 
 Originated as part 
of a broader 
network  
 
Opportunities and Challenges of LSCCOs 
These LSCCOs attempt to bring together different agencies and groups within a 
landscape to work together towards common conservation and natural resource 
management goals. This purpose brings a number of challenges. For example, there can 
be legal issues pertaining to political boundaries and differing managerial approaches by 
the varying agencies (Kittinger et al., 2011). Additional challenges include differences in 
members’ perspective (Berkes, 2004), language/discourse (Cash et al., 2006), and  
commitment to the range of issues (Cash et al., 2006; Margerum, 2008). Neuman (2005) 
also found disjointed processes due to multiple authoritative roles, lack of institutional 
managerial structure, and difficulty in evaluating success. These examples present 
general obstacles; however it is hypothesized that there are specific factors that can 
influence success of LSCCOs during specific stages of an organization’s life cycle. 
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Organizational Life Cycle  
The organizational life cycle model operates under the assumption that 
organizations follow a predictable pattern and transition through different stages from 
birth through growth and maturation and possibly decline and revival (Miller & Friesen, 
1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). According to this theory, each stage of an organization’s 
life cycle is associated with unique characteristics, challenges, and opportunities that 
distinguish it from the other stages (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). Organizations can 
differ in focus, structure, relations, resources, leadership, power, and commitment during 
the different life cycle stages. For example, members may focus on getting to know each 
other and building trust and relationships in the earlier organizational stages versus 
having strong personal and professional relationships in the organization’s maturity stage.    
Life cycle analysis has been applied to different types of organizations, such as 
corporations and non-profit organizations, and in a variety of fields including education, 
business, natural resource management, and online communities (Cameron & Whetten, 
1981; Dodge et al., 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; 
Kimberly & Miles, 1980; Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Moores & Yuen, 
2001; Pinto & Prescott, 1988; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Sirmon et al., 2010; Smith & 
Miner, 1983).  
In the literature there are numerous life cycle frameworks and models with 
diverse names for the stages. For example, the conception stage has also been referred to 
as the birth, courtship, first, entrepreneurial, and first stage. Based on our review of the 
153 
 
organizational stages in the literature, we utilized the following names for the five life 
cycle stages in this study following Miller & Friesen (1984): 1) Birth Stage, 2) Growth 
Stage, 3) Maturity Stage, 4) Decline Stage, and/or 5) Revival Stage. The focus of this 
paper is on the maturity stage and the factors that contribute to an organization’s success. 
The following sections describes this stage in further detail and Table 4.2 provides a 
summary of the characteristics associated with the maturity stage based on a review of 
the general organizational life cycle literature. Though, we still do not know what factors 
lead to success for LSCCOs in this stage.  
Maturity Stage 
After periods of growth and development, an organization focuses on maintaining 
its level of activity and maximizing efficiency (Dodge et al., 1994; Jawahar & 
McLaughlin, 2001; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Moores & Yuen, 2001; Quinn & Cameron, 
1983; Sirmon et al., 2010). By the maturity stage, members have formed strong personal 
relations from relationship and trust building in earlier stages (Adizes, 1979; Lodahl & 
Mitchell, 1980). Consequently, members can efficiently work together and often form 
subgroups with individual leaders (Gray, 1989; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Margerum, 2011; 
Miller & Friesen, 1984; Schein, 2004).  
Coinciding with these changes, the original leaders and founders often leave the 
organization by the maturity stage (Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984). Under 
new leadership, the organization decides whether to keep its original mission or change 
focus (Lodahl & Mitchell, 1980; Schein, 2004). Members’ support for new ideas and 
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change can create division within the group. For example, some organizations encourage 
innovative thinking and risk-taking (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Lester et al., 2003; 
Sirmon et al., 2010). Meanwhile, others have documented an overall reduction in 
innovation during this stage (Dodge et al., 1994; Koberg et al., 1996; Miller & Friesen, 
1984; Schein, 2004). As the organization continues to mature, its anticipation and 
responses to change can influence whether it enters the decline stage or continues to 
progress in its maturity. 
Table 4.2 Summary of characteristics of the maturity stage compiled from the 
organizational life cycle literature.  
Factors Maturity Stage 
Organizational Focus Stabilizing operations and maintaining activity 
Vision/Mission Potential for organizational drift from original 
mission 
Leadership Leader supports subgroups and distributes control  




Personal relationships among members, need for 




Divide over whether this stage supports or inhibits 
adaptation and innovation 
 
 
Need for Study  
There is recognition that conservation organizations and agencies need to manage 
at larger spatial scales to address transboundary issues threatening our natural 
environment. Though numerous LSCCOs have been established over the past decade, we 
are limited in our knowledge of how an LSCCO reaches maturation and the factors 
during this stage that influence whether it sustains action in the maturity stage or starts to 
decline.  To address these challenges and gaps in the literature, this paper seeks to 
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identify the factors influencing how a LSCCO maintains success in the maturity stage 




A comparative case study approach (see Yin, 2009) was used to address the 
following research question: What internal and external factors support or inhibit success 
during the maturity stage of a landscape-scale collaborative conservation organization? 
We selected two LSCCOs as case studies, the Southern Appalachian Man and the 
Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB) and the Crown Managers Partnership (CMP), because 
they both operated at a transboundary scale, focused on natural resource management and 
conservation, were comprised of multiple federal and state agencies, and were long 
standing organizations that have been in existence for more than 10 years (see Table 4.3 
for more details). 
Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB) 
Great Smoky Mountains National Park was established as a biosphere reserve in 
1976. SAMAB was established as an organization in 1988 to facilitate communication 
and coordination of efforts of federal and state agencies within the Southern Appalachian 
region. The organization’s membership included mainly federal agencies and state 
agencies that extended to six states in the southeastern United States: Alabama, Georgia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. This temperate region boasts 
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high biodiversity and encompasses 37.4 million acres, seven national forests, and two 
national parks (Tonn et al., 2006). For over two decades, SAMAB has served as a forum 
in the Southern Appalachians for agency collaboration on a variety of issues including air 
quality, invasive species management, an annual forum, and a large scale assessment of 
the landscape.  
Crown Managers Partnership (CMP) 
In 1932, an international peace park was established between Montana’s Glacier 
National Park and Alberta’s Waterton National Park. The peace park designation was the 
initial transboundary effort within the region, referred to as the “Crown of the Continent” 
ecosystem. Embedded within the larger Yellowstone to Yukon ecosystem (Y2Y), the 
Crown covers over 28,000 square miles of the northern Rocky Mountain region and 
includes parts of Montana, Alberta, and British Columbia.  In 2001, agencies within the 
“Crown” coordinated a meeting in Cranbrook, British Columbia to address current and 
emerging transboundary issues. Soon after this initial meeting, the Crown Managers 
Partnership (CMP) was officially formed an organizational entity comprised of mainly 
federal, state, and provincial agencies. For over a decade, CMP has served as a forum for 
interagency collaboration and has initiated numerous projects such as aquatic invasive 
species management, grizzly bear management, and an ecological monitoring program 
focused on a variety of indicators.  
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Table 4.3 Summary of similarities between SAMAB and CMP as comparative case 
studies. 
Characteristic SAMAB CMP 
Transboundary 
area 
• Encompassing Southern Appalachian 
region and extends to six states: 
Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia  
 
• Encompassing the shared Rocky 
Mountain region of Montana, British 
Columbia and Alberta, this ecological 
complex spreads across two nations; 
one state and two provinces; 28,000 
square mile  
Focus  • Conserve and sustain the use of natural 
ecosystems of the region and their 
genetic resources  
• Integrate conservation of natural 
resources with regional land uses  
• Demonstrate methodologies for sharing 
information and improving management 
skills  
• Foster public understanding of issues 
through education 
 
• Addressing cumulative effects of 
human activities across the ecosystem 
• Addressing increased public interest in 
how lands are managed and how 
decisions are reached 
• Addressing increases recreational 
demands and increased visitation 
• Collaborate in sharing data, 
standardizing assessment, and 
monitoring methodologies 
• Addressing the maintenance and 
sustainability of shared wildlife 
populations 
Membership • Federal and state agencies, universities • Federal, provincial, and state agencies, 
universities 






To identify and explore the factors influencing success of LSCCOs during the 
maturity stage, there were multiple phases of data collection and analysis. First, two 
forms of data were collected for this comparative case study: secondary data and semi-
structured interviews. Second, timelines were created for each organization’s history to 
identify significant changes, events, and accomplishments. Third, the data was 
triangulated and coded for factors and assigned to a timeline period. Fourth, life cycle 
stages were assigned to the timeline periods based on criteria from a review of the 
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organizational life cycle literature. Fifth, each life cycle stage was examined for 
similarities and differences between the two case studies resulting in the emergence of 
critical factors that influenced success for each organizational life cycle stage.  
Data Collection 
Two forms of data collection (secondary data, semi-structured interviews) were 
used based on recommendations by Yin (2009) and Patton (2002). First, secondary data 
in the form of letters, meeting minutes, administrative documents and reports, articles, 
etc. were collected from SAMAB and CMP.  We obtained these documents from 
organizational leaders and individual members. We also conducted a literature review to 
identify peer reviewed and publicly available documents. 
To complement the information found in the secondary data, we conducted 57 
semi-structured interviews (SAMAB = 41, CMP = 16) with past and present 
organizational members following recommendations by Seidman (2006).  The 
interviewees’ duration of organizational involvement ranged from less than a year to over 
twenty years and they represented different federal, state, and provincial agencies and 
universities. To ensure temporal representation, we interviewed at least two members for 
every year of the organizations’ history. To ensure accuracy and reliability, interviews 
were recorded, transcribed, and interviewees had the opportunity to review the 





We assigned life cycle stages based on concurrent research conducted by 
Thomsen, et. al. (see Chapter 2). We then examined and coded all data collected 
pertaining to the maturity stage to identify factors and characteristics that were using a 
qualitative data analysis program (MaxQDA). Patterns and themes emerged that 
represented the factors that influenced success during the maturity stage of each 
organization (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Case studies were then compared and 
contrasted to identify broad similarities and differences to generate overall themes from 




SAMAB’s Maturity Stage 
During SAMAB’s birth and growth stages, the organization expanded 
membership and increased productivity with the initiation of the Southern Appalachian 
Assessment (SAA). SAMAB’s first executive director (ED1) was skilled at acquiring 
resources from the agencies. In addition, SAMAB had strong support from the 
international MAB program and was perceived as a role model for transboundary 
ecosystem management. Entering the maturity stage, the SAA was recognized as one of 
the first landscape-scale assessments and SAA reports were distributed at high demand. 
For the SAA efforts, SAMAB was awarded the U.S. Forest Service’s Ecosystem 
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Management Award and the National Performance Review’s prestigious Hammer 
Award.  
After the SAA’s completion, ED1 announced his retirement. In search for a new 
director, SAMAB sought an individual with technical and scientific skills that could lead 
an effort to translate the SAA data into useful information. The second executive director 
(ED2) was described as “more of a scientist” and “intellectual leader” who transitioned 
to “a big focus on sort of the technology.” For example, one of ED2’s main efforts was 
integrating the SAA into a usable form: 
 “How do we try to take this product that we created, the Southern Appalachian 
Assessment, how do we put that on the internet? How do we get this information 
out? How do we do a regular update? How do we get beyond just the sort of the 
piece of data to actually doing things with the data? So it kind of moved from a 
static presentation of information to how do we actually utilize that?” 
Once hired, ED2 led efforts to manage and translate the SAA data over the next five 
years. SAMAB conducted a multi-day Community Sustainability Indicators workshop for 
the SAA to be used by local communities. A report was published identifying 
environmental, economic, social, and cross-cutting sustainability indicators and 
eventually Chattanooga served a pilot project.  
To further manage and translate the SAA data, SAMAB hired a data specialist 
and formed a Research and Monitoring Committee. SAMAB’s continued efforts to 
improve the database resulted in changing the SAA’s name and structure. For example, 
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the SAA became SARIS, the internet-based Southeastern Regional Information System 
(SARIS). By 2001, SARIS had made considerable advances in data mapping and then 
later changed to the Southern Appalachian Information Node (SAIN) after working in 
conjunction with the National Biological Information Infrastructure.  
Outside SAA data management, SAMAB initiated additional efforts including 
watershed and invasive species programs. These efforts attempted to increase public 
awareness, conduct research, guide management, and restore areas. Another major 
accomplishment during this stage was the completion of SAMI, a 10-year effort to 
describe and predict air pollution effects in the Southern Appalachians that began as a 
SAMAB offshoot project. These initiatives helped SAMAB maintain the high levels of 
activity and strong reputation from its birth and growth stages. 
Many of the original members that remained involved with SAMAB had 
established strong professional and personal relationships after working so many years 
together. One member noted “the collegiality you have with the people that believe in 
SAMAB is kind of the heart of it.” Many members stated how they “value the 
friendships” and described SAMAB as “a group of old friends that liked getting 
together…they had an emotional connection with SAMAB.” Their emotional connections 
generated group identity and accountability among members: 
“You do build a sentiment towards an organization that you spend some time 
with. You do want to see again the people at the table, you enjoy their company. 
So you like going to the executive committees because you want to talk with 
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different folks you have not seen for a while. And so the camaraderie was one of 
the impetuses for staying involved.” 
Despite the original members’ strong personal devotion, member turnover 
frequently occurred due to retirements and position changes.  Members recalled that “in 
the federal bureaucracy there’s so much changeover in leaders and people.” When these 
dedicated members left, there was a loss for SAMAB because when “you keep changing 
the people, you keep falling back to an earlier stage because everyone isn’t on the same 
page and you don’t know where you are going.” The relationships formed during the 
earlier stages were “a chemistry that just doesn’t happen overnight. That’s after years of 
aging to perfection.”  
When top-level members would leave, they were often replaced by lower level 
agency representatives. For example, a member recalled that “none of the leaders 
came…it was all the technical people in the executive committee” and “the agencies at a 
high level were not as engaged.” As a result, involvement in SAMAB began to be 
delegated to lower level agency representatives. This mandatory commitment influenced 
the dedication and level of involvement of these new representatives. As one of the 
original members described “it wasn’t a passion of theirs, it was an assignment.”  
As individuals were replaced, there was a lack of orientation for new members. 
For example, a member stated that they “didn’t feel like there was any attempt by 
anybody to really educate any of the new people about what SAMAB is and what it’s 
done in the past.” Without clearly communicating the value and mission of the group to 
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new members, there was “not enough of selling the program and its value to the agencies 
through the years as personnel changed.” 
While membership was changing, SAMAB began to struggle with the SAA 
database. Though there were strong advancements in data management, SAMAB did not 
have the capacity to maintain the system as it matured. Many members expressed 
frustration that the information was “never really used by the agencies” and the data “did 
not transfer into effecting policy decisions or program decisions” or “converted into 
tangible products.” Some potential reasons the SAA never transferred into usable 
products for agencies included “the amount of money to bring up a system and maintain 
it was more than SAMAB could generate” and without adequate resources “everyone 
knew that assessment would become dated after a while.” Eventually, the SAA became 
stagnant and the usefulness of the data became minimal: 
“Someone referred to it as a thorough medical checkup… if you don’t go to the 
doctor afterwards it didn’t fix it.  It did a lot of good and got a lot of attention... 
Not nearly enough follow-up to remedy the problems and take advantage of the 
opportunities that it offered.” 
As the frustrations for SAA data management mounted, the organization’s vision 
became more nebulous. A member recalled that “there was never really another big 
project…there was nothing the agencies could really rally behind to do.” Similarly 
another member stated, “When they finished the Assessment, I think the question was 
“now what?” I don’t think that was really ever answered.” Some noted how SAMAB 
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reached its peak around the SAA and “interest waned as soon as that assessment had 
been completed…it was the best thing they ever did and killed it all at the same time.” 
Others reflected on the lost identity and purpose of the group that was so clear in the 
growth stage:  
“I think we had an identity crisis. It wasn’t clear where we were going or what we 
were there for and how we were going to get there…We needed another major 
project. Then we could have all gotten behind it. I never really felt that that 
solidified.” 
This inability to communicate the organization’s importance and relevance proved to be a 
weakness of SAMAB. Often, “only those participants gained the knowledge about their 
partner agencies and it didn’t really communicate very deeply within each respective 
organization.” Consequently, when agency budgets tightened, SAMAB was “an easy 
place for individual agencies to cut” as members described it being “very difficult to 
show results and the benefits of interagency cooperation.”  
Without a clear focus and a lack of tangible benefits, members began questioning 
the costs and benefits of their involvement. For example one member asks: 
“How will this organization help me further my work? Help my colleagues back 




The costs started to outweigh the benefits as one member recalled, “I quit going to the 
meetings because I felt that without tangible products that it just wasn’t worth my time.” 
Others members started to view SAMAB as “a burden more than a help” and that “it was 
just sort of us giving but nothing coming back.” For agencies, resources were beginning 
to tighten and employees were expected to do more with less, making it difficult to work 
on additional SAMAB efforts: 
“I have plenty of work to do back in my own agency. Now if there is some way 
SAMAB can help me accomplish that work, I’m all for it, but I’m not out here 
trying to get myself another job, some other duty.” 
During SAMAB’s earlier stages, it was fulfilling a unique niche for an 
organization that could bring together state and federal agencies to work on 
transboundary efforts within the Southern Appalachians landscape. By SAMAB’s 
maturity stage, the landscape-scale concept had grown in popularity and as a result, more 
organizations were starting to emerge creating potential competition for SAMAB’s niche. 
Some of these organizations “put the beginning pressure on SAMAB…they [the other 
organizations] were really doing some projects, they were doing some project funding…” 
For example, one member described the reduced security about SAMAB’s role in the 
landscape as other groups were perceived as:  
“a competitor to the SAMAB group….felt they were somehow going to take over 
SAMAB or be the functional SAMAB and so a lot of the resources from agencies 
devoted to SAMAB at some point got diverted to the XXX group.” 
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Beyond other organizations emerging in the landscape, the “complete change in 
our country's relationship to the UN” may have had the greatest impact on SAMAB. 
This political turn resulted in skepticism from vocal groups towards any United Nations 
project including the Man and the Biosphere program. As MAB’s poster child, SAMAB 
began to receive backlash from political groups and the public in an attempt to relinquish 
any support for the MAB program. One member described the situation as: 
“There was a lot of concern of the UN taking over the management of federal 
lands and black helicopters and a lot of really kind a wacky stuff about fear that 
the federal government or the UN was going to dictate how private land should be 
managed.” 
Though many agencies ignored these inaccurate claims, there were “powerful 
members of Congress that went along with it…and tried to pass what was called the 
American Land Sovereignty Protection Act.” It was recognized that “in order for an 
organization like SAMAB to be successful it’s going to have to face up to those forces.” 
Some members felt that there should have been more outreach and communication to the 
public about SAMAB and its efforts to gain “support from local elected officials and a 
broad enough membership that understood what SAMAB was all about.” This public and 
political support could have helped SAMAB to overcome these false allegations quickly 
instead of degrading the organization’s reputation.  
As SAMAB began facing some difficult situations, the organization lacked the 
ability to address these challenges. The members tended to stay in their comfort zone and 
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“go back in one’s shell.” The group was described as being “very risk averse” and one 
member claimed: 
“We tried to push for things that were outside the comfort zone of the agencies 
and got pushed back very quickly, so they let us know that we were not to 
consider ourselves flag carrying leaders trying to do new things.” 
SAMAB was confronted with more struggles as it matured and when it could not adapt 
and overcome these obstacles, the organization eventually transitioned into the decline 
stage.  
 
CMP’s Maturity Stage 
CMP’s previous birth and growth stages focused on establishing themselves as a 
group, expanding membership, building relationships, and developing a strategic plan 
that included the start of the Ecological Health Project (EHP). As the CMP matured, the 
organization still operated with distributive leadership where they “rely on our steering 
committee members and the different entities they have within their jurisdictions.” 
Similarly, another member stated the CMP had a “very shared leadership in that 
everybody just sort of knew what their role was and how to go about getting it done.” 
Members could lead different efforts and tasks depending on their strengths, interests, 
and resources. While there are still roles for conceptual leaders who can act as “the think 
tank that generates ideas,” there are more opportunities in the maturity stage for other 
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individuals to step up in leadership roles. For example, some members may be “leading 
the charge in regards to the annual forum,” while others lead efforts on invasive species. 
One member expressed that “it just depends on a particular issue. When we are dealing 
with aquatic invasives, XXX took on a strong leadership role…so it moves around.” 
Though leadership was distributed among the CMP’s members, there was still a 
core group within the steering committee that stood out for their exceptional leadership. 
These individuals were described as “highly competent,” “committed,” “organized and 
being able to tell people to get going, keep them on track, “ and “know how to 
communicate clearly.”   
The initial chair position created in the growth stage changed to a new individual 
in the maturity stage. This informal process involved a discussion at the meeting and 
someone volunteering because of their interests and available time. This changeover did 
not influence the CMP’s overall focus or functioning and members “did not notice 
anything different between the two.” The chair acting as a facilitator versus a leader was 
described as:  
“The leadership position is not so much like the primary thinker or comes up with 
ideas but really helps facilitate the meetings and our process and our goals and 
makes sure things are documented and we move forward through agendas and all 




During the CMP’s maturity stage, its major focus was the progression and 
expansion of the EHP. The group had “a clear focus as a partnership” and used “the 
strategic plan as a guide to what they are doing and that helps them focus their efforts 
instead of just jumping on bandwagons…then do a work plan every year and that helps 
keep the group on track.” They regularly revisited their strategic plan to ensure alignment 
with their mission and work plan. For example, the CMP “had meetings where we talk 
about: Should we do this or that? Why do we exist?”  
The strategic plan for the EHP created a long-term plan for projects and on-the-
ground action that would continue long into the CMP’s future: 
“having a framework and a strategy to move forward and accomplish real 
tangible things is an accomplishment in itself. Because this would be so easy to 
talk about conceptual stuff and to pull together maybe data or concepts but not 
really accomplish anything so they have a well thought of framework and 
mission within that ecological health project that's going to sustain them for 
many, many years.” 
Another individual emphasized the influence of a long-term strategic plan with 
benchmarks to achieve goals on the sustainability of the organization: 
“...working towards the notion of the fact we’re going to set benchmarks and 
develop protocol for long-term management that would require a long-term 
commitment and long-term buy-in that’s where the vision is and I think that’s 
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really important. And I think the Ecological Health Project will help get us 
there.” 
Invasive species control was one of EHP’s first initiatives and a member described the 
reasoning behind choosing this topic: 
 “Everyone knows aquatic invasives can just devastate any water bodies so you 
would need to protect it so they chose a low aim fruit kind of concept and more 
awareness these handbooks in public education and they have done workshops all 
around the invasive species and then also increasing check stations at borders 
and strategic points have all been real tangible benefits that are a great 
accomplishment.” 
The EHP has been described as “gaining ground” and has contributed to the 
CMP’s visibility in the landscape. For example, the CMP “may be more viable as it starts 
to generate some achievements that it can point to and others become aware of it and it 
starts to become more recognized as an organization.” As the EHP advanced, so did the 
CMP’s efficiency for data management. The CMP had already faced obstacles with data 
management such as “trying to pool data that was consistent across the international 
border.” For example, Alberta had stricter protocols than British Columbia and Montana 
for data accessibility:  
“Alberta in particular has some very thorny restrictions on data access, how data 
is used…so in a lot of instances we’ve already overcome those, but, you know, it 
took quite a lot of effort to work that through.” 
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By the maturity stage, CMP members had worked out many of the kinks associated with 
data management and continued to “standardize data across the borders regardless of 
jurisdiction.” The CMP worked closely with the Miistakis Institute and the University of 
Calgary to find “lots of creative ways to sort of work around our jurisdictional 
boundaries” which helped the organization overcome the obstacles of moving data and 
money across international borders.  
During the maturity stage, political changes made it difficult for the CMP to retain 
British Columbia’s (BC) participation and commitment. Since the earlier CMP stages, 
BC had undergone multiple political reorganizations resulting in a tenuous relationship. 
One member summarized the impact of BC’s political changes on the CMP:  
 “BC was a striking example of how changes at the provincial level drastically 
were changed with the involvement in the agencies there. You know if you 
changed political parties and therefore political perspectives then one party might 
encourage involvement and the other one would discourage it and you know 
groups in BC would just kind of disappear from the CMP.” 
Though the CMP continued to reach out to BC, many members recognized it as “the big 
elephant in the room.” The province’s absence was notable as one member described, 
“it's pretty obvious when you are in a room and there is no one there representing that 




In tandem to BC’s political reorganization, there was an emergence of several 
new landscape-scale organizations addressing transboundary ecosystem management that 
created competition for membership and resources. Many members described “a plethora 
of groups forming around the Crown of the Continent” making it “a bit of a busy 
landscape.” As these new groups emerged, some members initially identified “quite a bit 
of friction.” One member described the situation as there “was definitely competition and 
my guess is there probably still is. I think the situation is better now but there has been a 
little more respect gained from each respective group for the other one…” Regular 
communication occurred between the groups and support for each other’s efforts has 
been facilitated by some CMP members participating in the other groups too.  
The restructuring of BC’s government resulted in BC shifting its membership and 
resources from the CMP to the Great Northern Landscape Conservation Cooperative 
(GNLCC), a unit of the LCC network started in 2010 by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service. The GNLCC offered stronger alignment with BC than the CMP as one member 
states that the “struggle with CMP is that the objectives of that group does not 
necessarily fit as well as other government structures” and a member identifies the 
limitations of BC’s government as “they just don’t have the capacity, the resources or 
the time to commit to it and they have decided to focus their energies on the Landscape 
Conservation Cooperatives.” The CMP is still seeking strategies to reengage BC as a 
member, but currently the only connection CMP has to BC is through the CMP members 
who also serve as members on the GNLCC.  
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Though there may have been some initial competition when these new groups 
arrived in the Crown, “the CMP was pretty actively trying to understand and try to work 
with it [other groups].” The CMP formed complementary partnerships with many of 
these groups as one member described: 
“It's all about the economics of efficiency in the landscape and determining who 
does what best and how we work together to actually get some collective work 
done across the crown with what resources because regardless of what 
competition is coming from other entities ultimately all of us are dealing with a 
world of shrinking resources so we have really taken the perspective of you know 
how do we work with the initiatives and how do we value add rather than you 
know take away.” 
Specifically to the GNLCC, members identified that “the CMP’s experience is absolutely 
influencing the LCC agenda in terms of how do we scale up…And it is a hugely beneficial 
experience to them.” For example: 
“When the Great Northern LCC came along and they wanted to move ahead on 
this initiative and they looked around the crown and said how could we deliver on 
some of these great ideas? And they saw that we already existed and we’re in a 
position to sort of move ahead and help them move ahead on some of their 
initiatives. So they just wanted to partner with us and that’s just fine.” 
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The GNLCC has supported the CMP’s efforts through funding support. For example, 
“they have annual money available for projects that fit large landscape-type work and so 
we have been able to successfully compete for some pretty good money to fund things.”  
The CMP also developed a relationship with the Crown Roundtable (CRT), a 
group that organizes an annual meeting with diverse stakeholder groups including the 
public to discuss various issues. Initially, the CRT created the potential for competition 
with engaging the Crown’s communities.  However, as “the relationship between the 
CMP and the Crown Roundtable has matured,” the CMP participated in the CRT’s 
annual forum and the CRT helped the CMP reach a broader audience. One member 
described the CMP’s initial relationship with the CRT as: 
 “We could have said you can do that, we’re going to do it too and get into a 
competition. We decided that doesn’t make sense. If he really wants to do this, 
let’s let him do that and we’ll support that initiative and find ways to complement 
each other. So I think that’s an example of how you adapt. You might have been 
thinking one way at a certain point and then the next minute you are adjusting 
your thinking.” 
Members recognized the importance of partnerships to “make sure that you don’t create 
unnecessary duplication or run across purposes.” However, the CMP also needs to 
maintain their unique purpose. For example, the CMP must be “more precise about 
where our niche is on the landscape and what it is that we offer in what is now sort of a 
crowded Crown of the Continent.”  
175 
 
Despite the loss of BC, the CMP retained most of its original partnering agencies 
and gained some new partners. However, the maturity stage did initiate the first major 
round of original member turnover mainly due to “retirement cycles and having people 
age and leave.” Anticipating this change, the CMP had already started planning in the 
growth stage to ease the transition of new members to the group and maintain efficiency 
of operations. In attempts to groom new representatives to take their place, one member 
stated in confidence that they “have been mentoring and so I don't think that the group 
will fall apart. I think that they will have built the foundation for it to last.” Similarly, 
another member mentioned that: 
 “it has been very important to us to bring new people in to form those 
relationships and for everyone to become familiar with the work and the thinking 
behind the work that we do and then to move it forward.”  
In addition to recruiting potential replacements, there was an orientation process 
for representatives. A new member described his positive experience when he met with 
the current chair: 
“[We] spent a couple of hours and we just met one on one and she gave me some 
of the materials and introduction to what their mission was and who the members 
were and gave me some good advice on what my expectations was in the steering 
committee so that was really an excellent introduction.” 
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Because of these proactive efforts, turnover did not majorly impact the CMP. One 
member related member turnover as changing individuals within the same field to 
different types of pasta: 
 “I think different personalities will bring a different vision to the table, but it’s 
just sort of like you’re going out for Italian food. Do you like it spicy or mild? I 
mean did you want cannelloni or did you want spaghetti or did you want lasagna? 
But I mean you are still going to go out and have a good meal and it will still be 
Italian food.” 
Turnover can be daunting to other members who expressed, “partnerships last as 
long as the people who set them up last. And that scared the bejesus out of me.”  Some of 
these fears could stem from members acknowledging the significant amount of time spent 
during the birth and growth stages to build relationships and trust among members. This 
“shared journey” resulted in “the evolution of the culture and the relationship that the 
agencies are more comfortable with one another, that the agenda is no longer perceived 
as scary.” Professional relationships had transitioned to personal relationships and 
consequently influenced members’ commitment:  
“You are engaged at more than just the working level.  I think everybody 
genuinely cares about each other. Because of that it makes people a lot more 
committed and seeing the value in it and being accountable.” 
Most of the relationship building had occurred during informal interactions, multi-day 
meetings, and field trips: 
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“These individuals have established relationships they have formed mutual 
trust…that happens when they are traveling out of their jurisdictions and they 
spend time overnight in lodges and stuff and they spend that down time together 
and get to know each other as individuals and I think that cannot be understated 
for any collaborative importance that that plays and you don't get to that level of 
trust by just knowing people over the phone.” 
From the regular face-to-face interactions, CMP’s maturity stage is associated with strong 
shared identity among members with a common passion: 
“I think once they establish those relationships, then it is a group of friends that 
get together and have influence. It amazes me working with these people. They 
are like a family that is interested in what happens within the Crown of the 
Continent and are determined to make things good and healthy.”   
CMP members had strong buy-in and “believed in that sort of collaborative cooperative 
approach.” For longstanding members, the CMP was humanized in that it was “like a 
baby. They have seen it grow from just an idea to become the influential group.” One 
member described the impact of CMP’s approach: 
“We are surrounded and influenced by everything that goes on around us. So for 
me the biggest benefit is that I am not a lone voice in trying to represent the 
protection of an area…Nobody should be doing it on our own. We should be a 
force multiplier and making good decisions across boundaries.” 
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Although members may support the collaborative process and have a strong 
individual commitment to the CMP, it was difficult to communicate the benefits to the 
higher-level agency leaders. Members expressed that “it’s going to take a kind of a broad 
change in mindset to get to that point where cooperation is not a luxury; it’s the main 
part of doing business to have efficiency and effectiveness.” CMP never had the top level 
directors as members, but during the maturity stage there was recognition that 
engagement of top-level directors may be needed in the future. Some members felt that 
the CMP may “lose that sort of momentum if we do not have that agreement or 
partnership elevated to a higher level.” There were discussions about having an ancillary 
role for top level managers that complemented the CMP steering committee in an attempt 
to have “the people who do make the decisions coming together more frequently and to 
have these on the ground recommendations come in to place more quickly.”   
Despite the CMP’s positive advances in the maturity stage, the organization was 
faced with changes and challenges. Members tried to anticipate changes “to get ahead of 
the curve, not respond to it” and “subjecting ahead of the objective rather than 
constantly reacting to the issue of the day which will never produce anything of value.” 
Similarly another member stated, “I think for the most part we have reacted well. We 
have a very committed group that has been able to sustain us through various 
difficulties.”  
The CMP’s strong adaptive ability may be attributed to the group’s open and 
supportive setting. For example, “people aren’t afraid to speak openly and candidly 
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especially when they get to know one another. And that’s healthy.” As a result of this 
supportive atmosphere, “the group was receptive to anything” and “very open to new 
ideas.” This was especially important in the maturity stage as many of the original 
members were replaced with new representatives:  
“…it’s wonderful to have new ideas, new blood…But with that you need to adjust 
your group dynamics in a way that encourages them to become active 
participants…”  
Today, the CMP progresses in its maturity stage by advancing the EHP, strengthening its 
membership, partnering with new groups, and retaining its important niche within the 




We conducted a study of two LSCCOs to investigate the factors that influence 
success during the maturity stage of the organizations life cycle. The following 
discussion identifies a list of factors and explores the similarities and differences between 








Long-term Planning and Utility of Projects 
SAMAB and CMP’s major efforts have focused on large ecological assessments 
of their respective landscapes: the Southern Appalachian Assessment (SAA) and the 
Ecological Health Project (EHP). Both groups have used the SAA and the EHP as their 
“calling card” that generated the most involvement and interest among members. While 
completing the SAA and EHP assessments is important, long-term member commitment 
and resources is needed to demonstrate the projects’ utility. For example, a large amount 
of resources were committed by participating SAMAB agencies for the collecting and 
synthesizing data for the assessment, but did not include long-term data updates, 
management, and dissemination. Consequently, the SAA transitioned from SAMAB’s 
biggest achievement to its biggest disappointment when the group gradually lost the 
ability to maintain and utilize the data.  
In contrast, the CMP aligned the EHP with its long-term strategic plan that went 
beyond data collection and created additional projects as offshoots of the EHP. After 
invasive species data was collected, the CMP took action to prevent further invasive 
introductions and restore impacted areas.  As the EHP continues to reach its benchmarks, 
CMP will focus on other aspects of the EHP with outlined actions and goals to sustain the 
group’s momentum.  
While long-term strategic planning is recognized as important, many 
organizations struggle to think and act beyond short-term goals (Gilbert, 2014). CMP’s 
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lengthy, but strategic process provided a long-term detailed plan to maintain the EHP’s 
utility and implement on-the-ground action. When conducing a large-scale assessment or 
another major project, a LSCCO’s plan should include resources and infrastructure for 
maintaining, updating, and disseminating information into a usable form (Margerum, 
2011).  
Knowing and Maintaining Purpose 
The organization had clear direction through its growth stage and continued the 
SAA’s data management into the maturity stage. As former projects reached completion 
and new members joined the group, SAMAB’s purpose became vague and the group 
continued searching for another universal project. By the end of SAMAB’s maturity 
stage, members could not clearly identify SAMAB’s purpose.  In contrast, the CMP has 
maintained a clear focus through its maturity stage by reviewing their mission and 
strategic plan regularly to ensure alignment and allow for adjustments to change. This 
routine strategy has proved critical to all their past and present members having a clear 
idea of where the group originated and where the CMP is going in the future.  
Having a clear vision and mission that is supported and known by members has 
been found to be influential to an organization’s success (Alexander, Comfort, & Weiner, 
1998; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Gilbert, 2014; Gray, 1989; 
Thomson & Perry, 2006).  While this mission may be clear in the beginning stages of an 
organization’s life cycle, these findings suggest that a LSCCO’s focus may become 
muddled in its mature stage without a clear understanding of the organization’s history 
182 
 
and long-term plan. Consequently, LSCCOs should continuously revisit their mission and 
the progress of their strategic plan especially when membership turnover occurs to 
prevent organizational drift  (Santora & Sarros, 2008).  
Smooth Member Transitions 
SAMAB and CMP’s membership included federal, state, and provincial agencies. 
As the organizations matured, both groups cited turnover as influencing the 
organizations’ functioning. Though, SAMAB was more severely impacted when 
members described the difficulty of recruiting and integrating new members. SAMAB’s 
experiences of slowed group processing and reduced stability as a result of turnover is not 
unique (Margerum, 2002b, 2011; Margerum & Whitall, 2004). However, CMP appeared 
to avoid the negative impacts of membership turnover by implementing proactive 
strategies in the growth and maturity stages to create smooth member transitions. These 
approaches included member recruitment and orientation to CMP’s activities to maintain 
organizational efficiency (Powell et al., 2009).  In contrast, SAMAB was more reactive 
and did not establish a process for recruiting and orienting new members which resulted 
in reduced membership and commitment by the end of the maturity stage.  
Distributive Leadership  
Since their start, SAMAB and CMP have operated under different forms of 
leadership. SAMAB’s first full-time executive director (ED1) came from an economic 
and business background that helped him secure resources and promoting SAMAB. This 
focus on the external environment (Hill, 2007) helped SAMAB to becoming established 
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and grow during the SAA. When ED1 retired, ED2 was hired for his technical and 
science background to utilize the SAA data, yet lacked some of the expertise of securing 
resources. Despite the differences in focus, SAMAB’s dependency on the ED created 
increasing pressure on him when the organization was faced with external and internal 
challenges.  
In contrast, the CMP operated under distributed leadership. This leadership does 
not arise from a single individual and has flexibility leadership boundaries with expertise 
spread among the group (Woods, Bennett, Harvey, & Wise, 2004). During the maturity 
stage, a chair position was created as a point of contact and to coordinate meetings. 
Unlike the SAMAB’s ED, the chair took on a facilitative versus leadership role. CMP’s 
distributed leadership spread responsibility among members and allowed members to 
lead based on their capabilities and interests.  
Though SAMAB and CMP have different leadership structures, the maturity stage 
is an opportune time for distributive leadership. A centralized leader with specific skills 
can be critical in earlier stages when there is greater uncertainty among the group. By the 
maturity stage, member relationships are well-established and the group is fully 
functioning in their capabilities (Adizes, 1979; Schein, 2004). With strong relationships 
and member abilities, distributive leadership can capitalize on individuals’ strengths 
(Imperial et al., forthcoming). These findings suggest that distributive leadership can 
support the organization overcoming obstacles by utilizing the skills among all members 
versus a single individual leader and prevent leadership burnout. However, this is 
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dependent on a number of conditions including a shared vision and trust in other 
members (Woods et al., 2004).  
Maintain Strong Relationships and Reemphasize Importance 
During the maturity stage, SAMAB and CMP indicated very strong emotional 
connections among long-time members. These strong relationships strengthened their 
affective or attitudinal organizational commitment (AOC) which refers to emotional 
attachment and identification with the organization (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; 
Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982; Robbins & Judge, 2007).  The time invested in 
relationship and trust building during the earlier stages had transitioned members from 
strangers to acquaintances to friends. Even though some of these members eventually 
retired or changed jobs, their AOC was reflected in their relationships with other 
members.  
Despite members’ AOC, several individuals questioned their involvement. During 
SAMAB’s earlier stages and the SAA’s initiation, there was strong goal alignment 
between SAMAB and members. When SAMAB’s efforts were no longer meeting 
individuals’ goals, members struggled to justify their involvement. Although investing in 
relationship building is critical to AOC, members’ commitment may be more dependent 
on alignment with the individual’s job and weighing the costs versus benefits of LSSCO 
invovlement. During the maturity stage, LSCCOs may need to reassess and reemphasize 
the benefits for members. Some strategies can include reward and acknowledgement for 
long-time members (Iriberri & Leroy, 2009) and revisiting the alignment of the 
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individual representatives and their respective agencies needs with the LSCCO (Thomson 
& Perry, 2006). 
Maintain High-Level Agency and Political Support  
In the maturity stage, SAMAB and CMP experienced reduced support from 
agencies and governments. For SAMAB, political relations between the U.S. and the 
United Nations became unstable and some agencies began to question their involvement 
with SAMAB because of the group’s close association with MAB. CMP’s relationship 
with British Columbia illustrated a different, but equally influential change in political 
support. The reorganization of government structure and the priorities of the new 
administration resulted in shifting support and resources away from the CMP.  
The necessity of obtaining high-level support has been demonstrated in other 
cases (Uitto & Duda, 2002). This research highlighted the influence of political changes 
and relations on the membership, functioning, and image of LSCCOs.  As 
administrations change frequently, so do their associated political agendas which can 
greatly impact landscape-scale planning (Margerum & Whitall, 2004; Margerum, 2011; 
Powell et al., 2009). In SAMAB and CMP’s earlier stages, there was a stronger effort to 
communicate with high-level agency directors and political entities. The temporal scale 
of LSCCO efforts does not usually coincide with political cycles and many of those 
leadership positions had changed by the LSCCOs’ maturity stage.  LSCCOs should 
maintain strategic high-level agency and political communication into their maturity 
stage for sustained awareness and support.  
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Cooperation with Peripheral Groups  
SAMAB and CMP both filled a unique role, facilitating landscape level 
collaborative action within their respective landscapes. As both groups matured, there 
was an increase of organizations within the landscape creating potential for cooperation 
and competition. The CMP was particularly active in reaching out to new groups and 
findings ways to complement each other’s efforts. For example, the CMP had struggled 
to engage the general public and other stakeholders beyond agencies. When the Crown 
Roundtable was started, CMP supported the Roundtable’s annual forum while the 
Roundtable has provided an additional opportunity for CMP to connect with the broader 
public and stakeholders within the landscape. In contrast, SAMAB did not actively 
communicate with new groups despite the potential competition for membership and 
resources. 
CMP offers an example of being outcompeted for membership and resources by 
another group. British Columbia’s transition in membership from the CMP to the 
GNLCC resulted as a shift of political priorities and limited capacity of the government 
to commit to both groups. This is supported in niche overlap theory which is based on the 
notion that the more organizations overlap in niches within the same context or region, 
the greater competition for the same resources and organizational survival (Baum & 
Singh, 1994; Hannan et al., 2003; Sohn, 2002). The GNLCC initially created competition 
for the CMP, but CMP’s relationship with the GNLCC has continued dialogue between 
the CMP and British Columbia. Without cooperating with the GNLCC and the Crown 
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Roundtable, the CMP would have likely lost the remaining connection with BC and 
maintained minimal interaction with the public and diverse stakeholders. These findings 
indicate that LSCCOs need to remain aware of emerging groups and assess opportunities 
to complement each other’s goals while reducing duplicity and competition.  
Openness to Change and New Ideas 
Organizations in their maturity stage attempt to sustain their activity and remain 
stable (Dodge et al., 1994; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Miller & Friesen, 1984; 
Moores & Yuen, 2001; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). This study’s findings highlighted the 
challenges facing LSCCOs’ stability in their maturity stage and the differences between 
SAMAB and CMP’s adaptive abilities. For example, SAMAB members repeatedly cited 
the inability of the group to accept change, think outside the box, and take risks. As 
SAMAB was faced with internal and external changes, the group appeared more 
skeptical of change and new ideas.  In contrast, CMP members expressed the group’s 
ability to get ahead of the curve versus reacting to change and the strong desire for new 
ideas. 
In a constantly changing world, organizational survival can be dependent on 
exploration and taking risks (Gilbert, 2014).  SAMAB’s risk-averse attitude is typical of 
the public sector because they are often remembered more for their failures than their 
successes (Bhatta, 2003).  This may be a reason why SAMAB distanced itself from MAB 
to avoid stigmatization despite early attempts to refute the allegations. Meanwhile, the 
CMP embraced changes as opportunities for exploring new solutions, like maintaining 
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BC’s membership. The group even made time at their annual meetings for identifying 
threats and opportunities. The differences between SAMAB and CMP support the 
inconsistency in the literature as to whether the mature stage supports risk-taking and 
innovation (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Sirmon et al., 2010) or inhibits it (Koberg et 
al., 1996; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Schein, 2004). SAMAB’s inability to identify, accept, 
and react to change with innovative strategies resulted in its eventual decline. CMP 
illumiantes the importance for LSCCOs to regualrly assess threats and use them as 




There has been a growing amount of LSCCOs established over the past few 
decades, yet there has been limited research on how these types of organizations reach 
their maturity stage and why some LSCCOs continue to blossom while others decline or 
disband. This research study offers insight to the influential factors that support or inhibit 
success of SAMAB and CMP during their maturity stage. The research also provides 
broader lessons for similar LSCCOs that are approaching or currently in their maturity 
stage regarding how these organizations are evolving over time and help them to 
anticipate and overcome future challenges (see Table 4.4). The findings and 
recommendations offered from this research provide an initial starting point for future 




Table 4.4 Recommendations for LSCCO’s success during the maturity stage of their 
organizational life cycle. 
Recommendations for LSCCO’s Maturity Stage 
 
 Implement Long-term Project Planning and Utility: Develop a long-term strategic 
plan for the LSCCO’s major project that continues to branch off into a variety of 
projects. The plan should include strategies for long-term resources and have 
infrastructure for maintaining, updating, and disseminating information and 
translating data into a usable form. 
 
 Revisit and Communicate Mission and Purpose: Continuously revisit the mission 
and the progress of the strategic plan to ensure old and new members have a clear 
understanding of the LSCCO’s history and future direction. The mission and strategic 
plan may need adaptation and revision reflective of internal and external 
organizational changes.  
 
 Create Smooth Transitions: Prepare for high member turnover and implement 
orientation strategies prior to new members joining the LSCCO to maintain the 
group’s efficiency and strong identity. These approaches ensure the new 
representative is familiar with the LSCCO’s history and current efforts. Opportunities 
for informal interactions between new and current members can help build trust and 
integrate the new member into the group’s culture.   
 
 More Distributive Leadership: If there is a shared vision and strong trust among 
LSCCO members among other conditions, distributive leadership may be desirable in 
the maturity stage. LSCCOs should assess members’ strengths, interests, and 
capabilities to increase resiliency and adaptability when the LSCCO is faced with 
challenges.  
 
 Reassess and Reemphasize Importance: The goal alignment between members and 
the LSCCO should be reassessed through regular discussions to ensure that the 
LSCCO is meeting the needs of its members and their agencies. The benefits of 
maintaining membership should be emphasized and can include incentive 
mechanisms and acknowledgement of long-time dedication.  
 
 Maintain High-Level Agency and Political Support: Revisit the LSCCO’s 
relations with high-level agency and political leaders to maintain awareness and 
support for the LSCCOs current and future efforts. Some strategies include briefings, 
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meetings, and periodic newsletters catered specifically to these high-level entities. 
Another option is to implement a multi-level organizational structure during the 
mature stage that includes a committee of high-level directors.   
 
 Be Aware of Competition and Maintain Niche: LSCCOs should be aware of the 
efforts of peripheral organizations in the region and to assess opportunities for groups 
to mutually benefit each other. It is equally important for LSCCOs in the maturity 
stage to reevaluate their niche within the larger landscape to avoid being outcompeted 
for limited resources and support.   
 
 Assess for Threats and Use as Opportunities: Dedicate time at meetings to assess 
current or potential threats and changes. LSCCOs should view change and failure as 
opportunities for learning and innovation by creating a supportive environment for 





WHY DO LSCCOS DECLINE? A CASE STUDY OF THE SOUTHERN 




Despite the popularity of landscape-scale collaborative conservation organizations 
(LSCCOs) in the past few decades, limited research exists on how LSCCOs transform 
over time and in particular what causes their organizational decline. To address these 
gaps, we conducted a case study of the decline of one the oldest LSCCOs in the United 
States, the Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB). 
Though SAMAB has worked for over two decades to support collaboration among 
agencies and other stakeholders for the conservation and restoration of the Southern 
Appalachian region, the LSCCO also experienced a long period of decline and a recent 
attempt at revival. This paper presents the findings from 41 interviews, observations, and 
an extensive review of organizational documents to identify the internal and external 
factors that influenced organizational decline. The results provide insight into the causes 
of decline and offer strategies for LSCCOs to anticipate and overcome obstacles to 







Our natural environment is challenged by threats including climate change, air 
pollution, habitat fragmentation, and invasive species (Soule & Terborgh, 1999). Often 
these threats transcend political and institutional jurisdictions and extend beyond 
traditional park and protected areas’ boundaries (Lidskog and Elander 2010). To address 
these challenges, conservation organizations and agencies increasingly seek to manage at 
larger spatial and longer temporal scales (Dobson et al., 1999; Groves et al., 2002; 
Simberloff et al., 1999). However, managing at the landscape scale has proven difficult. 
One mechanism for addressing transboundary issues has been the formation of 
landscape-scale collaborative conservation organizations (LSCCOs) that undertake land 
management planning and actions at the landscape scale. Though an abundance of 
LSCCOs have been created and established recently, we know little about why these 
organizations may decline (Levine, 1978; Margerum, 2011; Miles, 1980; Mone, 
Mckinley, & Barker, 1998; Whetten, 1980a). This research examines the decline of a 
longstanding LSCCO in North America and explores the question: What internal and 
external factors caused the decline of a LSCCO?  
Unique Attributes of LSCCOs 
While many different types of organizations have been studied extensively in the 
literature; LSCCOs are unique and have largely been ignored. LSCCO’s are unique in 
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several ways. First, they operate across traditional institutional, political, and 
jurisdictional boundaries. Second, LSCCOs function as “umbrella” organizations that are 
made up of representatives from multiple organizations and agencies. Third, participation 
in LSCCOs is voluntary which can make it difficult to hold members and their respective 
organizations accountable for any tasks or actions.  Lastly, LSCCOs are designed to be 
collaborative in nature by bringing together diverse groups; however each member and 
their respective group/organization may have their own distinct mission, goals, and 
operating procedures. Therefore, some representatives’ jobs and their agency’s missions 
may align more or less with the LSCCOs mission than other representatives and agencies.  
Types of LSCCOs 
While LSSCOs encompass unique characteristics, different types of LSCCOs 
exist depending on their membership, focus, scale, and network association (see Table 
5.1). First, LSCCOs’ membership may vary from mainly government agencies to private 
landowners to NGOs. Membership may be dominated by one type of group, such as 
federal agencies, while others may have a very diverse membership. Second, LSCCOs’ 
goals and mission may differ. One end of the spectrum often focuses on the general 
management of the area in question. Examples include organizations that employ 
ecosystem management or integrated coastal management, such as the Heart of the 
Rockies Initiative. At the other end of the spectrum are organizations that focus on one 
issue or species, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Joint Ventures Program. In 
addition, there are some LSCCOs that focus on identifying and protecting land, such as 
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collaborative land trust organizations, and others focus on management of an area. Third, 
although LSCCOs operate within landscapes and transcend boundaries, there can be 
variations in scale. For example, some LSCCOs may be organized around watersheds, 
such as the Salmon Falls Watershed Initiative. Meanwhile other LSCCOs extend beyond 
international boundaries such as Two Countries, One Forest. Lastly, LSCCOs may be 
associated with a broader network of other LSCCOs, such as the Landscape Conservation 
Cooperatives, or operate as a stand-alone entity.  
Table 5.1 Different characteristics contributing to variations in LSCCOs.  
Membership:  
the individuals or 




Mission focus:  
the level of 
specificity in the 
LSCCO’s 
mission/goals 
Boundary scale:  
the types of political 




networks of similar 
LSCCOs  
 
 Agencies  
 Political figures 




 Preservation vs. 
management 
 Only focus on a 
specific issue 
and/or species 





 City, county, 
district, etc. 
Generally within 
a single state or 
province 
 Multiple states or 
provinces 
 Multiple countries 
 
 Originated as a 
stand-alone entity 
 Originated as part 
of a broader 
network  
 
Opportunities and Challenges of LSCCOs 
LSCCOs bring together different agencies and groups within a landscape to work 
together towards common conservation and natural resource management goals. This 
purpose brings a number of challenges. For example, there can be legal issues pertaining 
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to political boundaries and differing managerial approaches by the varying agencies 
(Kittinger et al., 2011). Additional challenges include differences in members’ 
perspective (Berkes, 2004), language/discourse (Cash et al., 2006), and  commitment to 
the range of issues (Cash et al., 2006; Margerum, 2008). These examples present general 
obstacles; however it is hypothesized that there are specific internal and external factors 
that cause the decline of an LSCCO. 
Organizational Life Cycle  
The organizational life cycle model operates under the assumption that 
organizations follow a predictable pattern and transition through five different stages 
from birth through growth and maturation and possibly into decline and revival (Miller & 
Friesen, 1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). According to this theory, each stage of an 
organization’s life cycle is associated with unique characteristics, challenges, and 
opportunities that distinguish it from the other stages (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001).  
Life cycle analysis has been applied to different types of organizations, such as 
corporations and non-profit organizations, and in a variety of fields including education, 
business, natural resource management, and online communities (Cameron & Whetten, 
1981; Dodge et al., 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; 
Kimberly & Miles, 1980; Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Moores & Yuen, 
2001; Pinto & Prescott, 1988; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Sirmon et al., 2010; Smith & 
Miner, 1983). The focus of this paper is on the decline stage and attempted revival of one 
LSCCO.  The following sections describe each of these stages in further detail and Table 
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5.2 provides a summary of the characteristics associated with these stages based on a 
review of the general organizational life cycle literature.  
Decline Stage 
After an organization reaches the maturity stage, it can experience limited growth 
or decline. This decline stage has limited resources to support the organization and its 
efforts (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Levine, 1978; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Moores & 
Yuen, 2001; Santora & Sarros, 2008). In response to the organization’s declining 
resources, leadership uses funding conservatively and only focuses on  the group’s short-
term survival (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Santora & Sarros, 
2008; Sirmon et al., 2010). Consequently, there is a lack of activity and poor 
organizational performance (Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 
1984; Moores & Yuen, 2001; Santora & Sarros, 2008).  
The declining state of the organization contributes to weakened relationships 
among members and increased conflict (Carr et al., 1998; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; 
Whetten, 1980a). Therefore, this stage is associated with decreased participation and the 
organization struggles to retain membership (Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Santora & Sarros, 
2008). As the organization’s purpose and legitimacy gradually dissipates (Dodge et al., 
1994; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Levine, 1978), many members shift focus from 
group to personal goals during this stage (Lester et al., 2003).  Eventually, the 
combination of all these challenges increases the organization’s vulnerability to 
competing groups  (Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984).  Without actively 
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addressing the obstacles in the decline stage, the organization will continually deteriorate 
or disband.  
Revival Stage 
After experiencing stagnation or decline, the revival stage offers the organization 
an opportunity to become more productive and overcome the obstacles that caused its 
initial decline (Hurst, 1995). Often, external consultants are hired to facilitate this process 
and help the organization assess its strengths and weaknesses (Schein, 2004; Whetten, 
1980). Unlike the decline stage, there is strong support for innovation and risk-taking as 
the organization attempts to rebuild itself (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Miller & 
Friesen, 1980). For example, organizations often diversify their products, target new 
markets, and broaden their mission (Lester et al., 2003; Miller & Friesen, 1984). In 
addition, the organization begins exploring new and diverse sources for funding and 
rebuild its resource base (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). 
To accomplish many of these efforts, the revival stage needs an enthusiastic and 
charismatic leader who can override organizational constraints, reduce members’ 
anxieties, and guide the future direction of the group (Santora & Sarros, 2008; Schein, 
2004).  This may require the leader to rebuild the organization’s culture by reestablishing 
members’ relations and commitment (Hurst, 1995). Beyond strengthening the 
organization’s culture, the organization attempts to build new partnerships with groups to 
increase activity with limited resources (King & Anderson, 2002; Levine, 1978; Miller & 
Friesen, 1984). Though the revival stage is a critical aspect of the organizational life 
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cycle, we still have limited knowledge about how an organization transitions to this stage 
and the factors influencing its successful revival (Schein, 2004).  
Table 5.2 Summary of characteristics of the decline and revival stages compiled from the 
organizational life cycle literature.  
Factors Decline Stage Revival Stage 
Organizational Focus Lack of efficiency and activity; 
focus on short-term survival 
Refocusing and diversifying 
services 
Vision/Mission Unclear vision and purpose; 
loss of legitimacy 
Broadening and reevaluation of 
mission 
Leadership Leadership lacks the capacity to 
overcome obstacles 
Presence of a charismatic leader 
who can override constraints 
Resources/Funding Reduced resources require 
cutback in activities 




Weak relationships; Decreased 
participation, transient 
membership 
Rebuilding relationships; Revived 
commitment by group members 
Adaptability/ 
Innovation 
Little or no innovation and 
adaptation 





Need for Study  
Though numerous LSCCOs have been established over the past decade, why 
some LSCCOs decline or stagnate has largely been neglected. LSCCOs have many 
unique attributes that may distinguish their challenges from other organizations and 
identifying the factors contributing to decline can help similar LSCCOs anticipate and 
respond to these challenges. To identify the factors influencing organizational decline and 
potential revival, we investigated a longstanding LSCCO, the Southern Appalachian Man 






We used a case study approach (see Yin, 2009) to investigate the following 
research question: What internal and external factors cause landscape-scale collaborative 
conservation organizations to decline and what actions may contribute to the their 
revival?  We selected the SAMAB as a case study because it operated at a transboundary 
scale, focused on natural resource management and conservation, was comprised of 
multiple federal and state agencies, and was a long standing organization that has been in 
existence for more than 20 years (see Table 5.3). 
Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere Cooperative (SAMAB) 
Great Smoky Mountains National Park was established as a biosphere reserve in 
1976. SAMAB was established as an organization in 1988 to facilitate communication 
and coordination of efforts of federal and state agencies within the Southern Appalachian 
region. The organization’s membership included mainly federal agencies and state 
agencies that extended to six states in the southeastern United States: Alabama, Georgia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. This temperate region boasts 
high biodiversity and encompasses 37.4 million acres, seven national forests, and two 
national parks (Tonn et al., 2006). For over two decades, SAMAB has served as a forum 
in the Southern Appalachians for agency collaboration on a variety of issues including air 
quality, invasive species management, an annual forum, and a large scale assessment of 
the landscape.  
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• Encompassing Southern Appalachian region and extends to six 
states: Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee and Virginia  
Focus  • Conserve and sustain the use of natural ecosystems of the 
region and their genetic resources  
• Integrate conservation of natural resources with regional land 
uses  
• Demonstrate methodologies for sharing information and 
improving management skills  
• Foster public understanding of issues through education 
Membership • Federal and state agencies, universities 




To explore why LSCCOs decline, we collected three forms of data: secondary 
data, semi-structured interviews, and observations.  First, we collected secondary data in 
the form of letters, meeting minutes, administrative documents and reports, articles, etc. 
To complement the information found in the secondary data, we conducted semi-
structured interviews with a total of 41 past and present organizational members 
following Seidman's (2006) methods.  The interviewees’ involvement in SAMAB ranged 
from less than a year to over twenty years and they represented different federal, state, 
and provincial agencies and universities. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. To 
ensure accuracy and reliability, interviewees reviewed the transcription. Finally, we used 
observations following recommendations by Bailey (2007) to advance the researcher’s 
understanding of the organization and member interactions in real time and context.  
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Observations took place during several of the organizations’ face-to-face meetings, phone 
meetings, and individual interviews.  
We assigned life cycle stages based on concurrent research conducted by 
Thomsen, et. al. (see Chapter 2). We then examined and coded all data pertaining to the 
decline stage to identify the influential factors using a qualitative data analysis program 
(MaxQDA). Patterns and themes emerged from the triangulated data that represented 
influential factors (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
 
Results 
SAMAB was started in 1988 to coordinate the efforts of biosphere reserve units in 
the Southern Appalachians as part of UNESCO’s international Man and the Biosphere 
program. During its birth, SAMAB had a strong presence in the Southern Appalachians 
and was considered a model for landscape scale conservation. There was engagement by 
top-level agency directors and strong communication at the national and international 
levels led by an executive director who was able to network and obtain resources for the 
organization.  
Transitioning to the growth stage, SAMAB experienced expansion and high 
activity during its major project, the Southern Appalachian Assessment (SAA). After the 
SAA was completed, leadership transitioned to an executive director focused on 
translating the SAA data into useful information that could inform decision-making. 
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However, SAMAB’s ability to maintain and update the SAA database became 
problematic over the years. Toward the end of the maturity stage, SAMAB was faced 
with potentially its biggest challenge as the relations between the U.S. and the United 
Nations became unstable.  As a result, some vocal political groups expressed their 
skepticism and opposition to the U.S. MAB program, initiating the ongoing struggle to 
maintain SAMAB’s reputation and keep the U.S. engaged in the international MAB 
network. SAMAB’s challenges continued as agency budgets tightened and SAMAB’s 
purpose became unclear. By the early 2000s, SAMAB was struggling to maintain activity 
and its membership as the LSCCO further declined.   
SAMAB’s Decline Stage 
SAMAB’s inactivity and unclear purpose were early contributors to the 
organization’s decline. Members “weren’t quite sure what they were doing anymore” and 
SAMAB was perceived as “treading water,” “starting to run out of gas,” and “not going 
anywhere.” The costs started to outweigh the benefits for members as SAMAB was 
“spinning their wheels” and “lost its imperative importance, vitality, its sense of 
urgency.” Some questioned the benefits of involvement: 
“All of the sudden people that used to give you money and look at you as a 
valuable resource are saying; ‘what have they done for me lately?” 
An ongoing “challenge for SAMAB as a cooperative regional management 
organization has always been to identify value added activities that the participating 
members perceive as helping them to achieve their core functions.” As a consequence of 
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the group’s continuous lack of activity and direction, members admitted that “they just 
didn't want to be a part of something where nothing is produced” or “to be involved in 
something that we do not see the value or the relevance in.”  
Though some members remained supportive because of their personal history 
with the group, members who used to be SAMAB’s biggest advocates were becoming 
fatigued and frustrated: 
 “I have been very disappointed over the past couple of years…I fear for the 
longevity of the group, because I used to be one of the big cheerleaders.” 
By this time, there had been entire turnover of original members. SAMAB’s earlier 
stages had high level executives and directors participating as the agency representatives. 
In the decline stage, “a number of the agencies were sending low level staff” with more 
technical expertise in a specific area. Some members felt this occurred because “the 
purpose was no longer of interest to the executives. It no longer met their needs” or 
directors “found it unproductive or they just didn’t have time for it.” One member 
described the cascading effect of agencies sending lower-level staff: 
“I would go to those meetings to network with people at my level. I didn’t need to 
network with people two levels down. I’ve got people to do that. So, it like kind of 




The decline stage marked a decrease in organizational commitment by members. 
One member reflected that “I think it [SAMAB] evolved again because the commitment 
from the upper management had gone away. And so it was no longer a governing entity it 
was just another set of meetings. Consequently, many new members “didn’t have the 
ownership and they didn’t see the relevance.” In addition, they “don’t have that 
emotional investment in the same way.” Some described the relations of the original 
members as “a chemistry that just doesn’t happen overnight. That’s after years of aging 
to perfection.” 
Supervisors were requiring lower-level staff to attend and as a result, “you had 
fewer of the real leaders showing up and had more alternates show up and some of the 
agencies sort of dropped out.” Without the high-level directors at the table, a member 
claimed that “everything got sort of diluted to practical things that we could do at our 
own level within our comfort zones” because the “people who come to the table don’t 
have  the overall vision and responsibility of what the agencies need and don’t have clout 
or the ability to commit.” Members recalled the long time lag for decisions to be made 
because representatives would “have to go back to their boss…those aren’t very 
productive meetings.”  
In the early 2000s, agencies began reporting budget cuts, downsizing, and travel 
restrictions. Resources became increasingly restricted leading to the sequestration in 
2013. Sequestration was described as having a “chilling effect on everything,” that 
resulted in many agencies downsizing, cutting budgets, and restricting travel. 
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Consequently, members recalled it was “tougher to be a part of an outside group now” 
and there were limitations in agencies’ funding and support for SAMAB. Members 
described a lack of time to dedicate to SAMAB efforts: 
“I can’t hold up my hand and say I will spend a week doing so and so committee. 
I just don’t have the time. Just the time to go to the meetings is hurtful. And that is 
the case for most of the people that show up. There is just not enough time 
anymore.” 
Members identified “the strain on resources and time and travel budgets” and 
that “every year they [SAMAB] have less and less money and so eventually they’re going 
to come to a screeching halt…” It was a struggle for members that still valued SAMAB: 
“You were stone faced at the meetings because you knew you could not commit 
any more resources, you couldn’t commit money and you couldn't commit any 
more time. Yet you didn’t want SAMAB to go away. It was very difficult being in 
an organization that you know is slowly going away.” 
SAMAB continued to operate at low capacity, though members noted that you 
“can’t sustain an organization on chump change.” Funding was an ongoing struggle as 
“it is not very easy to bring resources to the table when the train is still just chugging 
along on the tracks. Until it derails it is tough to get people to pay attention and money 
comes with attention.” The lack of consistent funding made it difficult for long-term 
planning as one member states, “there was never anything you could really plan with and 
that was a major impediment to do things. You never knew if you were going to have 
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money.” Eventually as SAMAB continued to remain in the decline stage, instead of 
doing more with less, it was forced “to do less with less.” 
SAMAB’s resources depleted until the executive director position and his staff 
could no longer be supported. Many members described this as “a significant loss” and 
“a self-limiting factor.” Without the executive director, SAMAB “lost that public face,” 
and this loss eventually “led to a downfall” of the organization because “after you didn’t 
have a director, it became a really low level.” One member described the strong 
dependence on the executive director and the impact when SAMAB lost this position: 
“The wind comes out of an organization when all of the sudden you don’t have 
administration anymore and you have fluid leadership. All those kind of pillars 
that were holding everything up just kind of crumbled…” 
Once the executive director position dissolved, more responsibility fell on the 
voluntary chair position. Members who were used to ample funding and support from 
previous stages reported a significant decline in organizational functioning. One member 
discussed the undesirability of the chair position: “It was a lot of work for the leader… I 
think they all were glad to leave when they were leaving.” For the unpaid chair positions, 
SAMAB fell low on their priority list behind their agency job responsibilities: 
“When you hand those jobs off to people whose SAMAB is #5 on their to-do list, 
it’s not going to happen. All you are doing there, you are just keeping the train 
running. You are not thinking about expanding or what's coming or how things 
are changing, you are just maintaining is what you are doing.” 
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Over time, members reflected that “leadership has sort of floundered” and there was “a 
real leadership gap.” For example, one member illustrated the lack of motivation from 
leadership: 
“When you have a chair that is looking for reasons to stall things instead of 
reasons to push forward, you are not going to have an organization that’s going 
to hold my attention very long.” 
In tandem the loss of the executive director, there was a change in the 
management of SAMAB’s finances, data, and meeting planning as the University of 
Tennessee did not renew its contract. SAMAB transitioned to the Cradle of Forestry, a 
small non-profit organization in Asheville to take over managing the budget and 
meetings. Some compared the Cradle taking on SAMAB to “taking on an unwanted child 
of another family.” The Cradle assisted SAMAB in meeting its basic functioning needs; 
however the Cradle did not have the capacity to help SAMAB overcome the obstacles the 
group was faced with during this stage. 
Coinciding with the decline of SAMAB was the deterioration of the U.S. MAB 
program. The skepticism and threats that emerged in the maturity stage continued to 
heighten during the decline stage leading to the “disbanding for the national committee 
for MAB.” The negative image associated with MAB “was a bit of baggage” and caused 
SAMAB to create a separation from the broader network:  
“The cooperative over the years has really distanced itself from that program. 
They do not dance with the one who brought you.” 
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Though MAB was the catalyst for the SAMAB’s creation, decades later the SAMAB 
partners were more concerned about continuing the relationship with each other than the 
relationship with the MAB network: 
“We do not care if we are MAB; we just want to be cooperators. We really 
believe that that needs to be done. We will do whatever, let’s do what it takes. If 
that means disassociating ourselves with that program then we will disassociate 
from that program and move forward.”  
To counteract the negative image of SAMAB, members recognized that for the 
organization “to be meaningful and survive, we have to have public support” and 
“positive visibility.” Yet, most members “don't think the public knows anything about 
SAMAB.” In this stage, SAMAB had “maintained a very low profile,” but a member 
eloquently stated, “One of the best things an agency can do is make sure the public 
knows what they are doing. And number two, why is it valuable.” 
 The stagnant and eventual declining state of SAMAB was attributed to the 
absence of adaptation and innovation that began in the maturity stage. Members recalled 
hanging on to SAMAB’s earlier reputation as it was “caught in a time warp of the early 
90s… it never could go back to its days of glory.” The organization was described as “a 
rising star that has slowly faded over time. Its initial assessment of the Appalachian was 
its crown and all it did from then on was just polish the crown.” The highs and lows of 
SAMAB’s history were identified as: 
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“a great case study of what an organization can reasonably accomplish at the 
landscape scale. But I also think it is a good case study for what happens to an 
organization after severe neglect.” 
As described by a member, “That’s why they died or nearly died. They didn’t adapt and 
they did not come up with a solution or a plan of action.” Instead of taking an active 
approach to anticipate and respond to change, SAMAB was “operating with sort of these 
blinders on like it was just going to change itself.” Similarly, another member describes 
SAMAB as being “on life support just in hopes that something will come along.” As a 
result, “they haven’t adapted so much to the changing world.”  
In addition to lack of adaptation, members noted limited support for new ideas. 
They had a “standard way of doing things,” “didn’t want to shake things up that much,” 
and “didn’t want anything to go bump in the night.”  One member reflected on the 
absence of “additional information and thoughts and processes and ideas coming in, 
that’s when you stagnate and that’s probably where we’ve been the past couple years.” 
Instead of admitting to the downfalls of the group, the usual “reaction would be 
silence…avoided it.” For example, when the most recent annual forum was canceled, it 
was described as “the death blow…there’s nothing really SAMAB is involved in or doing 
other than being just an entity.” 
As SAMAB’s capacities decreased, it was now operating in a competitive 
landscape as other organizations continued to emerge. With limited resources and staff, 
agencies “can’t do every partnership that’s out there” and they were forced to choose 
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which collaborative efforts to focus participation and contributions. One member 
described his agency’s situation:  
“There are all these organizations out there wanting to do things and coordinate 
and when you look at the output and the advantages of SAMAB, they weren’t as 
strong and maybe they weren’t as strong as they once were.” 
By the decline stage, “SAMAB has been overrun by other groups and organizations 
doing more and better of the same kind of things.” For example, SAMAB struggled to 
compete with the Landscape Conservation Cooperatives, a network of LSCCOs driven by 
the U.S. Fish &Wildlife Service: 
“The Landscape Conservation Cooperatives, they are just now starting to come 
into their own, I think, you’re seeing from a federal standpoint a lot of the 
agencies are starting to say ok well there’s a lot of resources and funding that’s 
going into these Landscape Conservation Cooperatives but that’s where we’re 
going to focus our time and energy.”  
The many challenges SAMAB faced in the decline stage led the group to a critical 
point of either ending or reviving the organization. Members described this time as “this 
black cloud just hovering over us.” Despite recognition that SAMAB “probably should 
have thrown in the towel a few years ago,” the emotional connection some members had 
with the group was compared to trying to “bury your uncle.”  The continued involvement 
in the group was compared to “a habit.  You don’t want to hurt people.  It is easier to 
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continue doing.  It is very similar to relationship.” SAMAB was described as being “in a 
real state of flux” and had reached a critical turning point: 
“We are at the bottom of the curve…I mean you know they say that the dawn is 
the hopefully beyond the storm but it's hard to see it quite yet. We are right smack 
at the bottom.” 
There were mixed sentiments of SAMAB’s final destination as some accepted 
“maybe it’s time for SAMAB to get cut off.” Similarly, a member stated “Everything has 
a lifetime, and it may be that this is the end of the SAMAB lifetime, but it won’t be the end 
of what it contributed.” Meanwhile, others felt the group should continue to try and 
revive the organization:  
“Evaluate how we’re doing. Make change…Maybe sunset it…Start over again 
with a different set of people with the skill sets and so forth to tackle that 
particular problem.” 
After debating SAMAB’s future, members decided to try and revive the organization. 
Though SAMAB only recently made steps towards its revival, the following section 
briefly describes the actions during this critical turning point.  
 
Beginning of SAMAB’s Revival Stage 
Some drastic changes were needed for SAMAB’s revival. The group realized they 
had to reinvent themselves with a clear and relevant mission that set them apart from 
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other groups. SAMAB organized a retreat and hired a trained facilitator to guide a 
discussion on the organization’s future direction. A revitalization team was created and a 
new chair was selected who has created a supportive atmosphere for new ideas and 
generated excitement in the group.  
Though SAMAB had distanced itself from association with the MAB program, 
there was recently an attempt to reengage the U.S. MAB program with the broader 
international network. In response, SAMAB has made efforts to reconnect with its 
biosphere reserve units. The U.S. MAB program is in the midst of UNESCO’s review 
and the fate of the program is still to be determined. Beyond reengaging with the MAB 
network, SAMAB has partnered with other groups in the region, like the Landscape 
Conservation Cooperatives, to coordinate projects and conferences. Since SAMAB has 
only recently transitioned to the revival stage, it is unknown whether their actions will be 





Lack of Direction and Action 
SAMAB’s ongoing identity crisis and continuous search for a new project 
contributed to its decline.  Members cited the loss of SAMAB’s purpose and legitimacy 
which have been found as underlying factors to organizational decline (Levine, 1978; 
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Whetten, 1980b). Many SAMAB members expressed frustration with the group’s 
inactivity and felt SAMAB was spinning its wheels instead of making meaningful 
contributions to transboundary ecosystem management. Without a sense of purpose, 
SAMAB’s agencies and their representatives began to question their commitment to the 
organization.    
Public organizations need to remain relevant, highly-valued, and maintain a clear, 
significant purpose to be successful (Gilbert, 2014). Before SAMAB could develop a new 
vision for the future, the group had to face the challenges and failures of its past. With the 
guidance of a trained facilitator at the retreat, SAMAB was able to efficiently develop 
future goals. Facilitators have been found to be extremely influential in conflict 
resolution and fostering a supportive atmosphere for strategic planning (Cannon & 
Edmondson, 2005; Gray, 1989; Margerum, 2002a; Mullner, Hubert, & Wesche, 2001; 
Murdock, Wiessner, & Sexton, 2005; Powell, 2010; Susskind, van der Wansem, & 
Ciccareli, 2003). This study’s findings support that a facilitator may be especially 
pertinent to LSCCOs because of the increased complexity when operating at the 
landscape-scale (Alexander et al., 1998; Margerum, 2011).   
Decreased Organizational Commitment  
Though there had been turnover of most of the original members by the maturity 
stage, long-time members remained committed because of their emotional connections 
with other members. This is often referred to as affective or attitudinal organizational 
commitment (AOC) (Meyer et al., 2002; Mowday et al., 1982; Riketta, 2002). In the 
214 
 
decline stage, members’ AOC weakened and individuals started to weigh the costs 
against the benefits for SAMAB membership. For example, these members still valued 
visiting their friends at meetings, but they struggled to justify their involvement when 
SAMAB was no longer providing clear benefits to the individual or their agency.  
In SAMAB’s earlier stages, membership in the group was viewed as prestigious 
and was dominated by high-level directors. Over time, supervisors delegated the SAMAB 
responsibility to lower-level individuals. Many new representatives lacked any AOC to 
SAMAB because their involvement was often delegated by their supervisor. This 
perception of obligation or mandatory participation is referred to as normative 
commitment and does not result in the same high performance as AOC (Meyer et al., 
2002). Mandatory versus voluntary participation resulted in reduced buy-in and 
emotional connection to the group. These findings support that individuals delegated to 
attend meetings do not have personal buy-in to the collaborative process and can decrease 
their level of engagement (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Liedtka, Whitten, & Sorrells-Jones, 
1998; Margerum, 2011).  
Declining Resources  
There were many external factors influencing SAMAB’s decline stage including 
the declining economy and sequestration. During this period of time, agencies 
experienced downsizing, travel freezes, and budget cuts (Gilbert, 2014). Since SAMAB 
was largely dependent on agencies’ contributions, the tightened agency budgets left 
SAMAB fighting to maintain basic organizational needs. In addition, agencies were 
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unable to provide their representatives with adequate support and SAMAB members felt 
agencies were being “strangled.” Consequently, members struggled to attend meetings 
and dedicate any time to efforts outside their direct agency job requirements. These 
findings support that members’ focus on personal versus group goals during 
organizational decline (Lester et al., 2003). 
Though LSCCOs have become popular over the past decade, there has not been 
adequate and consistent resources for representatives to effectively participate in these 
initiatives (Carr et al., 1998; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Yaffee & Wondolleck, 2003a). In 
addition, the findings indicate that LSCCOs are not perceived as a necessity. Therefore, 
LSCCOs are one of the first items cut from budgets. Appearing as a luxury seems to be a 
common issue for other organizations involving mainly federal and state agencies 
(Gilbert, 2014). This may be a result of LSCCOs functioning as an umbrella organization 
and it falling in priority behind members’ individual and agency needs.  
Lack of Leadership 
With declining resources and the poor economic climate, SAMAB was unable to 
maintain the executive director position. SAMAB’s long history and reliance on the 
executive director left a monumental loss in organizational leadership.  With the 
executive director position diminished, more responsibility and a larger workload was 
placed on the voluntary chair position.  However, the voluntary chair was limited in their 
time and leadership capacity because their agency job responsibilities took priority. As a 
result, the chair position was not actively sought by members. Though chairs made 
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attempts to sustain SAMAB, members recalled limited leadership and absenteeism 
further debilitating the organization. 
Without an executive director’s supporting SAMAB’s long-term future, the chairs 
were struggling to keep SAMAB afloat. During organizational decline, leadership often 
focuses on day-to-day survival and less on the long-term sustainability of the 
organization (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Miller & Friesen, 1984). SAMAB’s long 
decline stage is reflective of the leadership changes and limitations that inhibited the 
organization’s adaptive ability. Members indicated the need for a motivating and 
visionary leader who could bring SAMAB back to fruition. These same conceptual skills 
of a leader were found useful in the early stages of organizational development indicating 
the need for a big-picture thinker. SAMAB’s new chair has demonstrated his ability to 
reduce members’ anxieties to change and guide the action steps of the revitalization team. 
However, the chair only serves for a year so SAMAB’s revival stage will be impacted by 
the leadership capacity of several chairs. 
Negative Image  
SAMAB’s reputation as a role model in transboundary ecosystem management 
shifted to a negative image from its association with UNESCO’s MAB program. What 
was initially perceived as insignificant and outlandish allegations eventually led to the 
disbandment of the U.S. MAB program. SAMAB’s close association with the MAB 
program instilled fear that the negative image would be transferred to the participating 
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agencies.  Consequently, SAMAB began distancing itself from the MAB program to 
avoid controversy. 
A group’s external image can influence how strongly individuals associate 
themselves with the organization (Dukerich, Golden, & Shortell, 2002). The influence of 
SAMAB’s external image became evident when some agencies started to disengage or 
reduce participation. Firms or organizations that have filed for bankruptcy have also been 
impacted by their negative image. Similar to SAMAB, members disengaged, reduced the 
quality of their participation, or even perpetuated rumors (Sutton & Callahan, 1987). 
Though SAMAB’s tainted image may not seem as extreme as a firm filing for 
bankruptcy, SAMAB experienced similar reactions from participating agencies 
illustrating the importance of a positive image.  
Some members felt that if SAMAB spent more time establishing a strong public 
and political image, the group would have been able to survive these allegations. 
Increasing public and political awareness of the organization’s mission and efforts has 
been found as a tactic to reduce decline (Levine, 1978). Yet, it can become increasingly 
difficult for organizations operating at the landscape-scale to effectively communicate 
with the public (Abel & Stephan, 2000; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005; Margerum & Whitall, 
2004;  Margerum, 2011; Stern & Predmore, 2011). Similarly, SAMAB has struggled to 
communicate, promote awareness, and generate support from the public throughout its 
lifetime. Incorporating technology and social media to target specific groups of diverse 
audiences has been found to contribute to an organization’s image (Gilbert, 2014) and 
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can hopefully help SAMAB regain its reputation. In the future, there may be an increased 
reliance on webinars, You Tube videos, social media, and online forums to facilitate 
LSCCO information sharing and communication (Gilbert, 2014; Market Connections, 
2013).   
Limited Adaptation and Innovation 
SAMAB’s lack of adaptation and innovation worsened during its decline stage. 
Members cited the group’s inability to admit failures, learn from mistakes, and 
implement adaptive strategies. As organizations evolve over time and are forced to 
respond to change and failure, this study illustrates the importance of discussing 
challenges to create an environment supportive of innovation and experimentation that 
contributes to organization’s long-term survival (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005; Frost et 
al., 2006; Santora & Sarros, 2008; Van den Bossche, Segers, & Kirschner, 2006). 
The inability for SAMAB’s members to face their declining state may be 
attributed to the psychological challenge of admitting failure (Cannon & Edmondson, 
2005). SAMAB’s risk-averseness is commonly associated with government agencies 
(Gilbert, 2014).  In addition, many members already felt overburdened limiting their time 
and energy. The additional workload needed to implement changes for revival is a 
common constraint for declining organizations (King & Anderson, 2002). Without 
adaptation and innovation, SAMAB was unable to actively respond to change and 





In its earlier stages, SAMAB fulfilled a unique role for interagency collaboration 
and transboundary ecosystem management in the Southern Appalachians. However, as 
more landscape-scale initiatives emerged, SAMAB was outcompeted for its niche. Most 
agencies had to choose which groups to allocate their membership and resources. Niche 
overlap theory is based on the notion that the more organizations overlap in niches within 
the same context, the greater competition for the same resources and organizational 
survival (Baum & Singh, 1994; Hannan et al., 2003; Sohn, 2002). Duplication of efforts 
can result in displacement of some organizations whose niche has been replaced.  
Unfortunately, SAMAB’s declining state resulted in many agencies shifting their 
resources and membership to other groups like the Landscape Conservation Cooperatives 
(LCCs).  
During a state of decline, organizations are more vulnerable to being outcompeted 
by other groups operating within their external environment (Lester et al., 2003; Miller & 
Friesen, 1984).  The excitement and energy of the LCCs was similar to SAMAB’s earlier 
stages. Many members felt that SAMAB was no longer meeting their individual and 
agency’s needs. As organizations age, their capabilities become less aligned with needs 
of their external environment (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). The LCCs and other groups 
were providing greater alignment; therefore SAMAB struggled to remain competitive for 
its niche. As new organizations emerge and others disappear, LSCCOs should regularly 
assess where they stand compared to other groups within the landscape and continually 
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reach out and communicate to new partners (Gilbert, 2014). Cooperating with other 
groups can contribute to a more legitimized and well-known status (Gnyawali, 2001) 
which can be particularly important for LSCCOs in their revival stage that are trying to 




LSCCOs have become increasingly popular over the past few decades and as they 
continue to evolve, it is necessary to understand the factors contributing to their decline. 
SAMAB illustrates the downfall and potential revitalization of a LSCCO. Though many 
of the internal and external factors influencing SAMAB’s decline were common to other 
organizations, some factors may have greater impacts on LSCCOs. By operating as an 
umbrella organization with voluntary membership, LSCCOs fall lower in members’ 
priorities behind their agencies’ fundamental needs. Without providing clear 
demonstrable benefits to individuals and their agencies, LSCCOs struggle to retain 
committed resources and membership. In addition, this study suggests that LSCCOs are 
more susceptible to external changes occurring within the members’ respective agencies 
and the landscape. While political and economic challenges can impact any organization, 
LSCCOs appear particularly vulnerable because of their large spatial scale and their 
involvement of federal and state agencies.  
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SAMAB’s continuous decline led to a critical discussion of whether to disband 
the organization. After much deliberation, SAMAB decided to take control of its future 
by making some necessary changes towards its revival. Though the organization only 
recently has entered its revival stage, this research provides lessons for other LSCCOs to 
anticipate the factors contributing to decline and recommendations for how LSCCOs can 
transition to the revival stage (see Table 5.4). Further longitudinal research on SAMAB 
can offer insight to the factors that contribute to a LSCCO’s successful revival. Instead of 
ignoring and avoiding organizational failure, researchers and practitioners should treat 
times of decline as opportunities for learning, adaptation, and innovation. The limited 
research on LSCCO’s decline and revival stages warrant future research to build on this 
case’s findings and further this field of study. 
Table 5.4 The factors contributing to an LSCCO’s decline stage and recommendations 
for LSCCOs transitioning from the decline stage to the revival stage. 
Factors Contributing to LSCCO’s 
Decline Stage 
Recommendations for LSCCO’s Transitioning 
from Decline to Revival Stages 
 
 Lack of Direction and Action: The group was 
constantly searching for a new project without 
any sense of direction or purpose. 
 
 Decreased Organizational Commitment: 
Long-term members began to weight the costs 
and benefits of participation and new 
representatives were being delegated their 
involvement in SAMAB.  
 
 Declining Resources: Agencies’ downsizing, 
freezing travel, and cutting budgets resulted in 
 
 Have a Facilitated Revival Retreat: Invite 
past and present members to a retreat. Hire a 
trained facilitator to guide discussions and 
create a supportive atmosphere for members 
to share ideas and perspectives.   
 
 Learn from Failures to Develop a New 
Vision: Openly discuss failures the LSCCO 
has experienced in its history. Learn from 
these challenges to creatively and 
innovatively think of the new vision for the 
LSCCO’s future and action steps to achieve 
these new goals.  
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reduced funding for SAMAB and limited 
capacity for members to actively participate.  
 
 Lack of Leadership: Unable to maintain the 
executive director position, there was increased 
workload and responsibility for the voluntary 
chair positon.  
 
 Negative Image: SAMAB’s reputation as a 
role model shifted to a negative image from its 
association with UNESCO’s MAB program 
resulting in agencies questioning their 
involvement with the group.  
 
 Limited Adaptation and Innovation: The 
group did not implement adaptive strategies to 
changes or support new ideas and activities.   
 
 Competition: SAMAB no longer fulfilled a 
unique niche and was outcompeted by other 
groups in the landscape for agencies’ 
membership and resources.  
 
 
 Motivating and Visionary Leadership: 
Recruit a visionary and charismatic leader 
who encompasses the conceptual skills for 
long-term planning and the ability to motivate 
other members to reengage with the group 
and bring the LSCCO back to fruition.  
 
 Promote New Image: Incorporate 
technology, social media, and other 
innovative communication strategies to 
promote the LSCCO’s new image and vision. 
Reengage members with the LSCCO through 
promoting the benefits of participation. 
 
 Partner with External Groups: Reach out to 
other groups to cooperate on projects and 
complement each other’s goals which can 
help reestablish the LSCCO as a legitimate 






SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation’s research was intended to help improve our understanding of 
landscape-scale collaborative conservation organizations (LSCCOs) by comparing two 
case studies of longstanding LSCCOs: the Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere 
Cooperative (SAMAB) and the Crown Managers Partnership (CMP).  Although there are 
a variety of LSCCOs, SAMAB and CMP shared similar memberships of mainly federal, 
state, and provincial agencies and both groups had broad management missions 
addressing multiple ecological issues. Despite their similarities, SAMAB and CMP 
differed in other LSCCO characteristics. While both LSCCOs transcended political 
boundaries, CMP’s boundaries crossed international borders. An additional difference 
between the LSCCOs was SAMAB’s association with UNESCO’s international Man and 
the Biosphere network, while CMP operated as an individual entity (although part of the 
broader Y2Y effort).  
To investigate SAMAB and CMP, I conducted an organizational life cycle 
analysis, which included using secondary data collection, semi-structured interviews with 
past and present members, and observations taken during meetings.  The similarities and 
differences between SAMAB and CMP offered an opportunity to explore how these 
LSCCOs evolved over time and the internal and external factors that influenced success 
during their different stages. The previous chapters described SAMAB and CMP’s life 
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cycle stages and identified the significant types of events and the factors influencing the 
LSCCOs in each stage.  
This chapter synthesizes this data and identifies overall themes that emerged from 
the two case studies. Though there were numerous factors identified during each 
organizational stage, the themes discussed in this synthesis were influential throughout 
both LSCCOs’ life cycles. The following synthesis provides insight on the most critical 





Evolving Leadership- Which structure and style for which conditions? 
Leadership has been well documented as an influential aspect of organizational 
success (Aas, Ladkin, & Fletcher, 2005; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Gunton & Day, 2003; 
Innes & Booher, 2007; Powell, 2010). Therefore, it is no surprise that leadership was a 
reoccurring theme throughout SAMAB and CMP’s life cycles. However, these LSCCOs’ 
leadership styles and focus were vastly different and consequently had distinct impacts on 
each LSCCO’s life cycle. SAMAB’s leadership was centralized in an executive director. 
In contrast, CMP applied a distributive leadership structure that promoted sharing 
responsibilities and encouraged multiple leaders depending on individuals’ strengths and 
the LSCCO’s needs.  
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SAMAB and CMP’s leadership structures influenced each LSCCO’s life cycle 
differently when faced with changes and challenges. SAMAB’s full-time executive 
director focused exclusively on SAMAB which supported the LSCCO’s rapid start and 
growth.  However, this dependence on the executive director became problematic in later 
stages when the individual did not have the appropriate skills to address issues 
adequately. Eventually when the position could no longer be financially supported, 
SAMAB was increasingly vulnerable to decline as SAMAB members struggled with the 
heavier workload and leadership responsibilities inhibiting the LSCCO’s capacity to 
maintain activity.   
In contrast, CMP’s distributive leadership structure did not vary throughout the 
life cycle and invested in all of their members for leadership versus a single executive 
director. Without an official director that could dedicate their full time to CMP, the 
LSCCO took longer getting established and growing. However, members were able to 
build a strong foundation that capitalized on individuals’ strengths promoting them to 
take initiative on various efforts which is commonly associated with distributive 
leadership (Imperial et al. forthcoming; Woods, Bennett, Harvey, & Wise, 2004). This 
structure allowed the LSSCO a collective and active response to challenges by efficiently 
utilizing members’ capabilities and avoiding overburden on an individual leader. 
In addition to differences in structure, leadership focus changed between the 
LSCCOs’ different life cycle stages. SAMAB’s centralized leadership structure required 
careful selection of an executive director to meet the LSCCO’s changing needs, however 
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recruiting for specific strengths in one stage left SAMAB vulnerable to the executive 
director’s weaknesses in another stage as the LSCCO evolved. For example, the first 
executive director was skilled at fundraising and networking which helped SAMAB 
promote its image and secure support, but he lacked the technical capabilities needed for 
data management for the SAA. In response, SAMAB later recruited the executive 
director for his technical and scientific background, though members recognized that 
SAMAB struggled to maintain the level of funding and awareness.  
Similar to SAMAB, CMP leadership changed focus depending on the needs 
during the life cycle stage. For example, members with visionary and conceptual skills 
were critical to CMP’s birth and growth stages. Meanwhile, members who had more 
technical skills for specific issues or projects came to the forefront during the maturity 
stage. Unlike SAMAB, CMP’s leadership skills were pooled in its diverse members 
versus a single individual. This allowed CMP to have a larger and more diverse skillset 
for different leadership purposes and therefore did not have the drastic changes in 
leadership that SAMAB experienced.   
SAMAB and CMP highlight different leadership types existing within LSSCOs, 
yet the question remains which type is better for LSCCOs? Depending on the type of 
LSCCO and their life cycle stage, different leadership structures and focus may be more 
appropriate. For example, distributive leadership may only be successful if there is a 
shared vision and trust among members (Woods et al., 2004). SAMAB struggled with its 
shared vision at points in its life cycle, therefore distributive leadership may not have 
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been effective for the LSCCO. Similarly, a full-time executive director skilled at 
networking and fundraising may be needed in the birth or decline stages when there was 
more uncertainty among members.  
While different skills and focus are more appropriate during certain stages, 
CMP’s fluid leadership supported a greater resilience to change and challenges than 
SAMAB’s centralized leadership. To illustrate the differences, I compared the LSCCOs’ 
leadership structures to trains (i.e. the organization) directed by conductors (i.e. LSCCO 
leaders) traveling with passengers (i.e. LSCCO members). Many changes and challenges 
can occur including the passengers’ needs, the train’s destination, or an event occurring 
along the tracks. When SAMAB was faced with one of these changes, it relied on its 
single conductor’s skills. If the conductor could not adequately address the issue, 
SAMAB had to stop its train, exit the passengers, and recruit a new conductor.  
In contrast, when CMP experienced changes, a range of interchangeable 
conductors were on board who could run the train depending on the shifting needs and 
challenges. CMP’s train may have taken longer to leave the station because it needed to 
ensure that a diverse group of potential conductors was aboard. However, CMP’s train 
was able to maintain its speed and functioning by creating fluid conductor transitions and 
long-term resiliency to internal and external changes. 
Like other organizations, LSCCO leadership is not a one-size-fits-all. This 
research illustrates that strengths of one leadership type may prove a weakness in a 
different organizational stage or context. Since organizations do not remain in a static 
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state, leadership structures can evolve throughout an organization’s life cycle and 
LSCCOs should continuously assess the group’s strengths, weaknesses, and needs to 
ensure the appropriate leadership structure is employed. SAMAB and CMP offered some 
initial descriptions and comparisons of structures that can guide other LSCCOs in 
designing and adapting their leadership structure depending on their life cycle stage and 
the needs of the group. While it is evident that both structures have strengths and 
weaknesses, future studies should further explore leadership models in other types of 
LSCCOs and the specific conditions that support of inhibit each type of leadership.  
 
Clear Purpose and Direction- why are we here and where are we going?  
Defining mission and purpose is often associated with an organization’s birth 
stage (Dodge, Fullerton, & Robbins, 1994; Iriberri & Leroy, 2009; Miller & Friesen, 
1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). Yet, this study highlights the importance and challenges 
of maintaining a clear focus and organizational niche throughout a life cycle. Initially, 
SAMAB and CMP offered a unique venue for interagency collaboration. In addition, 
both organizations undertook large scale ecological assessments that provided a 
legitimate purpose and focal point for the LSCCOs in their growth stage. So how did two 
LSCCOs that had similar goals and clear purpose in their early stages result in different 
levels of purpose and utility in later stages? 
One reason may be attributed to their different planning processes. SAMAB’s 
initial vision was externally-driven from the Man and Biosphere program and the SAA 
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idea was generated by the U.S. Forest Service’s need for a large-scale assessment.  As a 
result of these externally-driven processes and resources, SAMAB was able to quickly 
start and complete the SAA data collection within several years. Though the SAA 
generated recognition for SAMAB, the lack of long-term planning led to numerous issues 
regarding SAA data management. Eventually, SAMAB’s purpose became unclear and 
members began to question the LSCCO’s legitimacy. 
In contrast, CMP incorporated an internally-driven planning process where CMP 
representatives invested ample time to define goals and develop the EHP. Though the 
CMP’s planning process was lengthy, members had a strong collective investment in the 
EHP, which was designed to maximize utility for the respective agencies. Unlike 
SAMAB, CMP continuously revisited their strategic plan, revised where needed, and 
ensured the group maintained pursuit of their goals. This process ensured that members 
were consistently aware of the LSCCO’s history, present state, and future directions.  
Despite the differences between SAMAB and CMP, a shared vision of clear goals 
and direction is clearly needed for success in any stage (Alexander, Comfort, & Weiner, 
1998; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, Jacobson, & Allen, 
2001; Gray, 1989). This study offers evidence that internally-driven processes may be 
more adept at incorporating long-term strategic planning and can strengthen members’ 
commitment, a project’s utility, and the LSSCO’s niche. The large spatial scale and long 
temporal scale that LSCCOs operate appears to create additional challenges. While it 
may be easier for individuals and organizations to think short-term, long-term strategic 
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planning is critical for an organization to remain relevant and adaptable in a constantly 
changing world (Gilbert, 2014). Internally-driven planning in the early stages and 
continuously revisiting the goals in later stages can contribute to LSCCOs maintaining 
their purpose and legitimacy. Future research should explore the specific planning 
strategies necessary for developing long-term goals in the early stages, maintaining this 
shared vision in later stages, and adapting this vision to internal and external changes.  
 
Selective Membership and Turnover Planning- Who are the right people, how do we get 
them to the table, and what happens when they leave? 
There has been a large amount of literature illustrating the importance of 
representative membership and inclusivity (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Conley & Moote, 
2003; Gray, 1989; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). While recruiting agencies as members 
was an important phase of membership selection, this study highlighted the significance 
of two additional membership issues. Though these LSCCOs operated as an organization 
of organizations, SAMAB and CMP members emphasized that LSCCO success is largely 
dependent on the individual members. Thus, the second phase of representative selection 
may be more critical than agency recruitment. In addition, SAMAB and CMP 
demonstrated the importance of a third phase of membership selection for recruiting 
replacement representative when member turnover occurred in later stages.  
So what do these LSCCOs consider the right individual during second and third 
phase membership selection?  SAMAB and CMP members both emphasized the need for 
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a passionate and dedicated individual skilled at working with others. Some of these skills 
have been identified in the literature such as the ability to work cooperatively (Foster-
Fishman et al., 2001) and willingness and motivation to participate in the group (Powell, 
Cuschnir, & Peiris, 2009).  Though SAMAB and CMP members desired similar criteria, 
they differed in other aspects. For example, SAMAB and CMP recruited members from 
different levels in their respective agencies. SAMAB originally targeted top agency 
directors versus CMP purposely selected more mid-level individuals which offered 
different pros and cons. In these early stages, SAMAB’s top-level representatives were 
able to quickly make decisions and allocate necessary resources from their agencies. 
CMP’s mid-level members had more time to dedicate for the LSCCO; however the 
individuals would usually have to rely on their directors or supervisors to make any 
critical decisions. Despite differences in the level of representatives in their agencies, 
both LSCCOs indicated that the process should be consistent, transparent, and requires an 
investment of time and planning.  
In addition to selectively recruiting representatives, a third phase of member 
selection occurred in later stages. As the LSSCOs matured, they both experienced a large 
turnover of original members; however the differences between SAMAB and CMP’s 
turnover planning resulted in diverse impacts. In the CMP’s growth stage, members 
anticipated future turnover and consequently started recruiting and seeking replacements. 
Additionally, the CMP had an orientation for new members so turnover had minimal 
impact on the group. In contrast, SAMAB did not plan for turnover or actively recruit or 
orient new members. As a result, when top level directors left, they were replaced by 
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lower level representatives who often did not have an understanding or appreciation for 
SAMAB’s history and purpose. Eventually, representatives were being delegated to 
participate in SAMAB by their supervisors that contributed to reduced buy-in and 
involvement during SAMAB’s decline.  
While membership has been identified as important to organizational success, this 
study emphasized that LSCCOs need a three-phased recruitment process throughout their 
life cycle. By establishing these processes in the LSCCO’s birth stages, a LSSCO could 
ensure recruitment of the “right” representatives which appear to share distinct qualities 
despite which level they work within their agency.  Though member turnover cannot 
always be anticipated, having processes in place could increase the resilience during 
membership changes and prevent disruption to the LSCCO’s progress as demonstrated by 
CMP. Future research should compare LSCCOs with differing membership and assess 
the effectiveness of the three-phased strategic recruitment and replacement processes to 
further explore the unique membership needs of LSCCOs.   
 
Adequate and Consistent Support- What support is needed and what constrains it?  
SAMAB and CMP needed support for their basic functioning as well as support 
for the individual representatives’ involvement. Political and high-level organizational 
support came in many forms such as funding, time, travel, resources, etc. and previous 
studies found this support can influence an organization’s ability to function and sustain 
itself (Gilbert, 2014; Gray, 1989; Leach & Pelkey, 2001; Uitto & Duda, 2002; Yaffee & 
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Wondolleck, 2003a). Similar to other studies, representatives varied in their available 
time, skills, and financial resources which influenced their level of participation (Amy, 
1983; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Berkes, 2004; Kittinger, Dowling, Purves, Milne, & Olsson, 
2011; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Yaffee & Wondolleck, 2003b). During SAMAB and 
CMP’s early stages, a lot of excitement and support was generated from agencies and 
political sectors. Agencies often had multiple representatives at meetings and consistent, 
adequate funding was dedicated to the LSCCOs in agencies’ annual budgets.  
However, retaining high agency support proved challenging in subsequent stages. 
During the economic decline and sequestration, agencies experienced severe furloughs, 
downsizing, travel freezes, and budget cuts making it extremely difficult for agencies to 
contribute resources and actively participate in SAMAB and CMP. In addition to 
economic changes, SAMAB and CMP both experienced reduced political support. For 
CMP, British Columbia’s (BC) political reorganizations led to changing priorities that 
eventually shifted support from the CMP to the Landscape Conservation Cooperatives 
(LCCs). Meanwhile, SAMAB experienced reduced political support when the U.S.’s 
relations with the United Nations weakened and some vocal groups started a campaign 
against the U.S. MAB program. This negative publicity contributed to the decline the 
U.S. MAB program impacting SAMAB as its role model program.  
As demonstrated in these cases, when political or administrative changes occur, 
support can easily shift towards or away LSCCO efforts inhibiting the ability for 
organization’s to implement long-term planning (Gilbert, 2014; Powell et al., 2009). 
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Though external economic and political changes are difficult to predict, LSCCOs need 
the capacity to overcome obstacles and sustain adequate support. For example, the CMP 
responded to the economic decline by diversifying its funding sources and seeking 
foundations and other groups for support which decreased their vulnerability when 
agencies’ budgets decline. In addition, when BC shifted membership from CMP to the 
LCCs, the CMP actively responded by building relations with the LCCs and 
consequently was able to maintain communication with BC and made continuous efforts 
to reengage support from the province.   
While CMP’s active responses helped to maintain support for the LSCCO, 
representatives still experienced constraints for their individual involvement which has 
been supported in previous studies (Carr, Selin, & Schuett, 1998; Yaffee & Wondolleck, 
2003a). Similar to SAMAB, CMP members’ struggled to get permission and funding for 
out-of-state travel and LSCCO involvement was considered an additional workload of 
their overburdened jobs often without recognition in performance reviews. Additionally, 
LSCCO support was frequently cut during budget declines making it difficult for 
members to maintain involvement or support from year-to-year.   
LSCCOs, like CMP, are implementing strategies to overcome economic and 
political challenges, yet there is still lack of adequate and consistent support for many 
individual representatives. While there is an increase in LSCCO-type initiatives and 
committed agency involvement at the national level, this study illustrated the ongoing 
struggle for agency representatives to effectively participate in LSCCOs.  Agencies’ 
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mindsets are gradually changing, but it appears LSCCOs are still perceived as a luxury 
versus necessity. Until support trickles down to the representatives’ levels, LSCCOs will 
continue to experience constraints versus sustained support from agencies. Future 
research should identify the current policies and protocol within agencies that inhibit or 




It is inevitable that organizations are faced with internal and external changes. 
This study emphasized that an organization’s proactive strategies and active responses to 
change was a critical component to its resiliency (Frost, Campbell, Medina, & Usongo, 
2006; Gilbert, 2014; Gunton & Day, 2003; Margerum & Whitall, 2004; Powell, 2010; 
Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).  SAMAB and CMP offer two LSSCOs’ diverse responses 
to change and the implications of these responses to their current life cycle stages. 
SAMAB members continuously cited low levels of adaptation and innovation, which is a 
common finding for many agencies fear change, instead of seeing it as opportunity 
(Gilbert, 2014). In contrast, CMP members frequently discussed challenges and 
anticipated changes, which has been found to support experimentation, risk taking, and 
innovation (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005; Frost et al., 2006; Gilbert, 2014; Van den 
Bossche, Segers, & Kirschner, 2006). As a result, CMP has maintained activity and 
success in its maturity stage, while SAMAB experienced a long period of decline. 
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SAMAB and CMP life cycles offer insightful lessons for similar LSCCOs to 
strengthen their adaptive capacity and resiliency throughout their life cycle. While some 
strategies and factors were specific to the life cycle stage, others appeared critical to a 
LSCCO’s overall adaptive capacity such as maintaining flexible leadership that 
encompasses specific skills, internally developing and revisiting a shared vision and long-
term strategic plan, strategically recruiting and maintaining membership, and securing 
diverse sources and types of long-term support. This research illuminates some of the 
critical types of change and challenges facing two LSCCOs and provides guidance for 
how similar types of LSCCOs can prepare and respond to these changes by focusing on 




LSCCOs have grown in popularity over recent decades and more LSCCOs will 
likely emerge as conservation organizations and agencies manage at larger spatial scales 
that extend across political and institutional boundaries. Despite the large amount of 
resources directed toward LSCCOs, there has been limited research on the life cycles of 
these unique organizations and the factors influencing their success and transformation 
over time. To address these challenges and gaps in the literature, this dissertation 
compared SAMAB and CMP to explore their life cycles and the influential internal and 
external factors contributing or inhibiting their success throughout their different stages.  
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The theoretical and methodological implications of this research study extend to 
organizational, life cycle, and collaborative bodies of literature about how these types of 
LSCCOs are changing over time and offers strategies for maintaining their vitality. This 
dissertation contributed to the identification of variables influencing LSCCOs that can 
inform future quantitative research. As both SAMAB and CMP continue their efforts in 
transboundary ecosystem management, additional lessons may emerge about what types 
of changes and factors influence the success and functioning of landscape-scale 
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